Globalisation and the changing nature of the state in East Asia

Abstract

Economic globalisation is the defining characteristic of our age and a process which is transforming the parameters of the national state and global power relations. However, it is also a contradictory, uneven and unpredictable phenomenon. East Asia has been at the epicenter of globalisation for the past 30 years and will continue to be so with the rise of China’s economy. The region has been one of the main beneficiaries of the globalisation process, with exceptional geo‐political advantages producing terms of engagement with the global economy not matched by other developing regions. However, its relations have also been paradoxical. At a time when globalisation theory predicted the demise of the national economy and the waning of national identity, East Asian growth was driven, above all, by the developmental state, with strong and interventionist Governments often successfully supporting ‘national’ neo‐merchantilist economic policies and strong state identities. Some argue that the developmental state has now run its historical course, made redundant by its own success in the global market. This article examines the evidence for the changing nature of the state in the global economy and asks what are the likely future forms of the state in East Asia.

Notes

1. This is if one judges by the overall sales of corporations. Wolf (2004) estimates the figure as 37 out of the top 100 based on corporate value added.

2. Government tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in 2000 varied from 53.6% in Sweden, to 48.8% in Denmark, 37.4% in the UK and 29.6% in the US. Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP for a sample of 13 rich countries has grown from 13.1% in 1913 to 41.9% in 1980 and 45% in 1996 (Wolf, 2004, p. 253).

3. It took Britain 58 years to double its real per capita income from 1780. The USA did it in 47 years from 1839 and Japan in 34 years from 1900. South Korea took 11 years from 1966 (Morris, 1995).