On integral theory: an exercise in dialectical critical realism

ABSTRACT

This article offers an omissive critique of integral theory. To this objective, the article draws upon dialectical logic to investigate the affinities between integral theory and critical realism. Section 1 identifies new possibilities regarding the role of metatheory in practice by unpacking the metatheoretical coordinates of critical realism and integral theory. After providing a brief history of the origins of critical realism and integral theory, I review the ontological, epistemological, and methodological metatheorems of dialectical critical realism, and I put them to work to provide an omissive critique of integral theory. Then I introduce the notion of strictly non-dialectic because it functions to explain formally how integral theory relates to critical realism. Section 2 isolates the inadequacies at every moment in the passage from the MELD dialectic. Section 3 concludes the article with a discussion of the implications of foregrounding a critical realist ontology for integral theory.

KEYWORDS:

• Dialectical critical realism
• integral theory
• metatheory
• omissive critique
• strictly non-dialectic

1. Introduction

Critical realism (CR) is a philosophy of science that is arguably the least implicit framework of most natural science that makes genuine discoveries. Integral theory (IT) is an increasingly recognized approach to integrating multiple theoretical perspectives. One of the most important and persistent debates between integral theory and critical realism involves the identification of affinities between them (e.g. Hampson 2007; Marshall 2012, 2016; Rutzou 2012, 2014; Despain 2013, 2014; Schwartz 2010, 2015; Bhaskar et al. 2016; Schwartz and Esbjörn-Hargens 2019). Exploration of the CR-IT affinities is therefore an ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically salient task that, if successfully executed, would place the range of epistemic approaches within the integral-theoretical community within a broader realist metatheory.

The CR-IT debate is thus not a mere invitation for academic dialog; it becomes an injunction to action via omissive critique guided by the axiology of freedom. In enacting the concept of axiology of freedom, it is worth echoing Michael Schwartz's (2015, 391) passionate exposition to delineate it:

As presented in Dialectic and in Plato Etc.,¹ the axiology of freedom dialectically and metacritically demonstrates the unfolding of freedom from primal scream to the eudaimonistic society of the free flourishing of each as the condition for the free flourishing of all. Critical realism’s stated root concept is freedom as autonomy, alethic truth equalling the morally good equalling freedom. Its distinctive moral chord is centred in freedom, expanding to include all the notes of dynamic call of the good.

In the process of omissive critique, we deploy transcendental argumentation because it allows us to take the inner logic of an opposing argument and identify the absences, lacks, or omissions of transcendentally necessary categories, and in doing so, it brings out the interrelatedness of the contradictions or compromised formations needed to sustain faulty argumentation in practice – see Hartwig 2007b, 105–108, for a complete exposition. This omissive critique takes the metatheoretical vantage point of critical realism, initially proposed by Bhaskar and Danermark (2006), in perceiving no absolute differentiation among the theoretical, metatheoretical, and philosophical stances, as they are essentially referring to or describing the same reality, the same world, at different levels of abstraction. In contrast, the integral-theoretical relationship between a theory and a metatheory holds a strong constructivist perspective; it involves the formulation of questions regarding the aim of a theory, its logical structure, and the range of evaluating criteria to assess its broader (or meta) adequacy, as delineated by Edwards' (2008) evaluation followed by Wallis' (2010) succinct review of a multitude of metatheories.

The purpose of this omissive critique is thus to show that the trouble with integral theory is not, as Hampson (2007) argues, a lack of sufficient coherence or rigour, nor that it represents, as Rutzou (2012, 2014) argues, a venomous chalice. The trouble with integral theory is not even that it is perfectly consistent with its own internal logic of irrealism, as agreed by Despain (2013, 2014), nor that its knowledge claims are founded on constructivism with applications rooted in pragmatism, as Marshall (2012, 2016) identifies. Rather, it is the banality of the integral-theoretical approach that is terrifyingly normal, to use Arendtian terms. If, as Hampson proposes, the way to remedy the omissive absences of integral theory is through dialectical logic, this should be taken, indeed, as I shall illustrate, through the dialectical logic of critical realism; that is, as I have argued before (see Nunez 2023), that dialectical logic may be effectively understood and exemplified as a passage through the transcendentally necessary categories of MELD: 1M: non-identity, 2E: negativity, 3L: totality, and 4D: transformative agency.

2. Unpacking the metatheoretical coordinates of critical realism and integral theory

Roy Bhaskar, the chief creator of the philosophy of critical realism, continued to deepen its development across three recognizable phases: basic, dialectical, and the philosophy of metaReality.² Ken Wilber, the chief creator of integral theory, continued to develop his theses across what may also be described as a three-phase outline: endo, ecto, and in praxis.³ Basic critical realism emerged around 1975 as a critique of pre-existing philosophies. Integral theory emerged around the same time in 1977 as a way to systematically tackle the increasing complexity of daily life with the help of insights from various disciplines. Critical realism revealed that other philosophies had omitted ontology from their conceptualization of reality and set out to revendicate it.⁴ Integral theory revealed that there was partial truth, however miniscule, in all schools of thought being considered, and it set out to include more of reality to assess, deal with, and potentially interrelate multi-theoretical awareness into a binding resolution of problems – see Esbjörn-Hargens and Wilber (2006). A comprehensive historical analysis of critical realism and integral theory is beyond the exploratory scope of this article.⁵ There is, however, classical work that contributes to re-enchanting the existing communication between critical realists and integral theorists.⁶ For this exercise in MELD logic, it suffices to view critical realism as above all a metatheory of the deepening of ontology and, in turn, to view integral theory as primarily a metatheory of the systematic inclusion of epistemologies.⁷

In exploring these metatheoretical coordinates of critical realism and integral theory for and of omissive critique, this article begins with explicit ontological, epistemological, and methodological metatheorems (or arguments) about the world. These grounding metatheorems do not arbitrarily arise from obscurity. What this realist point of departure means is that metatheorems are argued for, and arrived at, by the processes of immanent critique and transcendental argumentation from the premise of intentional practice. In the process of immanent critique, we deploy a philosophical approach that allows us to take the argument of an opposing theory and show that it is internally inconsistent. In the process of transcendental argumentation, we deploy an examination into the necessary conditions of possibility for some human activity as conceptualized in our experience – see Bhaskar 1979/2007. In the next section, I review the ontological, epistemological, and methodological metatheorems of basic critical realism; I shall draw upon them and dialectical logic to offer an omissive critique of integral theory.

2.1 Ontological metatheorems

The ontological metatheorems of critical realism begin with a duplex argument for (a) an inexorable and irreducible nature of real entities in the world (ontology) absolutely or relatively independent of our knowledge (epistemology), where (b) epistemology is included as part of ontology. The conflation of ontology and epistemology into epistemology is argued to be fallacious. This error is known as the epistemic fallacy. The conflation of ontology and discourse into discourse is also argued to be fallacious and is known as the linguistic fallacy – e.g. see Bhaskar 1993/2008, for more on the linguistic fallacy, and for more on the epistemic fallacy, see Bhaskar 1975/2008.

From this (a)/(b) argument follows a third metatheorem, that is, the critical realist multi-stratified and differentiated view of the world as consisting of three-overlapping domains: the real, the actual, and the empirical. The all-encompassing domain of the real contains multi-generative mechanisms that power all existing things and also act at least partly independently of the flux of conditions that enable their identification. Generative mechanisms tend to be out of phase with the patterns of events and experiences that constitute the domain of the actual. The domain of the empirical consists of experiences. It follows that a fourth metatheorem of critical realism involves the distinction between open and closed systems. From this view, the world is an open system but is susceptible under certain conditions to closure. This distinction between open and closed systems implies that the generative mechanisms of the world – at the level of the real and identified under experimental conditions (i.e. artificially closed systems) – endure and act independently of those conditions and so cannot be empirical regularities or patterns of events. The degree to which reality may be an open system is debatable among critical realists – see e.g. Mearman's (2006) analysis. To better illustrate this critical realist conception of an open and differentiated/multi-stratified world, I will contrast it now with its integral-theoretical counterpart.

Integral theory conceives that there is no reality apart from the worldviews depicted with the four perspectives (or dimensions) of the AQAL model. From this integral-theoretical approach, there is no world; there are only worldviews or consciousness-being. The AQAL model is a hallmark of the integral-theoretical approach and consists of five basic elements – all-quadrants, all-levels, all-lines, all-states, and all-types – denoting the foundational (repeating) patterns of an integral-theoretical conceived reality – see Esbjörn-Hargens (2010b). Because integral theory founds its knowledge claims on constructivism (see Marshall (2016) highlights further differences between weak and strong constructivism), it is easy to begin to understand its idea of worldviews by building the all-quadrant element of the AQAL model along two foundational axes. The first axis separates the interior and exterior perspectives, that is, the view from the inside and the view from the outside. The second axis separates the collective and the individual perspectives, that is, the plural view of a group of people from the singular view of an individual. Then setting the first axis (interior/exterior) orthogonal to the second one (individual/collective) will produce a conceptual coordinate system of perspectives (also called dimensions) denoted as the upper-left quadrant (ULQ), lower-left quadrant (LLQ), upper-right quadrant (URQ), and lower-right quadrant (LRQ). From a critical realist vantage point, however, neither the first axis (interior/exterior) nor the second axis (individual/collective) is acceptable; both tend to encourage an atomistic view that reproduces rather than overcomes the dualisms of collective/individual, structure/agency, naturalism/anti-naturalism, mind/body, reasons/causes, and facts/values – see Hartwig 2007b, 91–96, for succinct introductions to the main dichotomies in social theory and their resolution via critical naturalism in tabular form. Bracketing these objections pro tem, it is here that critical realism differs radically from integral theory. This is because critical realism does not deny, omit, or neglect the existence of the world, including the absolute or relative independence of the real entities of scientific research (ontology) from our knowledge about them (epistemology).

Integral theory, as a guiding framework, delivers a double punch. It combines intuition with forceful neutrality – see e.g. Wilber 2005. The logic of intuition makes an argument appear compelling because it seems obvious. If the argument for greater facilitation of multi-disciplinary knowledge with the practical potential to advance an ever-greater comprehensiveness across different schools of thought seems obvious to you, then it must be almost rationally irrefutable. If this argument cannot be refuted, then it must be generally accepted and should increase your chances of success with every application. This is why integral theory appeals universally. What begins as logic in intuition can end as triumphalism – see Hartwig 2007a, 62–64; triumphalism, along with centrism and endism, is an error of irrealism. It refers to the overweening appeal of power to control, to know, to have, and so on. Triumphalism entails (→) endism, a view of the future in which social change has plateaued or halted, and it is entrained by centrism, a view that takes human beings as the purposeful centre of their universe. The logical progression is as follows: centrism → triumphalism → endism. As a guiding framework, integral theory also purports to achieve neutrality, which makes it seem detached from ideologies or fashions.

If integral theory’s logic of intuition and neutrality is self-evident, then where do you begin? What is its point of departure? By way of response, this metatheory tells you that neither being (ontology) nor knowledge (epistemology) should concern you because Ken Wilber, chief creator of integral theory, thought such a dismissal of ontology/epistemology to be correct, as he writes:

It is the refusal to ground ontology in epistemology or epistemology in ontology that sets Integral Theory apart from postmodernism and Critical Realism, respectively. Instead of, say, epistemology being grounded in ontology, there is instead a ‘mutual resonance’ that does – or does not – occur between these dimensions of being, and their enactive mutuality thus either ‘meshes’ (and the holon is carried forward by evolution) or fails to mesh (and the holon becomes extinct in the very next moment) (Wilber 2013, unpaginated).

What do you do when someone denies the distinction between ontology and epistemology? Researchers do not naturally begin by differentiating between ontology and epistemology. In some cases, investigators tend to avoid asking questions about presuppositions, and others even deny reality, a common strategy of containment indicating an implicit metatheoretical stance. Bhaskar (1979/2007, 192) coined the term ‘natural attitude’ to denote a stance in which one does not differentiate between ontology and epistemology because ontology becomes important when what is claimed to pass for knowledge is unsatisfying.

To reiterate the integral-theoretical position, Esbjörn-Hargens (2006, 82), leading scholar of integral theory, also explains how it ‘assigns no ontological or epistemological priority to any of these (AQAL’s) elements because they co-arise and ‘tetra-mesh’ simultaneously’. As with the emperor’s new clothes, you either see it or you do not. The trouble is, if you cannot see it – that is, if you find that, for example, the ‘mutual resonance’ which takes responsibility for ‘tetra-meshing’ the existence or utter extinction of the ‘holon’ is not self-evident, but rather unsatisfying or utterly absurd – then you soon realise the necessity for transcendental argumentation. The necessity of implementing transcendental argumentation refers to the ontological metatheorems of critical realism.

What I find interesting about Wilber’s and Esbjörn-Hargens’ quotations is not simply that the epistemic fallacy is argued for, and arrived at, by a logic of intuition with forceful neutrality, before assigning priority to anything else; although effectively they do just that, they also display a keen awareness of their irrealist point of departure. Thus, we see an ironic (postmodernist) self-distancing from ontology/epistemology, which in turn generates an awareness of (committing) the epistemic fallacy, albeit without being expressed with such a precise term. Therefore, I claim that because integral theory (deliberately) commits the epistemic fallacy, or what Rutzou (2012, 2014) sees as ‘perpetrating ontological violence’, it follows that it fails to sustain the ideas of difference and structure. The reduction of the domain of the real to the actual is also fallacious, following critical realism. This error is known as actualism – see e.g. Rutzou (2014) for a continuation of his ontological-violence argument, and for Bhaskar’s (1975/2008) concept of actualism (see his Chapter 2).

Integral theory exemplifies actualism; as Wilber (2005, 22) explains, discovering ‘the profound patterns that connect is a major accomplishment of the Integral Approach’. A problem with integral theory’s actualism, and actualism in general, is that generative mechanisms at the level of the real are identified as the invariant regularities of repeating patterns of events at the level of the actual, implying a flat world – that is, the reduction of the real to the actual, in which there is only one level of the world composed of the most basic, invariant patterns of reality – and deterministically assuming that this level will remain constant. Thus, Wilber’s critique of the ‘flatland’ of the ‘myth of the given’ functions to mask a flatland of his own! – see Wilber’s 2000, 70–73, notion of ‘flatland’ as an umbrella term for reductionism. To reiterate, the signature concept of integral theory is the AQAL model precisely because it helps us illustrate the idea of actualism with its five basic elements – all-quadrants, all-levels, all-lines, all-states, and all-types. These five elements constitute, as Esbjörn-Hargens (2010b, 35) explains, the ‘most basic repeating patterns of reality’. The integral-theoretical approach provides us then with an undifferentiated (in the ontology/epistemology dismissal), unstructured (in recognizing repeating patters at a single level in connecting worldviews in lieu of generative mechanisms at different levels of reality), and thus flat conception of reality. In this manner, we see that integral theory arguably commits a second fallacy; that is, actualism.

Moreover, because integral theory cannot sustain difference and stunts structure in the world, this implies that it fails to conceptualize non-identity. A world without non-identity is a world without difference. A world without difference is a world without negativity, a world without absence. A world without negativity is a purely positive world. In this manner, the AQAL model also helps us exemplify the idea of ontological monovalence: the failure to distinguish negativity in the world in favour of a purely positive, undifferentiated/unstructured account of reality – see Bhaskar 1993/2008. And that is how integral theory arguably commits a third fallacy; that is, ontological monovalence.

Another problem with integral theory’s atomism, and atomism in general, is that the whole totality is then reduced to its constitutive parts, called atoms, as the smallest, irreducible representatives of aspects of reality. Although critical realism and integral theory share concepts of totality and interrelatedness, their respective notions differ radically. Totality in the critical realist tradition, and in the most basic sense, references open, stratified systems or structures of internal relations that include its own holes, lacks, or absences. Integral theory denotes the whole totality of reality with the AQAL model, which is itself composed of four irreducible parts, denoted as domains. Leading integral-theory scholar Esbjörn-Hargens (2007, 80, my emphasis) explains that by ‘drawing on at least four distinctions … you are staying in contact with a manageable amount of irreducible aspects of reality … the goal is not to be totalistic’. Equivalently, and to rephrase the above quotation: the aim when implementing AQAL’s four-dimensional analysis is to be non-totalistic. Then integral theory employs pattern recognition among the four domains of AQAL to fit them together into a more integral view that is itself a reduction by atomicity.

Instead of pattern recognition, I want to suggest that it is possible to explain the interconnectedness of the four AQAL domains through an understanding of their respective Achilles’ heels. This idea of an Achilles’ heel critique is advantageous because this is not any arbitrarily weak point; it is the point at which the theory’s proponents deem it strongest – see Bhaskar (1993/2008, 340). Using critical realism, let us proceed sequentially to the first quadrant of the AQAL model by identifying the Achilles’ heel of (individual/interior) ULQ. Integral theory denotes and associates this dimension grammatically with ‘I’ (the first-person pronoun) because it represents the AQAL perspective of subjective knowledge. Its point of vulnerability is that on which the Achilles’ heel critique of hermeneutics fastens precisely because it is the realm associated with individual interpretation and experience, and it cannot sustain knowledge outside itself; that is, it fails to account for a dimension of knowledge outside narratives, interpretative knowledge, and experiences.

The second quadrant is (collective/interior) LLQ, the AQAL perspective of intersubjective knowledge. Integral theory denotes and associates this dimension grammatically with ‘you/we’ (plural pronouns). The vulnerability of LLQ is precisely that on which the Achilles’ heel critique of constructivism fastens because it fails to posit the independence, or at least the prior existence and causal efficacy, of objects of scientific research, that is, in a dimension of our knowledge about the world that is properly ontological or intransitive, relatively independent of our theories and discourses about the world in the epistemological or transitive dimension. Because there are no worldly grounds for testing or choosing among the plurality of rival theories, constructivism tends to lead towards relativism.

The identification of the Achilles’ heel of (individual/exterior) URQ follows. Integral theory denotes and associates this dimension grammatically with ‘it’ (the third-person singular pronoun) because it is the AQAL perspective of objective knowledge. Its point of vulnerability is that on which the Achilles’ heel critique of pragmatism fastens because it possesses a reductionist tendency in which the dimension of objective knowledge tends to be misconstrued in terms of the identification of patterns or regularities of events, behaviours, and/or functions of the brain (identified in closed systems). Another problem of pragmatism is its tendency to privilege utility over philosophy.

Finally, we conclude with the identification of the Achilles’ heel of (collective/exterior) LRQ. Integral theory denotes and associates this dimension grammatically with ‘its’ (the possessive form of ‘it’) because it is the AQAL perspective of interobjective knowledge. Its point of vulnerability is that on which the Achilles’ heel critique of postmodernism fastens because it encourages a worldview of structures (or systems) but often misconstrues them in terms of the collectivist account of individual activity in groups or the individual activity of groups – that is, the error of collectivism. Thus, it tends to reproduce the dichotomy of structure/agency. It is important to reiterate that the inclusion of four perspectives (ULQ, LLQ, URQ, and LRQ) does not occur here via a simple concatenation of four different perspectives or by pattern recognition. Rather, an inclusive understanding is possible because we are able to provide more explanatory power with the systematic identification of their respective Achilles’ heels.

If integral theory denies the transcendental necessities of non-identity and negativity, and if it under-theorises totality, then does it help you to conceptualize change in the world? Guided by Parmenidean ontological monovalence, Plato analyses change in terms of differences in the history of philosophy. Parallel to this example, I now want to show that integral theory also transposes the concept of change, but not with difference, rather with the idea of an overt awareness of exclusion caused by its inability to sustain the negative (or absence) in reality. The following quotation by leading integral theory scholar Esbjörn-Hargens exemplifies this point:

By drawing on at least four distinctions within each element [of the AQAL model] you provide yourself with an even number of check-points to ensure that you are staying in contact with a manageable amount of irreducible aspects of reality … The point here is not that the inclusion of more aspects is necessarily better. In other words, the goal is not to be totalistic … The point is less about including everything and more about being aware of what you are not including (Esbjörn-Hargens 2007).

To show that the above quotation cannot sustain its theory in practice, consider the following example: Let us suppose that you are an active citizen living under Athenian democracy in classical Greek times. Informed by the AQAL model, you understand that the point of this regime is not that the inclusion of women and slaves in politics is necessarily better for democratic life. In fact, you think that the point of democracy is less about including them in democratic engagement and more about merely being aware that they are not being included; that is, it is enough to be aware of their deliberate exclusion from this political aspect of reality, perhaps because women and slaves are deemed to be unworthy by the advocates of this regime and their non-totalistic view of democracy. How is the AQAL model connected to this thought experiment? They both share a non-totalistic view of reality. History provides a record of the deliberate exclusion of disenfranchized individuals and the Athenian democratic collapse. A similar argument can be made if we substitute women and slaves for historically marginalized communities – such as members of the social movements LGBT+, Occupy Wall Street, Me Too, and Black Lives Matter – living in today’s democracies. It would be patently ridiculous to argue along the lines of integral theory when the analytic point is more about merely being aware that these communities are being excluded, rather than including them in society via an actual fight for human rights. These examples illustrate why the integral-theoretical transposition of change via a simple awareness of exclusion fails in reality. The point being made is that the what begins as an under-theorisation of totality can end as fragments. Thus, the integral-theoretical analysis of change as a mere recognition of exclusion results in an underdevelopment of this concept, and thus it cannot sustain the idea of the transformative capacity for agency. In contrast, a critical realist view of being (ontology) is bound to non-being (absence) as the dialectic of transformative agency; to change is a process of absenting absences, lacks, omissions, and constraints on freedoms – see e.g. Lotz-Sisitka (2015, 318–339). Integral theory helps you to conceptualize change in the world with selected inclusion and a mere recognition of exclusion. Critical realism, in contrast, takes absence as the pivotal core of the nature of change – see Norrie (2010, 3–15).

Critical realism differs further from integral theory in that it holds the ontologically least restrictive viewpoint possible while remaining open to revisions and criticisms. This vision is possible to the extent to which it includes two features: (1) the insights of other multi-theoretical perspectives, while avoiding their disadvantages, which is also a distinctive feature in integral theory; and (2) the causal levels of reality relevant to the nature of the problem being studied and the possible interactions (and determinations) among them, which is an absent feature in integral theory. These twin features have been referred to as critical realism’s double-inclusiveness (see Bhaskar and Danermark 2006). Before turning to the epistemological metatheorems, which are concerned with the nature of knowledge, I summarize the main findings of this section with an irrealist ensemble of omissive errors pertaining to integral theory. Following dialectical logic, the arrow symbol (→ or ↓) means entails, implies, or towards.

2.1.1 An irrealist ensemble of omissive errors

• 1M Non-identity: At the level of 1M, we find integral theory's logic of intuition with forceful neutrality → ontology/epistemology dismissal → awareness of epistemic fallacy → triumphalism. A view of repeating patterns at a single level of reality in connecting worldviews in lieu of generative mechanisms at different levels of reality → lack of difference and stunted structure → flat reality → actualism.

  ↓

• 2E Negativity: At the level of 2E, we find integral theory's transposition of change with awareness of exclusion → underdevelopment of absence/change → lack of negativity → purely positive world → ontological monovalence. AQAL’s double-foundational axes (interior/exterior orthogonal to individual/collective) tend to encourage dualisms: collective/individual, structure/agency, naturalism/anti-naturalism, mind/body, reasons/causes, and facts/values.

  ↓

• 3L Totality: At the level of 3L, the AQAL model is separated into four indivisible domains, parts, or atoms → reduction of totality to its constitutive domains or parts → employs pattern-recognition to fit together domains of AQAL → non-totalistic goal of analysis → atomism. Achilles’ heel of (individual/interior) ULQ is akin to that of hermeneutics → Achilles’ heel of (collective/interior) LLQ is akin to that of constructivism → Achilles’ heel of (individual/exterior) URQ is akin to that of pragmatism → Achilles’ heel of (collective/exterior) LRQ is akin to that of postmodernism.

  ↓

• 4D Transformative Agency: At the level of 4D, we find integral theory's under-development of absence/change is conceptualized a selected inclusion and a mere recognition of exclusion → unsustainable concept of transformative capacity for agency.

What does strictly non-dialectical mean? The above irrealist ensemble of omissive errors pertaining to integral theory demonstrates what a dialectical omissive critique offers in practice. It shows how integral theory (1M) (self-consciously) commits the epistemic fallacy, together with the fallacies of (2E) actualism and ontological monovalence, including (3L) atomism, and in its (4D) unsustainable transformative agency. In this manner, his omissive critique shows that the trouble with integral theory is not, as Hampson (2007) argues, a lack of sufficient coherence or rigour, nor that it represents, as Rutzou (2012) argues, a venomous chalice. Rather, it is the banality of the integral-theoretical approach that is terrifyingly normal. And like so many other unoriginal metatheories, integral theory is strictly non-dialectical, a notion that effectively explains how in integral theory relates to critical realism in learning about a passage through the MELD dialectic.

2.2 Epistemological metatheorems

Epistemologically, both critical realism and integral theory favour non-partiality. Critical realism seeks to avoid the partial positions of rival theories because it aims to provide integrated explanations of how different multi-generative mechanisms at different levels interact to produce phenomena (Bhaskar 1975/2008). Integral theory seeks to avoid partiality with its integral methodological pluralism (IMP) by revealing and including all the partial insights of multiple perspectives – see e.g. Esbjörn-Hargens and Wilber (2006) and Martin (2008) for an overview of IMP. In brief, IMP is guided by three pragmatic principles: non-exclusion, enfoldment, and enactment. Non-exclusion refers to the acceptance of knowledge claims previously approved by their respective paradigm and scientific community, enfoldment refers to the recognition that some methodologies are more comprehensive than others, and enactment refers to the claim that a variety of inquiries will reveal diverse phenomena. These pragmatic principles become problematic when researchers commit the fallacy of pragmatism – that is, when research is carried out without reference to ontology and epistemology – which is precisely the integral-theoretical point of departure. Therefore, integral theory arguably commits a fourth fallacy – that is, the fallacy of pragmatism (as defined by Scott 2002, 2).

Critical realism differs from integral theory because it holds the epistemologically strongest position. This is because the goal in scientific practice is to move from established phenomena – such as regularities, patterns of events, language, and behaviours – to their causal explanation in terms of underlying mechanisms or structures. Although critical realism founds its knowledge claims and applications on reality, and integral theory founds its knowledge claims on constructivism and their applications within pragmatism, they both share a commitment to non-partiality as a common heuristic.

2.3 Methodological metatheorems

At this point, it is important to differentiate between metaphysical pluralism and ontological pluralism. Metaphysical pluralism holds that there is more than one reality; ontological pluralism sees that reality as structured and differentiated. Metaphysically, critical realism is a (stratified) monism – see Bhaskar (1986/2009). In other words, it conceives that there is but one reality, which nevertheless has a plural, differentiated, and stratified ontology. Integral theory is a post-metaphysical methodology used to integrate epistemologies – see Esbjörn-Hargens (2006).

Integral theory is arguably metaphysically monistic. In critical realism, the notion of ontological pluralism corresponds to the designation of a laminated system, in which different levels of analysis, corresponding to a differentiated reality, are necessary and conceived as dynamic and interacting – see Bhaskar (2010). Methodologically, ontological pluralism may be seen as a way of transcending reductionist positions via a laminated system, that is, a model of applied explanations corresponding to the irreducibly relevant causal mechanisms at different levels of reality and a conceptualization of how these layered mechanisms might interact to produce phenomena – see Leigh Price's (2014) argument for, and examples of, laminated systems in health education related to the causes of misogyny.

3. Foregrounding a critical realist ontology for integral theory

In this article, I have provided an omissive critique of integral theory. I have argued that critical realism may hold the ontologically least restrictive viewpoint available, the epistemologically strongest position, and a methodologically capable stance by which to begin to overcome reductionism. To exemplify critical realist metatheoretical coordinates in practice, I have explained how integral theory (1M) (self-consciously) commits the epistemic fallacy, together with the fallacies of (2E) actualism and ontological monovalence, including (3L) atomism, and in its (4D) unsustainable transformative agency. Because integral theory fails at every moment in the passage from MELD logic, I have also introduced the idea of strictly non-dialectic to explain formally how integral theory related to critical realism.

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the General Editor for their helpful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Iskra Nunez

Iskra Nunez received her PhD from the University of London, Institute of Education. She is the author of Critical Realist Activity Theory: An Engagement with Critical Realism and Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (Routledge, 2014).

Notes

1 It refers to Bhaskar's concept of axiology of freedom initially developed in his seminal work on dialectical logic (1993/2008) and then in its subsequent work (1994, 144–58).

2 Within basic critical realism, there are three main groups of theory: transcendental realism, a philosophy of science (see Bhaskar 1975/2008); critical naturalism, a philosophy of social science (see Bhaskar 1979/2007); and the theory of explanatory critique, a philosophical theory of value (see Bhaskar 1986/2009). The concept of explanatory critique is the means by which critical realists aim to resolve the dichotomy between facts and values. The notion of explanatory critique may be illustrated succinctly in three simple stages: (1) commitment to critiquing false or inadequate beliefs, (2) critique of action that is grounded in false beliefs, and (3) removal of the causes of false beliefs. For more on the second phase of dialectical critical realism, see Bhaskar (1993/2008), and for more on the third phase of the philosophy of metaReality, see Bhaskar (2002/2012).

3 Although Ken Wilber himself, chief proponent of integral theory, may describe its development as non-linear, in several phases, and 'as far from [a] sequential, ladder-like, clunk-and-grind series of steps (Wilber 1995, p. xviii), I have followed Marshall's (2016) integral realist viewpoint to delineate it nonetheless in three phases: endo, ecto, and in praxis. The main reason for this stratification is twofold: On the one hand, it provides an accessible point of departure for the new reader as it may be contrasted with the three-phase outline of critical realism by referencing dates of publication of their respective key texts, and in this manner, the reader will find yet another affinity between critical realists and integral theorists. On the other hand, it describes the last phase as open, evolving, and with a strong backbone in its applications, current or otherwise; viz, in praxis. Esbjörn-Hargens' (2010c, 19) succinct history of IT's academic emergence and research programme provides snapshots of its formative years and lays the applied, theoretical, and constructive foundations for 'enacting an integral future'. The initial endo-phase of integral theory may be understood as an internal voyage or what Ken Wilber saw as a vision or perspective from within, mainly concerned with reductionisms (e.g. see Wilber 1995, 115, and his notion of flatland in Wilber 2000, 70–73). The second ecto-phase took Wilber’s integral theory externally in a quest for an all-encompassing, indeed integral, paradigm capable of combining and connecting knowledge from a variety of scientific, philosophical, and even mystical-spiritual fields of study (see Wilber 2005, 1); and the third phase of in praxis may be understood as the new beginning, a dawn in vision referring to an integral era in which we see its applications in action (Wilber 2010, 431). The development of the application of integral theory remains an ongoing project.

4 See e.g. Bhaskar and Hartwig (2010) and Collier (1994) for introductions. For a defence of realism, and in particular, critical realism as a subset of the academic discipline of philosophy of science that is ‘mainly concerned with ontology, with being', I refer the reader to Sayer (2000, 23).

5 A current historical analysis of integral theory, and one that includes their First Biennial Integral Theory Conference, is provided by Schwartz and Esbjörn-Hargens (2019) and Forman and Esbjörn-Hargens (2010), respectively, together with the two-volume result of a multi-year symposia series documented by Hedlund and Esbjörn-Hargens (2023) and its companion chronicled by Hedlund et al. (2016).

6 In particular, it is important to differentiate between Wilber’s writings and others in the integral community – see e.g. the contributions of Hampson (2007), Marshall (2012, 2016), and Rutzou (2012, 2014), including their arguments for a fertile ground for CR-IT dialogs found in Despain (2013, 2014, 2016) and Bhaskar et al. (2016) propositions. There is, also, avant-garde scholarship that takes IT to the next level of applied perspectives such as in Wilber's (2019) engagement with realism and idealism, including, IT's influence on the systematic inclusion of a wide range of academic disciplines such as, a view of an integrative higher education (Hampson and Rich-Tolsma 2023), and vision of an integral moral philosophy (Schwartz 2015; Schwartz and Esbjörn-Hargens 2019), together with applications related to integral political-economic discourse and policy (Bowman, 2022), and in arguing for integral investments in the reallocation of resources as a path for holistic wellbeing (Bozesan 2020), to provide a few examples.

7 I refer to Wilber's (2019, 470) view of integral theory as it provides us with his current understanding of reality, as he states, ‘when I focus on the outside (“ontological”) view, I focus on the existing elements of the AQAL Framework’; it is thus worth echoing Schwartz (2010, 231) to remind us what the so called ‘outside (“ontological”) view’ means: ‘Metatheoretical application typically involves the use of Integral Theory and its AQAL model to coordinate preexisting theories within a given domain of inquiry’. I now paraphrase, it means that integral theory, at least how its chief proponent sees it, equates ontology to AQAL, and its many metatheoretical applications involve a view mainly concerned with epistemology as it pertains to the integration of aspects of reality. Arguably, in current metatheoretical applications, IT may have elements of the distinct concepts of ontology, epistemology, immanent critique, and transcendental argumentation as it engages with realism in general; however, it was not conceived initially in such precise critical realist terms.