The role of resources in the resolution of the Western Sahara issue

The westernmost corner of Algeria, near the border with Morocco, Western Sahara and Mauritania, is a desolate and unforgiving place, where summer temperatures reach and sometimes exceed 50 degrees C. This barren plateau type of desert is known as hammada and has historically been referred to as ‘the Devil's Garden’. It is an apt name for an environment where sustaining life is impossible without complete reliance on external support.

It is in this area, near the Algerian town of Tindouf, that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Rio de Oro, or Polisario Front) administers refugee camps for Saharawi people displaced by Morocco's 1975 invasion of Spanish Sahara (later known as Western Sahara). Between around 100,000 and 165,000 people live in the six camps in the area,¹ surviving on aid from Algeria, South Africa and the wider international community. The Polisario Front also administers the ‘liberated’ territory of Western Sahara, known as the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).²

It is in this all but forgotten place that the four-decades-old claim to Western Saharan independence was again building towards armed conflict. A growing young population, educated but with very few jobs, almost no opportunities and little future, was pushing for its administration to reclaim their land from Moroccan occupation. As the Saharawi refugees wait in these remote and desolate camps, their compatriots in occupied Western Sahara are regularly subjected to abuse and oppression; dissent is not allowed in occupied Western Sahara and is dealt with harshly, often through extra-judicial means.

Meanwhile the relative wealth that the Saharawi people regard as their birthright and which might provide a basis for them to build more complete lives in a future independent state is being sold off to foreign companies, in return for which they receive nothing. Almost all of these resources are finite and such financial legacy as might have been available to the SADR is being depleted by Morocco as a colonial occupier.³ Faced with being locked into an indefinite and futile future in ‘the Devil's Garden’ or pressing the issue militarily, with some hope of breaking the current deadlock, the latter was increasingly the preferred option.

The papers in the collection consider aspects of the role of Western Sahara's resources in finding a resolution to the status of Saharawi refugees and Morocco's illegal military occupation of Western Sahara. In part, Western Sahara's natural resources might provide an avenue for finding a way towards a resolution of this issue but, probably more so, the lack of access to those resources by the Saharawi people, and their being plundered under Moroccan administration, is an increasing source of conflict. There is, therefore, an increasing likelihood that, should the issue of Morocco's occupation of Western Sahara not be settled, there will be a return to war in north-west Africa.

This potential and increasingly likely return to war will destabilize north-west Africa at a time when much of North Africa is already in turmoil. The costs to the Saharawi, and perhaps to Morocco, Algeria and the region, will be high.

Background to the conflict

The oasis of Tindouf, in the middle of this otherwise uninhabitable land, had been settled in 1852 by one of the Saharan tribes, the Tajakant, which, along with other regional tribes, was descended from the Arabic Beni Hassan tribe that had conquered the north of Africa in the eleventh century and which blended with local Berber and Tuareg tribes. As a result of tribal conflict, 43 years later, the Tajakant were displaced by the Reguibat tribe, which continues to dominate not just this town but has become the dominant tribe in the region, including in Western Sahara. The colonial French did not reach Tindouf until 1934, when they established it as an outpost of French Algeria.

Although Morocco claims historical ownership of a much greater region than it now occupies, historical maps show that, for example, in 1595 it was divided into two provinces, together being smaller than current Morocco. The following century, an expansionist Morocco seized territory as far south as Senegal, but in 1765 signed a peace treaty with Spain recognizing it did not have authority over Tekna tribes in the border area between Morocco and Western Sahara. While the Tekna continued to acknowledge Moroccan sovereignty, their territory marked the boundary of the Moroccan state.

The Spanish had, since the seventeenth century, used ports in what was to become Western Sahara to facilitate the slave trade from Mauritania. When the French occupied Algeria and imposed a protectorate over Morocco, they set the southern limit at the Draa River (just north of the current southern border). The French did not delineate the southern land border in the desert on the basis that it was uninhabitable. Growing tensions between Spain and France over regional control resulted, in the 1884 Berlin Conference at which the region was divided between colonial powers, with, Spain controlling the north of Morocco and what was to become Spanish Sahara between just south of the Draa River in Morocco and Mauritania. The Reguibat resisted Spanish colonialism, not being subdued in what was Spanish Sahara until 1934, a half a century after Spain's colonial takeover.

Following its independence from France in 1956, Morocco had claimed the oasis of Tindouf, but so had the recently independent Algeria. In the 1963 ‘Sand War’, Algeria ensured that Tindouf remained as part of Algeria and thus set the international boundaries of the new state.⁴ However, Tindouf is in an otherwise inhospitable region, and the area to the south of it is perhaps even more so. This is the area of six self-administered Saharawi refugee camps, administered independently by the Polisario Front which claims to be the legitimate representative of the Saharawi people of former Spanish Sahara.

Morocco's invasion

From the dying days of European colonialism, the position of the United Nations had been that there should be a referendum among the indigenous population of Spanish Sahara in order to settle the status of the Spanish colony. With the growth of a new national consciousness among still colonized peoples, in 1971 a group of Saharawi students formed a political organization that, two years later, would become the Polisario Front. The intention of the Polisario Front was to end Spanish colonialism in what was then Spanish Sahara, to which end the organization initiated a guerrilla campaign against the colonial administration.

The Polisario Front grew quickly, especially with the defection of Saharawi Spanish troops. Spain backed the National Saharawi Union Party (Partido de Union Nacional Saharaui – PUNS), privileging ties with Spain, Morocco moved to claim Spanish Sahara on the basis of claimed historical links between its royal family and the Saharawi people, while Mauritania claimed Spanish Sahara based on a common ethnicity. In June 1975, a visiting UN envoy, Simeon Ake, noted that there was ‘overwhelming consensus’ in Spanish Sahara for independence.⁵

However, Morocco had claimed the territory since its own independence and had won and lost territory to the colonial Spanish in the late 1950s. In response to this move towards decolonization, the Moroccan army began attacks from early October 1975 and the following month initiated its ‘Green March’ of about 350,000 militarily supported civilians to occupy Spanish Sahara. Under pressure from Morocco, in mid-November 1975, Spain signed the ‘Madrid Accords’ which divided the colony between Morocco and Mauritania (not published by the Official State Bulletin and hence not formalized), just four days later ratifying the contradictory ‘Law on the Decolonization of Sahara’.

As Morocco and Mauritania invaded, war with the Polisario Front ensued. In February 1976, the Polisario Front declared the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. With war raging, Saharawi refugees flooded across the border to what were to become the camps near Tindouf. Though severely outnumbered, the Algerian-backed Polisario Front had initial military successes to the extent that, in 1978, the understaffed and divided Mauritanian army had to withdraw. The following year, Mauritania formally recognized SADR. By August 1979, however, Morocco had annexed that southern part of Western Sahara abandoned by Mauritania. Between 1982 and 1987, Morocco built a series of six walls, each further consolidating its territorial control over Western Sahara, the last partitioning Western Sahara with around 70% of the territory inside the ‘useful’ zone and the arid and resource-poor outer region (‘liberated zones’) remaining under SADR control.

Under international law, Morocco's invasion of Spanish Sahara remains illegal.⁶ However, the functional military stalemate created by the construction of the 1987 wall meant that, as the Cold War was drawing to an end, the parties agreed to an internationally monitored referendum on self-determination for the Saharawi people in 1988, ratified in 1991.⁷ This was to be implemented and monitored by the United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), which has continued to have its mandate renewed by the UN Security Council, despite its inability to implement most of its originally stated agenda. Morocco has since refused to allow the ballot. Initial disputes were over who would be eligible to vote, with the Polisario Front arguing in favour of those included in the last Spanish census and their descendants, and Morocco claiming the right to vote by settlers since then.

There have been a number of attempts to find a settlement to the Western Sahara problem but, despite no progress, the 1988 ceasefire between the Polisario Front and Morocco (ratified by the UN in 1991) has held. Morocco's rejection of a vote has led to a stalemate. There have been further attempts to find a resolution, including the Houston Agreement of 1997 for a referendum in 1998 and the subsequent Moroccan-drafted ‘Baker Plan I’ of 2001⁸ and ‘Baker Plan II’ of 2003, which was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)⁹ but which Morocco refused to accept. The Baker Plans were followed by the Manhasset Negotiations of 2007–8, which similarly failed to find a solution to the deadlock.

This, however, could change. Morocco has put forward an ‘autonomy’ proposal for Western Sahara, in which the territory could be self-administering within the state of Morocco. However, there is little faith among the Saharawi in that autonomy being genuine, and it does not include an alternative to autonomy. The Polisario Front has, however, said it will accept the autonomy proposal if the Saharawi people are allowed to vote on it. They expect the proposal would be rejected, thereby further establishing grounds for the alternative of independence. Hans Corell, meanwhile, has written that the UNSC should simply declare Western Sahara independent. Corell also noted that companies were entering into illegal contracts with the government of Morocco for exploitation of Western Sahara's natural resources.¹⁰

Western Sahara continues to be listed by the UN as a non-self-governing territory, with Spain as its de jure administering authority, which Spain refuses to accept.¹¹ For Spain to represent Western Sahara in the UN would raise questions of remaining colonialism at Ceuta, which Spain is reluctant to give up. Ceuta controls the Straits of Gibraltar and provides a control point for African immigration. The UN also acknowledges Morocco as the de facto administering authority for 80% of the territory and SADR as the de facto administering authority for the other 20% of the territory).¹²

Return to war?

Two generations of Saharawis have grown up either in the refugee camps or under often brutal Moroccan occupation. Based on informal responses from younger Saharawis in the SADR-run camps, there is a strong and growing sense of frustration among them that they are trapped, while the resources of their homeland are being exploited by Morocco. Many seem to believe that returning to war with Morocco to reclaim their land is now the only option.

The Polisario Front has also expressed frustration with Morocco and the failure of an internationally mediated settlement that allows a democratic vote.¹³ There is now explicit recognition within the SADR administration that returning to war is possible. The decision about whether SADR will return to war was intended to be made at its four-yearly General Popular Congress in November 2015. There was a growing sense that if SADR does not escalate the situation, the Saharawis will remain doomed to being a people divided by occupation; half repressed, half exiled, with a view increasingly being expressed in conversation with Polisario leaders that the resources upon which they intend to build the economic future of their state are being exploited and depleted by Morocco.

The view that the Polisario Front may return to war followed comments by SADR Foreign Minister Mohammed Salem in 2014 when, in response to a pledge by Morocco's King Mohammad to maintain its presence in Western Sahara ‘until the end of time’, he said: ‘We will have no other choice but to return to armed struggle’.¹⁴

Should SADR return to war, it will at least require the tacit agreement of its host country, Algeria. This will then escalate tensions between Algeria and Morocco which, despite recently more normalized relations, have a history of antagonism dating back to the ‘Sand War’ of 1963, in particular over the territory around Tindouf.¹⁵ The conflict could also spill over into the conflict in neighbouring Mali, where Islamist fighters from North African jihadi groups have descended. Such conflict could also involve Mauritania, which had initially also invaded southern Western Sahara.

With conflict across the Arab world, from Libya to Iraq to Yemen, war between SADR and Morocco, perhaps involving Algeria and other regional states, would very likely further destabilize an already deeply unstable part of the world. There is, then, a desire by many, both within the region and beyond it to avoid such an outcome. But Moroccan intransigence in the face of international law and its continued exploitation of Western Sahara's natural resources appears to be making such an outcome increasingly inevitable. As one Saharawi leader said,¹⁶ it would now take only a small incident for the situation to descend into war.

According to SADR Prime Minister Abd Alkadar Taleb Omar, the Polisario Front did not wish to return to war if that was avoidable. ‘We will consider all options for the future at the Congress later this year', he said. ‘We have been very patient and waited many years. We have the support of many friends, especially in the African Union. But France and Spain are blocking progress [towards the referendum].’ Prime Minister Omar said that diplomacy, politics and war were all along the same spectrum of possibilities, meaning that where one failed it would lead to another along that spectrum. ‘There is much conflict in this region', he noted, ‘and we wish to avoid adding to that if we are able to do so.’¹⁷

The Governor of Awserd¹⁸ camp and member of Polisario Front Secretariat, Salek Baba Hasana, was more blunt:

We prefer a peaceful solution in accordance with international law and UN Security Council resolutions. But there has been a weakness of the UN to impose a solution. Morocco's affiliation with France, as a permanent member [with power of veto] has blocked a resolution through the UN Security Council. But we have not lost hope in an international solution. But if it fails, all other choices are on the table, including armed struggle.¹⁹

Governor Hasana noted that ‘If there is conflict, we have the permission from Algeria, which has stood by us as good friends. The main thing depends on the will of our people and the will of friendly countries, which adopt the principles of freedom and justice'.

Despite a slight thaw in Algerian–Moroccan relations, the bilateral relationship remains tense.²⁰ However, Algeria faces some threat to its east from Islamist insurgents stemming from the civil war in Libya, and would be unlikely to want to open up a new war on its western front. Having noted that, it is possible that it could remain passive in the face of a Polisario Front return to war, supporting it by not engaging in the conflict. Morocco would be similarly reluctant to try to punish Algeria for its support for the Polisario Front, given it would be unlikely to achieve any positive outcomes but would draw away from its significant military presence in Western Sahara of about 140,000.

‘No-one wants to go to war', Governor Hasana said, ‘but we may be forced. It is already 16 years. Our army is better than before and we can certainly defend our people and get back our land. In 1976, we just had militias and Morocco was considered one of the strongest African armies. We have trust in our people [to decide the issue].’ Governor Hasana's view of the Saharawi people's options appeared to be less diplomatic than those of the Prime Minister but more in line with those expressed informally by others. ‘We have been here [in the camps] for 40 years, but our presence here is only temporary', he said. ‘We have in our minds that we came yesterday and will go tomorrow. We continue to resist and are able to continue to resist.’²¹

When asked about the option of Saharawi autonomy within Morocco, he replied:

There is only the democratic solution in accordance with international law. There are three choices; integration, autonomy or independence. Integration is in contradiction with international law. So we are just talking about autonomy or independence. There cannot be a solution without respect for the right of self-determination. The presence of Morocco [in Western Sahara] is colonial and illegal. This is a decolonization case. There is no state that acknowledges the sovereignty of Morocco over Western Sahara.

While it is technically correct that no country recognizes Morocco's legal sovereignty over Western Sahara, more than 20 countries either support Morocco's territorial claim over Western Sahara or support an autonomy proposal under Moroccan sovereignty. However, SADR is recognized by 84 countries, the African Union (of which it is a member) and the UN Security Council has approved more than 100 resolutions in favour of self-determination for Western Sahara.²² Of international organizations, only the Organization of Islamic Cooperation recognizes Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara.

The SADR Minister Delegate for Asia and former ambassador to the UN and Washington, Mouloud Said, argued that France has primarily been behind the impasse which has led to the Polisario Front again considering returning to war.

There were several attempts under James Baker to find a resolution to the problem, but the French stopped him [in the UN Security Council]. So the situation depends more on than the Moroccan position, but the French position. The French like to see this part of the world as their back yard.²³

Minister Mouloud acknowledged that diplomatic pressure had to date not been sufficient and that there might need to be a crisis that paralleled that in relation to Timor-Leste, with which SADR sees itself most closely aligned in terms of the characteristics of its struggle.²⁴ He noted that the Santa Cruz Massacre of 1991 galvanized world attention on Timor-Leste, after which the EU shifted its position to one of more strongly seeking a final resolution to the territory's status. This was followed, in 1998, by Indonesia's economic crisis, the resignation of President Suharto, the differing approach to occupation by his successor, President Habibie, which led to a referendum and, finally, Australian-led military intervention to quell post-referendum violence by the Indonesia military and its proxy militias.

The view of SADR's Minister for Education, Mariam Salek Hmada, was that the Polisario Front's commitment to education had led to growing frustration and an increasing desire for a final resolution. ‘The path to freedom is knowledge. If you don't have education you don't know the meaning of freedom’, she said.

But there are no markets and no jobs for our youth. The UN can't solve the problem of the referendum or of the plundering of resources without any benefit to the indigenous people. This has created frustration among the youth in particular. The youth have been pressing Polisario to go back to war as the talks between the UN and Morocco are just a waste of time.²⁵

‘The youth are therefore angry. Eventually Polisario will be forced to follow the will of the people', according to Ms Hmada.

We know what war means. We know the challenges faced by the region, in Libya and Mali. Any movement will take the region to the brink. Yet the last thing to be given by the UN is human rights monitoring and to stop plundering of Saharawi resources. The UN says to the Saharawi people to stay where we are and does not give anything in return, which is not possible.

Ms Hmada also expressed concern that if the Polisario Front leadership did not act, some youth would be attracted away by radical Islamist agendas. ‘We are not extremists, but the lack of progress for the youth means we cannot always be an exception [to Islamist extremism].'

In all discussions in the SADR camps, there was recognition that change was only likely to come about through there being an event that acted as a catalyst for growing tensions among the Saharawi population. Such a catalyst, or critical juncture, might involve a radical shift in Morocco's economic or political circumstances, such as an economic embargo or the death, abdication or forced removal of not just the king but also his immediate successors, or the creation of an opportunity cost that becomes too high for Morocco to bear. For this to be the case, the cost would have to be borne by Morocco's elite rather than its citizens, if it is to have any likely impact on perceptions about viability.

However, the Moroccan economy is stable and growing, its political environment is also stable and effectively set (if with a lack of tolerance for dissent). Despite Western Sahara's similarity with Timor-Leste's position under international law, its practical similarities have more in common with West Papua, in that regardless of the moral or legal claims, there is little likelihood of resolution under the current circumstances.

Should Polisario return to war, it will at least require the tacit agreement of its host country, Algeria. This will then escalate tensions between Algeria and Morocco which, despite recently more normalized relations, have a history of antagonism dating back to the ‘Sand War’ of 1963, over the territory around Tindouf. There could also be spill-over into the conflict in neighbouring Mali, where Islamist fighters from northern jihadi groups have descended. Such conflict could also involve Mauritania, which had initially also invaded southern Western Sahara. The essays presented here each look at what is driving this conflict and what might need to be addressed, including a recognition of the basic rights of the Saharawi people, for it to be avoided.

Jeffrey Smith opens the discussion by looking at the role of natural resources in the continuing issue of Western Sahara's occupation by Morocco. Aspects of the development of the territory's resources have featured in the United Nations and efforts to arrive at self-determination for the Saharawi people. Misconceptions about the effect of resources development continue, however, because of a lack of credible information and analysis of the causal connection of resources to the stalled process of self-determination and the territory's occupation. Smith begins with Spain's colonial establishment of Western Sahara and resource development and then considers how the revenue accruing since 1975 from resource extraction compares to the cost of occupying Western Sahara. He concludes that taking resources from occupied Western Sahara has never been profitable relative to the costs of occupation. He argues that exploitation of natural resources is pursued as a basis for the settlement of Moroccan nationals in the territory to help generate acceptance for its territorial acquisition among the international community.

Stephen Zunes follows this discussion by considering the established illegality of facilitating the exploitation of natural resources by an occupying power in a non-self-governing territory. Yet, as he notes, as in the cases as Namibia and East Timor, this illegality has often been overlooked by foreign corporations and governments. The resource-rich territory of Western Sahara is no exception, as European, North American and Australian companies have sought to take advantage of lucrative fishing grounds or mineral deposits. While some have tried to claim that such resource extraction is legal since Morocco reinvests the money it receives into the territory through ambitious development programmes, the benefits of such ‘development’ have largely gone to Moroccan settlers and occupation authorities, rather than the indigenous population. As with Namibia and East Timor, it has fallen to global civil society to pressure such companies, through boycotts and divestment campaigns, to end their illegal exploitation of Western Sahara's natural resources.

Ben Saul similarly explores international law on occupation and its implications on natural resources in Western Sahara. He argues that much of the international legal analysis of dealings in natural resources in Western Sahara has focused on its status as a non-self-governing territory, as well as the right of self-determination of the Saharawi people. What he says is overlooked in the legal debates is a close examination of the application of the international law of occupation under international humanitarian law (IHL). Saul's paper therefore considers whether and how Western Sahara constitutes an ‘occupied territory’ under IHL, discussing some of the unique peculiarities that complicate the legal answer. He then considers issues of state and individual criminal responsibility under international law for illegal dealings with natural resources and property in Western Sahara by Moroccan and foreign companies, including under Australian federal criminal law implementing international obligations.

Dana Cordell et al. follow this exposition of international law by identifying the larger social and environmental burden of phosphate mining in Western Sahara. He notes that without phosphorus, many foods would not be produced, as farmers need access to phosphate fertilizers to ensure high crop yields. Yet the world largely relies on non-renewable phosphate rock that is mined in only a few countries. Growing global demand for phosphorus could surpass supply in the coming decades, while Morocco alone controls 75% of the remaining reserves, including those in Western Sahara. The market price of phosphate fertilizers also hides a far deeper burden, with consequences as far-ranging as the exploitation and displacement of the Saharawi people, to nutrient pollution with the result that some aquatic ecosystems have been classified as ‘dead zones', along with jeopardizing future generations' ability to produce food. The full cost of phosphate rock might indicate that it should be used more sparingly, to extend the availability of high-quality rock for future generations, to diversify phosphorus sources to include those with lower societal costs, and to share responsibility for these costs and consequences.

Exploitation of Western Sahara's natural resources do, however, have an important role in nation building, according to SADR representative Fadel Kamal. He claims the SADR government believes that its significant natural resources will play an important part in the development of a viable, self-reliant and democratic nation which will contribute to the peace, stability and progress of the entire Maghreb region. His paper examines the SADR's efforts to manage its natural resources through the establishment of the SADR Petroleum and Mines Authority, the launch of licensing rounds, its claim to an exclusive economic zone in the Atlantic Ocean and the recent enactment of a Mining Code. The paper draws on the SADR's efforts to protect its natural resources and examines the SADR oil and gas licensing rounds as an example of SADR's assertion of sovereignty. The SADR natural resources strategy has, Fadel says, two basic goals: to deter Morocco's efforts to exploit the SADR natural resources and to prepare for the recovery of full sovereignty.

It is not enough, of course, to identify a problem; it is also necessary to consider possible ways forward. Pedro Pinto Leite does this by moving beyond the impasse that existed at the time of writing, and which was threatening a dire outcome, to how Western Sahara's independence could be achieved. In doing this, Leite contrasts Western Sahara with the example of East Timor (Timor-Leste), identifying the International Commission of Jurists' common position on the right to self-determination of both Sahrawis and East Timorese.

Leite notes that East Timor is now independent, but that most of Western Sahara remains under foreign occupation, subject to serious human rights violations, with its natural resources pillaged. Morocco refuses to hold a promised referendum, as noted above, while the UN Security Council has been unable to take suitable action due to the use or threat of veto by France and the US. Leite asserts that it is therefore time to recall that the Sahrawi Republic (SADR) was proclaimed and that its government controls the majority of the people and a part of the territory. In that respect, SADR qualifies as a state, and is recognized as such by more than 80 countries. The UN, he argues, should follow the example of the African Union and welcome SADR into its fold. In order to reach that goal, the UN General Assembly should ‘consider the matter immediately’, recognize SADR and force a breakthrough.

These papers are followed by a ‘communication’ from Erik Hagen, tracing what he calls the ‘Saharawi conflict phosphates’ and their link to the Australian dinner table. Hagen notes that companies in Australia and New Zealand have been large importers of phosphate rock from Western Sahara for many years. A report launched by Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW), for which Hagen works, showed that companies in New Zealand and Australia accounted for a fifth of the purchases from Western Sahara for the year 2014. WSRW estimates that the total exports from the occupied territory last year was around 2.1 million tonnes, at a value of US$230 million, carried on board 44 bulk vessels. These exports took place, he noted, even though the Saharawi people objected to it, and despite its clear violation of international law. Several international investors have also deemed such trade unethical, while a handful of previously importing companies have ceased importing from the occupied territory due to legal and ethical concerns. Hagen elaborates on the global phosphate trade of the Saharawi phosphate rock, and the research and international campaigning done by Western Sahara Resource Watch in halting the controversial trade.

According to Minister Mouloud:

The UN has lost all credibility it had with the people. That leaves the leadership up against the wall. There is frustration and disappointment. Some people say we should have not stopped the war in ‘91.This frustration makes people more upset than they were in 1975. They are more ready for war. The people are more committed to the issue. In the occupied territories, they hate Morocco more than we do, they are more radical than us.

As a result, he said, ‘We are in an area of the unknown, where anything can happen at any time. A small incident can restart a war’.²⁶.

It is important to note, following Leite's suggestion, that there remains time for a resolution to this growing threat of a new Sahara war but, with Morocco appearing to harden its stance on not allowing a popular vote, this is looking increasingly remote. From the perspective of Polisario, if Morocco does not move soon, many Saharawi believe it will be left with little choice but to return to war. With conflict across the Arab world, from Libya to Iraq to Yemen, war between Polisario and Morocco, perhaps involving Algeria and other regional states, can only further destabilize an already deeply unstable part of the world. There is, then, a desire by many, both within the region and beyond it to avoid such an outcome.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Damien Kingsbury holds a Personal Chair in the Faculty of Arts and Education at Deakin University, Melbourne, and is Professor of International Politics in the School of Social Sciences and Humanities. Professor Kingsbury is author or editor of more than two dozen books and numerous book chapters and journal articles on political and security issues and has acted as adviser to a number of non-state military organizations seeking settlement of outstanding political claims. His primary research focuses on conflict resolution and political transitions in authoritarian and post-conflict environments.

Notes

1 Population figures are disputed, but the Algerian government claims 165,000, possibly for reasons of greater foreign aid. The camps are named after towns in occupied Western Sahara, including Dakhla, El-Aaiun, Smara and Awserd, as well as Boujdour and the administrative camp of Rabouni.

2 Arabic: al-Jumhūrīyah al-‘Arabīyah aṣ-Ṣaḥrāwīyah ad-Dīmuqrāṭīyah, Spanish: República Árabe Saharaui Democrática.

3 WSRW, P is for Plunder: Morocco's Export of Phosphates from Occupied Western Sahara 2012, 2013 (Melbourne: Western Sahara Resource Watch, 2014).

4 ‘Simply – Western Sahara’, New Internationalist, no. 297; ‘A Brief History of the Territory and its People’, http://www.arso.org/05-1.htm (accessed August 15, 2015); Janos Besenyo, Western Sahara (Budapest: Publikon Publishers, 2009).

5 T. Shelley, Endgame in the Western Sahara: What Future for Africa's Last Colony? (London: Zed Books, 2004), 171–2.

6 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, 12; Hans Corell, ‘Western Sahara: UN Legal Counsel Renders Opinion on Oil Prospecting Contracts’, UN News Centre, February 5, 2002; Hans Corell, ‘Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council’, S/2002/161, United Nations, February 12, 2002.

7 United Nations Security Council Resolution 690: The Situation Concerning Western Sahara, New York, 1991.

8 J. Mundy, ‘Seized of the Matter: The UN and the Western Sahara Dispute’, Mediterranean Quarterly 15, no. 3 (2004): 130–48.

9 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1495, New York, 2003.

10 Hans Corell, ‘The Responsibility of the UN Security Council in the Case of Western Sahara’, International Judicial Monitor (Winter 2015).

11 United Nations General Assembly, Article 73e of the UN Charter; also see: A/5446/Rev.1, annex 1; UN Security Council S/2002/161, ‘Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council’.

12 UN Security Council A/RES/68/91 of 11 December 2013, also United Nations Annual Working Paper on Western Sahara, A/AC.109/2014/1.

13 See ‘Polisario Urges UN to Press for Western Sahara Referendum’, Agence France Presse, February 16, 2016.

14 ‘Polisario Threatens War with Morocco after Speech by King’, World Tribune.com, November 12, 2014, http://www.worldtribune.com/2014/11/12/polisario-threatens-war-morocco-speech-king/ (accessed May 5, 2015).

15 Michael Jacobs, ‘Hegemonic Rivalry in the Maghreb: Algeria and Morocco in the Western Sahara Conflict’, University of South Florida, January 2012; ‘Morocco and Algeria: The Impossible Reconciliation?’, Al Monitor, July 7, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/07/reconciliation-between-morocco-and-algeria-possible.html# (accessed August 15, 2015).

16 Informal discussion with the author, Rabouni camp, April 10, 2015.

17 Informal Interview with the author, Rabouni camp, April 12, 2015.

18 Also spelled Aousserd.

19 Interview with the author, Awserd camp, April 11, 2015.

20 ‘Morocco–Algeria Relations Tense Despite Breakthrough Periods’, Middle East Monitor, 2014, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/15984-morocco-algeria-relations-tense-despite-breakthrough-periods (accessed May 4, 2015).

21 Interview with the author, Awserd camp, April 11, 2015.

22 44 resolutions since 1991 are listed at MINURSO, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/resolutions.shtmla (accessed August 15, 2015).

23 Interview with the author, Awserd camp, April 11, 2015.

24 Indonesia invaded what was then Portuguese Timor in late 1975 following moves for its Portuguese colonial masters to withdraw, and the occupation was not recognized by the UN.

25 Interview with the author, Rabouni camp, April 12, 2015.

26 Informal interview, Rabouni camp, April 12, 2015.