Scientific realism and quantum theory: on the status of the ‘unobservables’

ABSTRACT

Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical relation between theoretical terms referring to the unobservables and scientific methods. The second argument made by realism is the ‘no miracle’ thesis. These arguments stand challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The aim of the paper is to examine the relevance of the two arguments of scientific realism in countering the idea that the existence of quantum states in the microphysical world renders realism obsolete.

KEYWORDS:

• Unobservable
• natural kind term
• no-miracle argument
• hidden variable
• scientific progress
• agential realism

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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Arunima Chakraborty

Arunima Chakraborty is a PhD candidate at the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta. Her research interests include metaphysics and philosophy of science, scientific realism, critical realism and materialism.