Going in three directions: parallel trajectories of Kazakhstanization, Westernization, and Post-Soviet multiculturalism in Kazakhstan’s elementary and secondary education

ABSTRACT

Kazakhstan is a post-Soviet nation whose education system and curricular constitution recently have gone through a number of substantial reforms. These changes have occurred in light of political-economic initiatives to strengthen the country’s economic competitiveness. The current article examines the latest version of the national curriculum with an emphasis on the subjects Kazakh, English, Russian, smaller minority languages, as well as history. The findings highlight a tripartite trajectory of Kazakhstanization, post-Soviet multiculturalism, and Westernization in the educational realm.

KEYWORDS:

• Kazakhstan
• curricular reform
• parallelisation
• Westernization
• trilingualism

Introduction

Post-Soviet nations have often chosen two main directions regarding their cultural, political, and educational trajectories: one signified by Westernization and another one characterised by being a part of Russia’s sphere of influence (e.g. Götz and Staun 2022). Estonia is an example of a predominantly westernised path (Boman 2020), whereas Central Asian countries often have close ties to the Russian Federation in terms of security arrangements, economic cooperation, and geopolitical positions (Hartwell 2023).

However, several post-Soviet nations have also chosen complex and multifaceted directions which are characterised by ambiguous approaches, which is the case with for example Georgia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan (Boman 2023; Boman and Mosesson 2023; Broers 2011; Kuzio 2002; Mearsheimer 2018; Yemelianova 2014). On the one hand, there is ample evidence of de-Sovietization and de-Russification in Kazakhstan (Asanova 2007; Kissane 2005; Yemelianova 2014), in parallel with strengthened patriotism and Westernized modernity, but on the other hand the ties to the Russian Federation and the Russian language are still distinctive (Boman 2024).

While there are a number of recent studies that focus on Kazakhstan’s cultural and educational pathways in current times (e.g. Courtney et al. 2022; Danabayev and Park 2020; Yakavets et al. 2023), no study has yet examined the parallel trajectories of Kazakhstanization, Westernization, and Post-Soviet multiculturalism which seem to be reflected in the national curricular documents and in the broader educational, economic, and sociohistorical contexts.

The current article aims to fill this gap by focusing on the nexus between educational and curricular development, cultural change, and political-economic prospects. As such it reflects the complex and contextual transitions that many emerging nations go through as the local conditions interact with global and regional forces (Boman and Mosesson 2023; Carnoy and Rhoten 2002; Dale 2000; Pieterse 2015). It focuses on the current research question:

1. How are Kazakhstan’s cultural and political-economic trajectories reflected in recent curricular documents?

The article proceeds with a theoretical background section that briefly sketches some of the core cultural, educational, and political-economic elements of Kazakhstan, as well as a literature overview and a conceptual framework section, which describes the main theoretical components that the article hinges on. Then follows a method and data section, followed by the findings of the curricular analyses. The article ends with a conclusive discussion.

Theoretical background

Kazakhstan in relation to culture, education, and politics

Kazakhstan is the ninth largest country in terms of geographical size but, as of 2023, it has only approximately 19 million inhabitants. The country is an upper-middle-income country with a young population (OECD 2014; World Factbook 2023). A large share of the inhabitants live in larger cities such as Almaty and Astana, and there are striking economic and educational inequities between urban and rural areas (Yakavets et al. 2023). There are also ethno-demographic differences throughout the country, for example, Uzbeks typically live in the south and Uyghurs close to the Chinese border in the east, whereas both the majority Kazakh group (70%), ethnic Russians (18%), and smaller minorities are dispersed in both urban and rural areas (Courtney et al. 2022; Republic of Kazakhstan Bureau of National Statistics 2021; World Factbook 2023). While the Kazakh macro group is relatively heterogenous, its ancestry is predominantly Mongolian and Eurasian. Hence, the Kazakhs are often phenotypically distinguished from ethnic Russians and instead more similar to East Asian populations (Dulik, Osipova, and Schurr 2011; Zhao, Wurigemule, and Sun 2020).

Ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a process of de-Russification has occurred in Kazakhstan. First and foremost, the relative numbers of ethnic Russians have decreased from almost 50% in 1989 to less than 20% in 2023 (Asanova 2007; Kissane 2005; World Factbook 2023). Secondly, the Kazakh language and national identity have been elevated at the expense of its Soviet-Russian past (Kissane 2005). While there are also influences from South Korean popular culture in contemporary Kazakhstan (Danabayev and Park 2020), these are relatively peripheral and subcultural compared to the main elements in the country which are Kazakh, Soviet/Russian, and Western (World Factbook 2023; Yergaliyeva 2018).

Specifically, these core components are manifested through explicit trilingualism which includes the Kazakh, Russian, and English languages (e.g. Kambatyrova 2022). In post-Soviet times, Kazakhstan has aimed at building strong nationhood around the Kazakh history, culture, and language, as well as a revitalisation of its Islamic past. Yet many Kazakh Muslims remain quite a-religious (Spehr and Kassenova 2012; Yemelianova 2014; Yergaliyeva 2018). Kazakh ancestral culture is a mixture of mostly Turkic and Mongolian nomadism (Hartwell 2023).

Under the rule of Nursultan Nazarbayev (1991–2019), Kazakhstan’s oil and gas intense economy grew rapidly from a very low base. Initially, the country had serious problems with rural poverty and high infant mortality rates in the first phase of the post-Soviet situation (Chankseliano et al. 2020; Hartwell 2023). According to IMF (2023), however, the country’s GDP per capita is currently above 12 000 USD. This makes Kazakhstan’s economic development on par with Russia, Turkey and China, as well as making it the wealthiest Central Asian country. However, this is substantially lower than Westernized post-Soviet nations such as the Baltic states (e.g. Boman 2020). According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (2023), Kazakhstan is an authoritarian country with a particularly low score in the electoral process and pluralism sub-category. These figures have not changed meaningfully since 2010 (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2010; 2023). As Hartwell (2023) underlines, countries that are rich in natural resources tend to have democratic deficiencies as well as an undiversified economic framework. Kazakhstan is no exception in that respect (Collins and Bekenova 2017).

Under the rule of Nazarbayev’s successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan’s economic development and political stability have been curtailed by the COVID-19 pandemic, civil unrest in January 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine from February 2022 onwards, the brief Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in 2022, and many other minor or major issues. Nevertheless, the country is internally stable and has constructive diplomatic relations with for instance Russia, the US, Turkey, China, and many others. President Tokayev has stressed on the one hand that he does not endorse the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but the ties to Moscow remain and the Russian language is an integral part of the country’s official standpoint. Kazakhstan is also a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is an interstate military alliance that consists of six post-Soviet states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Moreover, Kazakhstan is a part of the Eurasian Economic Union, whose member states are Russia, Armenia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan (Dumoulin 2023). Moreover, Kazakhstan has not undermined the use of the Russian language to the same extent as Ukraine (e.g. Fortuin 2022). On the other hand, as of 2025 the Kazakh language will no longer be written with the Cyrillic script and instead be based on the Latin script (Kambatyrova 2022).

In an attempt to boost the economic competitiveness of the nation, Kazakhstan’s education system has been reformed and restructured in recent years. The set goal is to place the country among the 50 most socioeconomically advanced states in the world. Moreover, future education is supposed to become more learner-centred, inclusive of increased collaborative learning and critical thinking (Yakavets et al. 2023).

In assessments such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), Kazakhstan’s achievement levels have been substantially below the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) average in both the 2009 and 2018 surveys, roughly 80–100 points, which constitute almost an entire international standard deviation (OECD 2014; 2019). While the link between achievement in ILSAs and economic development is highly contested (e.g. Komatsu and Rappleye 2019), it is obvious that cognitive skills are at least one dimension that may be beneficial to improve as regards a country’s socioeconomic development.

In light of these reforms and national goals, it is pertinent to gain a better understanding of Kazakhstan’s curricular contents as they are stipulated in the Updated Content of Education (UCE) (e.g. Courtney et al. 2022). It is likely that these updated educational contents and directions also reflect cultural and economic development, which tap into its seemingly complex and parallel pathway towards increased global integration along a delicate line between Russia and the West (Boman 2023; 2024).

Related literature

Fierman (2005) examined the role of the Kazakh language as a potential cohesive group-enhancing factor in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. The author emphasises the merging (sliianie) of different Soviet cultures as a strategy of the Soviet past, which seems to be partially reflected also in post-Soviet times. Hence, there might be parallel patterns of nationalism and multiculturalism in Kazakhstan’s national policy building.

Fauve (2015) has analysed the Nazarbayev regime’s attempts to promote an appealing image of the country, despite its authoritarian direction in politics. Examples include both sports and academia. Wealthy actors have helped to shape a form of global actor-network.

Rees and Williams (2017) focus on the different top-down strategies that the country’s elite has presented as nation-building strategies, some of which seem to be derived from the West, particularly civic nationalism (Kazakhstanization) and multiculturalism. Their empirical findings suggest that the predominant use of the Kazakh language and belief that citizenship is important can predict Kazakhstani (i.e. civic nationalism) identity. This might be because a Kazakhstani civic identity requires some degree of Kazakh fluency. However, the statistical effects of the language variable were typically small in the regression models, which further indicates that a multicultural model might be integrated into a broader supraethnic identity (i.e. Kazakhstanization).

Sharipova, Burkahanov, and Alpeissova (2017) investigated the impact of factors such as Kazakh language, trust in political institutions, and perceived discrimination, all of which were statistically significant variables in their regression analyses of civic and ethnic nationalisms. Moreover, people with lower incomes were unexpectedly less likely to support civic nationalism, on average. Overall, the Kazakh language was regarded as an important predictor of both types of nationalism. However, Kazakh ethnicity was, somewhat surprisingly, not a substantial predictor of civic nationalism.

Bolat (2024) has examined the development of the education system in Kazakhstan at the pre-school level. The author reveals that Kazakhstan’s pre-school development reflects the broader development of economic growth and increased human capital (e.g. GDP per capita, health, longevity, educational attainment). Moreover, several steps have been taken to ensure the rights of children in the country as well as to align the broader education system with global norms (e.g. adherence to the Bologna Process). These developments are underlined in official documents.

Courtney et al. (2022) analysed Kazakh, Russian, and Uyghur child language literacy in relation to the Updated Content of Education (UCE) in Kazakhstan. Their growth curve analyses indicate that the UCE had significant longitudinal effects on the literacy of the schoolchildren who participated in the study.

Partly similar to the above-mentioned work, Yakavets et al. (2023) examined how schoolteachers in Kazakhstan engaged with the Renewed Content of Education (RCE). The results of focus group discussions with 227 teachers indicate that the majority of them saw some merit in RCE, for instance being embedded in a broader process of trying to boost the country’s economic competitiveness. At the same time, however, many felt it was difficult to translate these ideas into every teaching practice in accordance with novel ways of instruction which are believed to be in concordance with RCE.

Overall, there are several studies that examine Kazakh national identity, culture and nation-building processes, as well as language policies. Some also cover recent educational changes. However, qualitative analyses of curricular documents are lacking, particularly those that connect education and culture with political-economic goals and national development trajectories. Hence, the current article aims to fill this research gap.

Conceptual framework

Parallelization is a multidisciplinary integrative framework that was developed to examine complex phenomena in the social and behavioural sciences and with an overlap to both the natural sciences and arts and humanities (e.g. cultural history). Empirical examples include, for example, cultural development, academic achievement, migration, secularisation, and political conflicts in and across multiple country contexts (Boman 2021; Boman 2024; Boman and Mosesson 2023). It expands Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s work on cultural globalisation (e.g. Pieterse 1994; 1995; 2015) and focuses on broader issues such as political conflicts and the nexus between climate change and economic development (Boman 2024).

The concept implies that societies, especially nations and regions, are too complex for a single pattern or trajectory to be prevalent regarding for instance cultural, educational, and political matters. For example, Ukraine is manifested by both Ukrainian, Russian, and Western elements which all have long roots (Boman 2023), whereas today’s Georgia is characterised by Georgian, Russian, and Western elements (e.g. Boman 2024; Gamksakhurdia 2019; Stolz et al. 2023). Contemporary South Korea is characterised by both Westernization (e.g. homogenisation of world cultures, liberal democracy), hybridisation (i.e. a mix between two or more cultural or political elements), and polarisation (physical and/or discursive conflicts) (Boman 2024; Boman and Mosesson 2023; Kalyvas 2003), while in Sweden there are parallel elements of both integration and segregation, as well as secularisation and Islamisation (Boman 2024).

These patterns transcend mere cultural hybridity (e.g. Pieterse 2015) and convergence/divergence in curricular development (Boman and Mosesson 2023; Tahirsylaj and Wahlström 2019). Many countries do indeed build on a variety of cultural influences, just as education policy documents hinge on different internal and external sources (e.g. Steiner-Khamsi 2014; Sung 2011). What this means, more specifically, is that the country’s current constitution and development are not singular. There are multiple patterns that coexist, both dependently and interdependently (Boman 2021; 2024).

In the case of Kazakhstan, it is fruitful to examine the parallel trajectories of Kazakhstanization, post-Soviet multiculturalism, and Westernisation, and perhaps also other parallel patterns, in the educational realm. Janmaat (2008) argues that conflicting priorities, such as the emphasis on nation-building, democratisation, and globalisation in post-Soviet Ukraine eventually lead to that one priority or pattern that must take the stronghold at the expense of others. Similarly, Holm-Hansen (1999) has identified contradictions within Kazakhstan’s nation-building project in post-Soviet times. However, this is not always the case as there are multiple patterns that coexist (e.g. Russification and Russophobia in Georgia and Ukraine, see Boman 2023; 2024). Moreover, political-economic and educational priorities are not necessarily the same as empirical conditions. Some patterns coexist despite being in conflict with state initiatives. In ethnically diverse and migration-intense states such as the United States and Sweden, the goal is socioeconomic and sociocultural integration. Yet, the reality might be the opposite, or rather, integration and segregation coexist because of a large influx of different individuals and groups that either segregate or integrate. It is also possible that states aim to find a delicate balance between reaching somewhat conflicting goals, as they realise that they have to serve different groups and interests (Boman 2024).

Method and data

In line with earlier content analysis of curricular documents and textbooks, a qualitative and thematic content analysis was chosen as the main method (e.g. Asanova 2007; Boman and Mosesson 2023; Clarke and Braun 2014; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). This implies that important curricular documents, specifically the official national curricular documents of Kazakhstan, were analysed by reading and making thematical interpretations of the texts (Asanova 2007; Boman and Mosesson 2023). In this line of curricular analysis, attention is paid to the national contexts (e.g. educational, historical, cultural, economic, political), as well as earlier research (Boman and Mosesson 2023; Krippendorff 2018). In the case of Kazakhstan, a top-down approach has been identified as this reflects that the goal of the political elite is to increase the country’s global economic competitiveness (Courtney et al. 2022; Yakavets et al. 2023). Hence, the political and economic contexts are pivotal, but also the cultural and historical circumstances (Asanova 2007; Kissane 2005).

The two main national curricular documents (Ministry of Justice 2018; UBA 2022) are very extensive and detailed. These were chosen as they are stipulated as official documents by state bodies. At first, the authors made a sweeping reading process in order to get a sense of the structure and organisation of these two documents. UBA (2022) is a detailed curricular document, in Russian, which consists of almost 5900 pages and includes 123 appendices on all subjects in elementary and secondary education. UBA is related to the National Academy of Education Center named after Ybyrai Altysnsarin of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which is a scientific center that carries out methodological support of the education system. Thus, it has a similar supportive role as for example KEDI (Korean Educational Development Institute) in South Korea (Boman and Mosesson 2023).

Ministry of Justice (2018), which is a short-term for the Ministry of Justice for the Republic of Kazakhstan, stipulates the legal constitution of the education system, as well as curricular documents. The latter document has an unofficial English translation. Hence, the authors have worked with both the English and Russian versions of this document. Whenever translations were made from Russian into English, these are explained within brackets. At some points, we chose to include brief excerpts in Russian and explain the meaning of this content afterwards.

Regarding the Ministry of Justice (2018), the authors examined the general directions, values and guidelines in order to get a sense of the cultural and ethical elements of the national curriculum. This selection of syllabi and value-related sources in our analytical work aligns with Boman and Mosesson (2023). Specifically, what this means is that the authors examined both specific subjects (e.g. Kazakh, Russian) and their related syllabi, as well as the general directions that highlight the specific aims, values, and directions for the education system in contemporary Kazakhstan.

The step thereafter was to read and analyse a sufficient number of curricular appendices of UBA (2022) in order to understand the constitution of the current curricular content, and how it may or may not tap into cultural, economic, and political development. We focused mainly on the learning objectives (Russian: Цели обучения). Based on the preunderstandings of the contexts and data, which are based on previous research on Kazakhstan’s culture and education system, we chose to look into the subjects Kazakh, Russian, English (e.g. see UBA 2022, Appendix 23, 738), History and World history, as these subjects cover both the trilingual direction of the country, as well the potential patriotic proclivities which have been identified in previous research on Kazakhstan’s educational system (e.g. Asanova 2007; Courtney et al. 2022; Kissane 2005; Yakavets et al. 2023). In addition, we read the minority language appendices which cover Tadjik, Uzbek, and Uyghur languages as they might indicate a multicultural direction that reflects the country’s post-Soviet situation and heterogenous ethno-cultural composition. World history may imply humanitarian and universalist themes and values (Boman and Mosesson 2023).

In conjunction with the reading processes, we aimed to discern a set of themes and compare these with previous research findings in this particular context (Krippendorff 2018), as well as to interpret these in line with the theoretical framework. The focus was on main themes but a few connected sub-themes were also highlighted and briefly discussed below. These sub-themes are similar to floating signifiers in discourse theory (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 105–112).

Findings

After repetitious readings of the curricular contents, three major themes emerged in the data: Kazakhstanization, Post-Soviet multiculturalism, and Westernization. What follows is a set of descriptions of the findings and how these relate to the external contexts that were previously described.

Kazakhstanization

The Ministry of Justice (2018) curricular document emphasises Kazakhstani patriotism and civil responsibility as vehicles for the education system and larger society. This is also underscored in the History subjects where it says:

Цель учебного предмета ‘История Казахстана’ – формированиеу обучающихся исторического сознания, казахстанского патриотизма, уважения к истории своей страны, гордости за достижения своих предков, привитие национальных и общечеловеческих ценностей, развитие исследовательских, мыслительных, коммуникативных навыков. (UBA 2022, Appendix 61, 3208)

This implies that students should understand Kazakhstan’s unique national history, have pride in their historical ancestors, and develop both national and universal values. The explicit emphasis on patriotic values implies that the process of Kazakhstanization is concrete and fundamental, even within the frames of a particular school subject.

It is notable that the term Kazakhstanization is ambiguous as it can be associated with both a civic nationalism and an ethno-nationalism direction. For ethnic nationalists in the country, the above-mentioned elements are mandatory whereas civic nationalists regard these as more flexible discursive signifiers that are not necessarily required for all people in the country (Sharipova, Burkahanov, and Alpeissova 2017). Nevertheless, Kazakhstanization enables a focus on nationalism, and thus pleasing those that demand such elements, whether the state elites (i.e. top-down) or the general population in the country (i.e. bottom-up) (Kalyvas 2003; Rees and Williams 2017).

In addition, the students are expected to learn more general skills about critical thinking and historical analysis (e.g. change and continuity, cause and effect, interpretation) (UBA 2022, Appendix 61, 3208–3210). These latter aspects have a more neutral constitution and enunciation compared to the value-laden elements that were highlighted in the quote above. That is also the case with the Kazakh language curricular appendices that do not assert that the language is superior or even primary, relative to English, Russian or the minority languages. As such, the stipulated trilingualism appears neutral and objective in these regards.

Post-Soviet multiculturalism

The second main theme of pertinence in the two curricular documents is post-Soviet multiculturalism. While the emphasis on the Kazakh nationhood, even explicit patriotism, is distinctive it does not imply that Russian and other minority languages are seriously undermined or downgraded. In that regard, Kazakhstan differs from Ukraine which instead has chosen a process of ethno-cultural nationalism (i.e. Ukrainian homogenisation) merged with Western values, although there are also civic nationalism tendencies in Ukraine (e.g. Boman 2023; Fortuin 2022).

Appendices 43–48 include curricular contents of secondary-level Uzbek, Tajik and Russian (UBA 2022). Similar to the appendices on Kazakh and English, these underline the stipulated oral communication skills, essay writing, spelling norms, lexical norms, punctuation norms, grammatical rules, and other pivotal language skills. It does also stress the importance of understanding the relations between language and culture (e.g. ‘формирует осознание взоимосвязи языка и культуры’, UBA 2022, 1815).

However, these assertions do not imply any value-laden meanings regarding the status of the Uzbek language in the Kazakhstan educational and cultural context. As such it implies an understanding of the partial continuity between the Soviet past and post-Soviet present where Russian functions as a lingua franca throughout most parts of the country, but also where a substantial number of people belong to smaller minority groups such as the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Uyghurs. The rich and detailed contents indicate that the smaller minority languages are taken as seriously as Kazakh, Russian and English. Moreover, the emphasis on Uzbek literature (see UBA 2022, Appendix 44) shows that Uzbek culture and literature are taken seriously and stand on their own feet. The same goes for the Tajik language appendix (45), which also ought to be compared with Kazakh, Russian and Uzbek culture. Even if the Kazakh majority does not learn Uzbek or Tajik, minority students could still learn their native languages with sufficient breadth and depth.

From our reading, it is not easy to decide if this form of multiculturalism is predominantly a continuation of Russian-Soviet merging (sliianie) or a Western liberal influence (Fierman 2005). Nevertheless, the multicultural element is quite palpably expressed in the document.

Westernization

The mere fact that English is a subject of the national curriculum of Kazakhstan, and an integral part of the country’s official trilingualism (Kazakh, Russian, English), demonstrates that the state is heading in a partly Western direction. Hence, Westernization might be regarded as one of the main legs of the country’s national development. This would have been unthinkable in the first years of the post-Soviet situation (Hartwell 2023). It is notable, however, that the English language is not particularly uplifted as a superior language in the documents, which instead focus on the learning content. UBA (2022, Appendix 123) consists of detailed descriptions of what students are supposed to learn in terms of oral and other communication skills, grammar, and content (e.g. writing and speaking about familiar topics). English is at most implicitly regarded as an important language to learn as a global lingua franca.

There are also other examples in the document that show that Kazakhstan’s elites want to integrate the country into the broader global educational framework. For example, the parlance of the English version of the Ministry of Justice (2018) document consists of concepts such as cognitive skills and creative skills (e.g. see also OECD 2014). This seems to be an element of external borrowing of Western parlance (e.g. Steiner-Khamsi 2014; Sung 2011), although implicit.

Another example of Westernization, as well as globalisation more in general, is the directions that are stipulated in the World history appendix. It says as follows:

Цель учебного предмета ‘Всемирная история’ – формирование у обучающихся исторического сознания, толерантности, уважения к истории и культуре стран и народов, привитие общечеловеческих ценностей, выработанных людьми на протяжении многих веков, развитие исследовательских, мыслительных, коммуникативных навыков. (UBA 2022, Appendix 62, 3306)

This means that the purpose of the subject World History is to develop the students’ historical consciousness, tolerance and respect for the history and culture of countries and peoples, as well as to inculcate universal human values developed by people over many centuries. Moreover, it is to develop skills in relation to research, thinking, and communication, particularly at higher grades of the secondary level. This constitutes a more unambiguous Western influence than the multicultural direction, as it is explicitly linked to humanism (Boman and Mosesson 2023). However, it is unclear if Kazakhstan’s political elites and educational policy specialists have been inspired by any specific Western nation in this respect.

Discussion

Kazakhstan’s educational development is a response to a particular set of regional, historical, economic, political, and cultural circumstances. This specific pathway is also reflected in the recent curricular documents, which emphasise both the Kazakh, the post-Soviet multicultural situation which implies a coexistence of various ethnic and linguistic groups (e.g. Russian, Uzbek), and the Western and universal themes. On the one hand, the country has prioritised state-building set around a distinguishing historical, linguistic, and ethno-cultural Kazakh identity (Fierman 2005; Holm-Hansen 1999; Rees and Williams 2017). This is emphasised in the curriculum of Kazakh history as a subject at the elementary and secondary levels of the current school system. In part, it excludes the Russian element that was distinctive during the Soviet Union (Asanova 2007). However, it is not clear if this is more congruent with civic or ethnic nationalism. As these two types of nationalism partly overlap it might be regarded as a form of ambiguity that serves two ends within a broader national context.

The post-Soviet multicultural theme is emphasised in relation to both the trilingual direction of the country (i.e. Russia is still an important lingua franca) and the minority status of languages such as Tajik, Uzbek and Uyghur. The Western element is accentuated in relation to the trilingual direction, as English is one of the main parts of the country’s official trilingualism. In addition, the emphasis on universal values and ‘World culture’ shows that Kazakhstan aims to transcend both Kazakh nationalism (i.e., civic, ethnic) and post-Soviet regionalism. This is being done in order to find a delicate balance between ethnic nationalism, Soviet-style multiculturalism, and Westernized elements such as liberal democracy, all under a common umbrella of supraethnic civic nationalism that appears strategically vague and ambiguous (Rees and Williams 2017; Sharipova, Burkahanov, and Alpeissova 2017). These directions are reflected in the national curricular documents under scrutiny in the current study.

These three main elements of the country’s educational, political and cultural development trajectory are not completely separated but do partly intersect and overlap. For example, the mix between on the one hand ethno-cultural nationalism (i.e. ethnic Kazakh particularism), protection of minority rights (i.e. liberal particularism), and intercultural dialogue demonstrates a form of interdependence. Many modern states are built around similar principles and compromises between the universal and particular, between the interests of minorities and majorities (e.g. Broers 2011), as well as local and regional circumstances. However, it is not clear if one of these elements might take the upper hand, at the relative expense of the rest, in the future (Boman 2024; Janmaat 2008).

The authors are relatively agnostic about the future direction of Kazakhstan’s cultural, educational and political-economic orbits as the status of the world’s great powers, China, Russia, and the US, is likewise unknown, as is the outcome of the Ukraine war (e.g. Boman 2023; 2024) and other factors that affect the regional conditions in Central Asia and beyond (Collins and Bekenova 2017; Hartwell 2023). Nonetheless, there is always room for conscious and relatively independent decisions by policy makers and other stakeholders. At the moment, however, we regard the current trajectory as tripartite. It is also likely that it will remain so in the coming years.

Regarding future research, the authors welcome more comprehensive analyses of curricular documents and other pertinent sources as our examination was not exhaustive. Units of analysis could also be textual resources such as textbooks and interviews with teachers and other stakeholders, as well as quantitative analyses that connect the education system with broader political, economic, and demographic factors.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.