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Abstract
Since the leadership transition in China in November 2012, there have been significant changes in Chinese foreign policy. It has been widely observed that under the new leadership headed by President Xi Jinping, Beijing has become more assertive in international affairs. This paper ex- amines the emerging contours of China's foreign policy under Xi and the implications for the future regional order in the Asia Pacific. It argues that recent international behaviour of China is the manifestation of a new phase of Chinese foreign policy that could be defined as ‘peaceful rise 2.0’. In this analysis, while Beijing still adheres to its declared ‘peaceful development’ policy aiming to maintain a stable external environment conducive to its ascendance, the manner in which it seeks to do so are considerably different from past decades. The paper further argues that despite China's growing power, President Xi faces greater difficulties than his predecessor to achieve his foreign policy objectives. Indeed Beijing's capacity to shape the regional environment in its favour in the near future is arguably declining rather than increasing.
Acknowledgements
An earlier draft of this article was presented at the 6th Oceanic Conference on International Studies at the University of Melbourne, Australia, 9–11 July 2014. I am grateful to the conference participants, Aran Martin, Steven Slaughter and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive suggestions and comments. I would also like to thank Kai Liao for assistance with references.
Notes on contributor
Jian Zhang is a Senior Lecturer and Deputy Head of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, UNSW Canberra, the Australian Defence Force Academy. His research focuses on Chinese foreign and security policy.
Notes
1 Michael Yahuda, ‘China's New Assertiveness in the South China Sea’, Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 81 (2013): 446–59; Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘China's Recent Assertiveness: Implications for the Future of US–China Relations', Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 25, 2014, Washington, DC, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/download/friedberg-testimony-06-25-14;Thomas F. Christensen, ‘Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy’, Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011): 54–67 (2011). For a useful discussion on such a view, see Michael D. Swaine, ‘Perceptions of an Assertive China’, China Leadership Monitor no. 32 (2010).
2 Ha Anh Tuan, ‘China's South China Sea Play: The End of Beijing's “Peaceful Rise”?’, National Interest, May 9, 2014. Benjamin Schreer, ‘Peaceful Rise, Anyone? China's East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone’, Strategist, November 28, 2013, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/?s=peaceful+rise; Graeme Dobell, ‘China's Peaceful Rise into Pieces', Strategist, June 12, 2014, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-peaceful-rise-into-pieces.printni/14349; John Lee, ‘China's Peaceful Rise Less Likely’, Australian, March 4, 2013, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/chinas-peaceful-rise-less-likely/story-e6frgd0x-1226589469155?nk=28d317fa6f284f1c90718cec3f556665.
3 Brad Glosseman, ‘China's Grand Strategy Disaster’, National Interest, May 20, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-grand-strategy-disaster-10492.
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5 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?’, International Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 7–48; Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China's Assertive Behavior – Part Two: The Maritime Periphery’, China Leadership Monitor no. 35 (2011).
6 Björn Jerdén, ‘The Assertive China Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought into It', Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 1 (2014): 87.
7 Swaran Singh, ‘Xi's Proactive Foreign Policy Fruitful’, China Daily, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-03/19/content_17360607.htm.
8 Qu Xing, ‘2013 Zhongguo Waijiao Xinzheng' [2013 China's new diplomacy], Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs], no. 1 (2014): 32–3; Wang Yusheng, ‘Zhongguo de Waijiao Xinzheng' [China's new diplomacy], Jiefang Ribao, November 11, 2013, http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2013-11-11/101028677031.shtml.
9 For example, see Wang Yi, ‘Embark on a New Journey of China's Diplomacy: Address by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Symposium “New Starting Point, New Thinking and New Practice 2013: China and the World”', http://cebu.china-consulate.org/eng/xwdt/t1109943.htm.
10 Yan Xuetong , ‘From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 2 (2014): 153–84.
11 Linda Jakobson, ‘China's Foreign Policy Dilemma’, Analysis (February 2013), Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
12 Xie Lai, ‘Shiba Da Hou Zhe Yinian' [the year after the 18th National Party Congress], http://app.cankaoxiaoxi.com/print.php?contentid=304641.
13 Zheng Bijian, ‘China's “Peaceful Rise” To Great-Power Status', Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 18–24.
14 Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, ‘The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of “Peaceful Rise”', China Quarterly 190 (2007): 291–310.
15 Information Office of the State Council, ‘China's Peaceful Development Road’, December 22, 2005, China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-12/22/content_505678.htm; Information Office of the State Council, ‘China's Peaceful Development’, September 6, 2011, Xinhua News, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-09/06/c_131102329.htm.
16 David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order’, International Security 29, no. 3 (winter 2004/05): 64–99; Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).
17 ‘Xi Jinping zai zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju di san ci jiti xuexi shi qiangdiao genghao tongchou guonei guoji liangge daju, hangshi zou heping fazhan daolu de jichu’ [Xi Jinping stressed at the 3rd study session of the Politburo the need for coordinating domestic and international strategic situation, building a solid foundation for walking on the peaceful development road], People's Daily, January 30, 2013.
18 ‘Xi Jinping qiangdiao qiangjun yu hanwei “hexin liyi”' [Xi Jinping emphasizes building up a strong military and protecting ‘core interests'], BBC Chinese net, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/03/140312_xi_jinping_core_interests.
19 Glaser and Medeiros, ‘The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China’.
20 Liu Zhongmin, ‘Pinglun cheng zhongguo heping jueqi bushi weihu nanhai quanyi de jinguzhou [Commentary claims that China's peaceful rise policy should not be a straitjacket constraining China's efforts of safeguarding its rights and interests in the South China Sea], http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2011-06-27/0849654058.html.
21 For example, see Yan Xuetong, ‘From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement’.
22 For example, Wang Yiwei, ‘Zhongguo heping jueqi bingfei jinguzhou, qianti shi bieguo yeyao heping' [China's peaceful rise is not a straitjacket, the pre-condition is that other countries must commit to peace as well], Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2014-02/4854076.html.
23 Wang Yi, ‘Jianding buyi zou heping fazhan daolu, wei shixian minzu fuxing zhongguo meng yingzao lianghao guoji huanjing' [Insisting on a peaceful development road and creating a favourable external environment conducive to the realization of the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation], Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], no. 1(January/February 2014): 18–44.
24 ‘Xi Jinping zai zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju di zan ci jiti xuexi shi qiangdiao'.
25 For example, Wang Yiwei, ‘Zhongguo heping jueqi bingfei jinguzhou, qianti shi bieguo yeyao heping'.
26 Xi Jinping, ‘Working Together Toward a Better Future for Asia and the World' (speech given at Boao Forum for Asia, http://english.boaoforum.org/mtzxxwzxen/7379.jhtml).
27 Zachary Keck, ‘Did Xi Jinping Really Rebuke North Korea?’, Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/did-xi-jinping-really-rebuke-north-korea.
28 ‘Full Text of Li Keqiang's Speech at Opening Ceremony of Boao Forum’, Xinhua, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-04/11/content_17425516.htm.
29 Yang Jiechi, ‘Implementing the Chinese Dream’, National Interest, September 10, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/implementing-the-chinese-dream-9026.
30 Ibid.
31 For a detailed discussion on the conference, see Timothy R. Heath, ‘Diplomacy Work Forum: Xi Steps up Efforts to Shape a China-Centered Regional Order', China Brief 13, no. 22 (November 2013).
32 ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform’, China Daily, January 16, 2014, http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm.
33 ‘Xi Jinping to Lead National Security Commission’, Xinhua, January 24, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/24/c_133071876.htm.
34 Lu Gang, ‘Guoanhui zhutui waijiao juece moshi gaige’ [National Security Commission promotes reforms in foreign policy decision-making], Shehui Guancha [Social Outlook], no. 12 (2013): 36–38. On problems in China's fragmented foreign and security policy-making system, see Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors in China (Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010); International Crisis Group, ‘Stirring up the South China Sea (I)’, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/223-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-i.pdf.
35 ‘Xi Jinping: Jian chi zongti guojia anquanguan, zou zhonguo tece guojia anquan daolu' [Xi Jinping: insisting on the overall national security outlook, walking the national security path with Chinese characteristics], Xinhua Net, April 15, 2014.
36 Yang, ‘Implementing the Chinese Dream’.
37 ‘Chinese FM, UN Chief Discuss Korean Peninsula Tensions', Xinhua Net, April 6, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/06/c_132288307.htm
38 Reuters, ‘China Draws “Red Line” on North Korea, Says Won't Allow War on Peninsula’, Reuters, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/uk-korea-north-china-idUKBREA2703T20140308.
39 Andrew Browne, ‘Chinese Premier Li Warns Southeast Asia Nations Against “Provocations”', Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2014.
40 ‘Nanhai renhe tiaoxin bi zao guoduan huiying' [Provocations in the South China Sea will certainly be responded to in a decisive manner], People's Daily (Overseas edition), April 11, 2014, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2014-04/11/content_1413618.htm.
41 ‘Xi Jinping: Jiaqiang dingceng sheji he dixian siwei, jiji kazhan daguowaijiao’ [Xi Jinping: strengthening top-level design and bottom line thinking, actively advancing major power diplomacy], www.China.org, http://henan.china.com.cn/news/china/201312/H084770T3Q.html.
42 For example, Jin Canrong and Wang Hao, ‘Shiba da yilai zhongguo waijiao de xinlinian he xintedian' [New thinking and new features of China's foreign policy since the 18th National Party Congress], Hubei daxue xuebao [Journal of Hebei University] 41, no. 3 (May 2014): 26–30.
43 Yang, ‘Implementing the Chinese Dream’.
44 Mel Gurtov, ‘The Uncertain Future of a “New Type” of US–China Relationship', The Asia-Pacific Journal 11, no. 52 (2013), http://www.japanfocus.org/-Mel-Gurtov/4052.
45 Peter Mattis, ‘Nothing New About China's New Concept', National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/nothing-new-about-chinas-new-concept-8559.
46 Jin Kai, ‘Can China Build a Community of Common Destiny?’, Diplomat, November 28, 2013.
47 Information Office of the State Council, ‘China's Peaceful Development’.
48 Jin Kai, ‘Can China Build a Community of Common Destiny?’
49 China Daily, ‘President Xi to Give Speech to Indonesia's Parliament’, http://www.chinadailyasia.com/news/2013-10/03/content_15090901.html.
50 Heath, ‘Diplomacy Work Forum’.
51 Liu Zhenmin, ‘Jianchi hezuo gongying, xieshou dazao yazhou mingyun gongtongti’ [Insisting on win–win cooperation, working together to build an Asian ‘community of common destiny'], Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies] no. 2 (2014): 1–10.
52 William Pesek, ‘Xi's Dream Calls for Love, Not Money’, BloombergView, November 10, 2014.
53 Shannon Tiezzi, ‘The New Silk Road: China's Marshall Plan?’, Diplomat, November 6, 2014.
54 Douglas H. Paal, ‘Contradictions in China's Foreign Policy’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 13, 2013.
55 Deng Yuan, ‘Quxing: Zhongguo waijiao de dingceng sheji yu dixian siwei’ [Quxing: the top-level design and bottom-line thinking of Chinese foreign policy], Guoji xianqu daobao [International Leader Herald], September 16, 2013, http://app.cankaoxiaoxi.com/print.php?contentid=272722.
56 Michael D. Swaine, ‘China's Assertive Behavior – Part One: On “Core Interets”', China Leadership Monitor no. 34 (2011).
57 Information Office of the State Council, ‘China's Peaceful Development’.
58 New York Times, ‘China's Evolving “Core Interests”’, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/opinion/sunday/chinas-evolving-core-interests.html?_r=0.
59 Swaine, ‘China's Assertive Behavior – Part One'.
60 Michael D. Swaine, ‘Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the US Pacific Pivot', China Leadership Monitor no. 38 (2012).
61 For an excellent discussion on the limitation of China's power, see David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
62 James Reilly, ‘China's Economic Statecraft : Turning Wealth into Power’, Analysis (November 2013), Sydney: Lowy Institue for International Policy.
63 For example, Yan Xuetong, ‘From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement’; Jin Canrong and Wang Hao, ‘Shiba da yilai zhongguo waijiao de xinlinian he xintedian' [New thinking and new features of China's foreign policy since the 18th National Party Congress]; Ruan Zongze, ‘Ying de xiayige shinian zhongguo suzao duozhidian waijiao' [Gaining another 10 years, China formulates multidimensional diplomacy], Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], no. 4 (2013): 20–36. Ni Shixiong and Qian Xuming, ‘Shibada yilai de zhongguo xinwaijiao zhuanlue sixiang bianxi' [An analysis of China's new diplomatic thinking since the 18th National Party Congress], Xueshu Qianyan [Frontier Research], no. 3 (2014): 72–83.
64 For example, Glosseman, ‘China's Grand Strategy Disaster’; Rob Taylor, ‘Chinese Territorial Claims Driving Asia Closer to U.S.’, Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2014. Robert Manning and Banning Garrett, ‘Does China have a Strategy?’, PacNet no. 29, April 30, 2013, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS. Also see Christensen, ‘Advantages of an Assertive China’.
65 Jane Perlez, ‘China's “New Type” of Ties Fails to Sway Obama’, New York Times, November 9, 2014.
66 Shannon Tiezzi, ‘NSA Susan Rice in China: Rethinking “New Type Great Power Relations”', Diplomat, September 10, 2014.
67 Zachary Keck, ‘Why the US is Trying to Squash China's New Development Bank’, Diplomat, October 10, 2014.
68 Wei Zhongyu, ‘A New Model for China–US Relations?’, Diplomat, November 10, 2014.