On the Threshold of Space Warfare

ABSTRACT

Space hybrid operations possess considerable residual offensive capabilities for waging space warfare. Adequate utilization of space hybrid operations may surpass the disadvantages of kinetic anti-satellite weapons related to the proliferation of space debris and keep a wide array of impacts with flexible outcomes. Moreover, the significance of space hybrid operations is underlined by the renewed geopolitical competition and rivalry that spills over from the traditional states as key actors of conflict to non-state space actors influenced by international disputes. Non-state actors, especially the commercial sector, are then dragged into the geopolitical conflict with a twofold role since their space assets constitute valuable targets, and given the dual-use nature of space systems, may directly or non-directly support space militarization and even weaponization. As such, state and non-state actors must closely cooperate and create mutually beneficial relations that will ensure the protection of space assets and the building of resilient space infrastructures.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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² Bohumil Doboš, and Jakub Pražák, “To Clear or to Eliminate? Active Debris Removal Systems as Antisatellite Weapons,” Space Policy 48 (2019): 217–223.

³ Elizabeth Quintana, “The New Space Age,” The RUSI Journal 162, no. 3 (2017): 88–109.

⁴ Deganit Paikowsky, “What Is New Space? The Changing Ecosystem of Global Space Activity,” New Space 5, no. 2 (2017): 84–88.

⁵ Everett Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 147.

⁶ Ibid., 147–151.

⁷ David Ziegler, “Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary,” in Beyond the Paths of Heaven, ed. B. DeBlois (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1999), 192.

⁸ Brian Weeden, and Victoria Samson, “Global Counterspace Threats: An Open Source Assessment” (Secure World Foundation, Washington, DC, 2021). https://swfound.org/media/207162/swf_global_counterspace_capabilities_2021.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021).

⁹ John W. Raymond, and United States Space Force, Chief of Space Operations’ Planning Guidance (Nimble Books, 2020).

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¹² Ibid.

¹³ Jana Robinson, Tereza B. Kupková, and Patrik Martínek, “Strategic Competition for Space Partnerships and Markets,” in Handbook of Space Security, ed. Kai-Uwe Schrogl (Springer, Cham., 2020), 163–183.

¹⁴ Bleddyn Bowen, War In Space, 1^st ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020).

¹⁵ Ibid., 2.

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²³ Ibid., 7.

²⁴ Ibid., 8.

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²⁶ Ground-based kinetic ASAT weapons, co-orbital kinetic weapons, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, high-power lasers, etc. are intentionally not included as the attack is irreversible and easy to attribute (Robinson et al., 2018, p. 3).

²⁷ Ibid.

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³⁰ Weeden and Samson, “Global Counterspace Threats: An Open Source Assessment” (2021): xxx.

³¹ Brian Weeden, Victoria Samson, “Global Counterspace Threats: An Open Source Assessment” (Secure World Foundation, Washington, DC, 2022), https://swfound.org/media/207344/swf_global_counterspace_capabilities_2022.pdf (accessed April 16, 2022).

³² Ibid., xii.

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³⁶ Weeden and Samson, “Global Counterspace Threats: An Open Source Assessment” (2021).

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⁴⁶ Harrison et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2018”; and Harrison et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2020”.

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⁴⁹ Harrison et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2020”.

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⁵¹ Ibid.

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⁶⁰ House Science, Space and Technology Committee, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, “Written Testimony for Dr. Theresa Suloway, MITRE Corporation” (July 28, 2022), https://science.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Suloway%20Testimony.pdf (accessed October 13, 2022).

⁶¹ Robinson et al., “Europe’s Preparedness to Respond to Space Hybrid Operations” 4.

⁶² Ibid.

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Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Cooperation Program, research area of Political Science.