From Fiuggi to the Farnesina: Gianfranco Fini's Remarkable Journey

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Acknowledgements

Thanks are due the editors of this section, the anonymous reviewers and Duncan McDonnell for their useful comments and suggestions. Because of space restraints I have not referenced every mention of a statement or taking of a position by Fini or other political actors. In general these were taken from coverage of Italian politics since 2001 in la Repubblica and Corriere della Sera.

Notes

¹ This gave Fini the right to appoint the national executive and nominate its regional secretaries.

² This was led by Mario Segni, who had previously campaigned against the corruption of the ‘First Republic’ and had been the prime mover behind the referendums to reform the electoral system in the early 1990s.

³ Gasparri declared that within the AN ‘everyone was opposed, even those that say they are not’. The party's national coordinator, Ignazio La Russa, was involved in physical altercations with hard-line party militants who were jeering Fini as he explained his position at a party meeting in November 2003.

⁴ The Fiuggi political thesis called for the return of assets appropriated from the Italian minority by the Tito regime and argued that the entry of Slovenia and Croatia into the EU should be made conditional on a firmer defence of the interests of the Italian communities in these countries. As a direct result of the AN's stance, the first Berlusconi government blocked an EU association agreement with Slovenia. In 1991 Fini had travelled to Belgrade to discuss with Serb leaders the possibility of Italian re-annexation of Istria and Dalmatia (Locatelli & Martini 1995, p. 231).

⁵ Fini voted to abrogate clauses which outlawed scientific research on embryos, limited the scope for implanting embryos and pre-checking them for genetic defects and introduced an equivalence between the rights of embryos and mothers.

⁶ Despite its return to government in 2001, the AN's vote share fell from its 1996 high point of 15.7% to 12% (the UDC parties combined polled 3.2%). In the European elections of 2004 it polled 11.5% (the UDC polled 5.9%). In the 2005 regional elections it polled 11% (the UDC polled 5.7%).

⁷ For example, when Berlusconi declared that the behaviour of the judiciary was worse than that of the Fascist regime or when he suggested in an interview with The Spectator that those imprisoned by the Fascist regime had been treated as if they were in holiday camps.

⁸ In late 2004 Fini created an inner party directorate of three Vice Presidents, comprising Gianni Alemanno of the destra sociale faction, Ignazio La Russa of the destra protagonista (‘active right’) faction and Altero Matteoli of the ‘liberal’ nuova alleanza (‘new alliance’) faction. Appointments to key party posts and ministerial positions have generally had to reflect an equilibrium between these factions. This balance was disturbed when Fini proposed the appointment of Storace as Health Minister in April 2005 (following his loss of the Lazio region). Gasparri's attempt to prevent this led to his dismissal from government. Gasparri's destra protagonista faction sought to represent the ‘grand centre’ of the party in opposition to Alemanno and Storace's destra sociale. It favoured staunchly conservative positions and emphasized alliances with other forces of the centre right. Indeed, its members were sometimes viewed as closer to Berlusconi than Fini, as illustrated by Gasparri's role, as Minister of Telecommunications, in piloting a law on media ownership very favourable to Berlusconi. Alemanno resigned as party Vice President following the dispute over the fertility treatment referendum.