From Ubiquitous Presence to Significant Elusiveness: Berlusconi's Portraits, 1994–20051

¹ The present chapter is the expanded and updated English version of an article which first appeared in Vingtième Siècle, 80, 2003.

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Notes

¹ The present chapter is the expanded and updated English version of an article which first appeared in Vingtième Siècle, 80, 2003.

² On Berlusconi's communicative skills and use of the media, see for instance, Amadori (2002, 2003, 2005), Benedetti (2004), McCarthy (1994 and 1997) and Rancarolo (2005). See also Cheles and Sponza (2001).

³ On the phenomenon of personalization in Italian politics, which began in the 1980s, and went hand in hand with that of spectacularisation, see Campus (2002).

⁴ On the (painted) portrait as a pictorial genre, its evolution and its social and political use, see Castelnuovo (1993). The portraits of post-war Italian politicians have received little scholarly attention, but see D'Almeida (2002) and Luzzatto (2004). This sort of investigation is more developed in France, as is attested to by the numerous publications dealing especially with the portraits of presidential candidates and presidents (see, for example, Fresnault-Deruelle, 1989; Delporte, 2001; Esders, 2002; Boude, 2003).

⁵ On the 1994 election, cf. Ignazi & Katz (1996).

⁶ On optimism as a topos of Berlusconi's discourse, see Amadori (2002, pp. 61–63). On the theme of the new economic miracle, cf. Novelli & Urbani (1995).

⁷ Berlusconi was not, in fact, the first to display a broad smile. He had been preceded by the Socialist leader Bettino Craxi (an ally of his), who, during the election campaign of 1983, featured on his printed propaganda beaming and wearing an open-necked shirt to suggest informality and optimism (his slogan was precisely ‘L'ottimismo della volontà’, Optimism of the will) (cf. Craxi et al., 1983). The broad smile is a standard feature of the election portraits of American candidates (see Melder, 1992). See also Figure 25 of this article.

⁸ On the symbolism of the right- and left-hand sides, see Sfera (1990).

⁹ Berlusconi has adopted the term Azzurri (The Blues) to refer to Forza Italia parliamentarians and local councillors. Other sporting terms have been used to give the party a supra-ideological character (see McCarthy, 1997).

¹⁰ The halo made up of twelve stars is, incidentally, also one of the attributes of the Virgin Mary, Queen of Heaven (Figure 4). The association made here is not as unlikely as it sounds. It has in fact been claimed that the European logo (golden stars on a blue background) was directly inspired by the Christian symbol (Hersant, 2003). It is worth noting that when Italy assumed the rotating Presidency of the European Union in July 2003 the press delighted in reproducing photographs of Berlusconi's face framed by the European logo, thus ironically presenting him as a saint (see, for example, The Times, 2003; The Australian, 2003 [Figure 5]; Il Sole - 24 Ore, 2003). The photographs of Berlusconi featured in the independent and left-wing press frequently act as a subtle form of counter-propaganda: they satirize his suave and glamorous official image by presenting him in unflattering terms, more often than not in imperious and insolent attitudes that recall Mussolini's (cf. The Financial Times, 2003 [Figure 6]; la Repubblica, 2005). I propose to deal with this topic in a separate article. On Berlusconi's official press photographs see below, note 27.

¹¹ Wreaths and crowns were, notably, granted by the Romans to commanders and athletes celebrating a triumph. Cf. Hornblower & Spawforth (2003).

¹² On this election, cf. D'Alimonte & Nelken (1997).

¹³ The Left traditionally privileges collective values rather than the idea of a charismatic leader. In 1994 Achille Occhetto, leader of the Partito Democratico della Sinistra (ex-Communists) and of the Progressisti, the left-wing alliance, chose not to have his effigy represented on printed propaganda.

¹⁴ Prodi was advised by a group of semiologists and sociologists from Bologna University, who monitored every stage of his campaign (cf. di Rienzo, 1995; M.S., [Sic], 1995).

¹⁵ On this election see Daniels (2000).

¹⁶ Séguéla's posters had been imitated before by Italian parties. For instance, that bearing the slogan ‘La force tranquille’ (The quiet strength), which depicted Mitterrand in a rural setting, was copied by the Republican Party leader Giorgio La Malfa for the election campaign of 1992 (cf. Cheles, 2001a, pp. 158–159).

¹⁷ On this election cf. Chiaromonte & D'Alimonte (2000).

¹⁸ For this election see especially Bellucci & Bull (2000) and Newell (2002), which includes a particularly informative chapter by Paolucci.

¹⁹ I have dealt with this question in Cheles (1995) and Cheles (2001b).

²⁰ On this double role, epitomized by the double-breasted suit and the jumper, which he alternates, see Pozzato (2001, pp. 292 and 294). On Berlusconi's strategy of appearing both close and remote see Amadori (2002, pp. 131–132).

²¹ For a detailed analysis of these texts and their relation to Berlusconi's portraits cf. Guarino and Pezzini (2003).

²² The first giant posters of Berlusconi appeared in October 2000, more than six months before polling day. Those of Rutelli (who was only designated leader of the centre-left coalition in October 2000) in January 2001 (cf. la Repubblica, 2000; Messina, 2001). The disparity of resources used by the two coalitions in the campaign was considerable. See below.

²³ This campaign was also the most professionally run to date. In order to project an image of competence and modernity Rutelli turned to the American media specialist Stan Greenberg, who had acted as consultant to Bill Clinton. For his part, Berlusconi employed a guru who has worked for the Republicans, the opinion pollster Frank Luntz, as well as the polling society Datamedia (Paolucci, 2002, pp. 131–135), although, in practice, Berlusconi himself played the leading role in the organization of the campaign. A Datamedia consultant, Luigi Crespi, admitted to a journalist in an interview: ‘We implement what Berlusconi wants us to do: we don't tell him what to do’ (cf. Marroni, 2000).

²⁴ Forza Italia, for its part, used themes such as solidarity and the environment, which belong to the traditional repertoire of the left. In a poster Berlusconi even promised to become ‘un premier operaio’ (a worker-leader).

²⁵ In 2001 44.8% of housewives chose Berlusconi's party (see Ginsborg, 2003, p. 19).

²⁶ Pellizza da Volpedo's painting, which became widely known outside Italy after Bernardo Bertolucci used it as the ‘logo’ for his successful film 1900 (1976), has frequently been parodied (see Mani et al., 2002).

²⁷ On this brochure cf. Harris (2001) and Amadori (2002). Innumerable photographs of Berlusconi also appeared in the press, which is, for the most part, owned by him or sympathetic to his views. Since his pictures are mostly provided by Forza Italia, they should be treated as propagandistic. Berlusconi's ‘personal photographers’ escort him on a variety of public engagements to take pictures that present him in the most flattering way. These are sent to the press after being carefully vetted. This phenomenon, which was started by Craxi and is now widespread (Prodi too had a ‘personal photographer’ during his period as Prime Minister), disturbingly evokes the control exerted by the Fascist regime over the press (see Quaranta, 1999).

²⁸ See Eco (2001), who, as well as drawing attention to the influence of advertising on Berlusconi's campaign, insists, with subtlety and humour, on its ‘leftist’ traits.

²⁹ On this interesting case of counter-propaganda and counter-counter-propaganda see Barley (2001). Some of the satirical photomontages were published in book form (cf. Bernardini, 2000; Anon., 2001c).

³⁰ On this law, known as Par Condicio, see Ballini (2002, pp. 51–55).

³¹ On this propaganda see Ellwood (1993). In a message broadcast during the campaign for the local elections of 25–26 May and 8–9 June 2003 Berlusconi appealed to the ‘popolo del “48”’, namely to the spirit of the masses who in 1948 voted in large numbers in favour of the coalition led by the Christian Democrats thus preventing the left from winning this crucial election (cf. Luzi, 2003).

³² The volume does not include a critical account of the portraits. For a useful overview see Novelli (2004).

³³ Berlusconi's personal Press Office kindly informed me that Berlusconi's photograph is one of several available and was chosen because deemed ‘appropriate to the nature of the publication’.

³⁴ This photograph has been President Bush's official portrait since he was first elected in 2001. I am grateful to the Press Office of the American Embassy in Rome for this information.

³⁵ Namely Benin, the Federal and Islamic Republic of the Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Gabon, Kazakhstan, San Marino, Monaco, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia and Vanuatu.

³⁶ On the horizontal format of contemporary political portraits as evocative of a TV screen see Fresnault-Deruelle (1989, p. 151).

³⁷ The countries are Azerbaijan, Barbados, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bhutan, Comoros, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Israel, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Oman, Poland, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Tuvalu and the United Arab Emirates.

³⁸ On the iconography of papal portraits see Tittoni et al. (2004). Interestingly, a well-known official portrait of the Chinese leader Zou Enlai also depicts him sitting in an armchair with both arms placed on the armrests, his face turned in perfect profile. The picture was taken by Giorgio Lotti, who happens to have also worked, on various occasions, for Berlusconi (cf. Novelli, 2004, p. 67).

³⁹ This elusiveness is merely a parenthesis; it need not be interpreted as the sign of a new style of campaigning, subdued and self-effacing, rather than irruptive and self-centred. Berlusconi's press conference with Tony Blair in Rome, on 27 May 2005 (less than two months after his coalition's catastrophic performance in the regional election), in which he vehemently attacked the Economist for painting a sombre picture of the Italian economy and boasted that Italy was a successful and contented country (see Luzi, 2005) suggests that a change of approach is not envisaged.