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Abstract
Turkey's Iraq policy has come under scrutiny since the Turkish parliament defeated a motion that called for Turkey's involvement in the war against Iraq in 2003. This study argues that rationalist perspectives cannot completely account either for Turkey's non-cooperation with the USA in this war or for the articulation and implementation of Iraq policy since then. A comprehensive account of Turkey's Iraq policy requires a discussion of the impact of identity politics and historical narratives on perceptions of interests.
Notes
1 For an articulation of the impact of identity politics on the foreign policies of Middle East countries see Telhami, S. & Barnett, M. (Eds) (2002) Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,).
2 For a detailed discussion of the impact of the Iraq issue on Turkish–American relations in the 1990s see Altunışık, M. B. (2004) Turkish–US security relations: the Middle East dimension, in: Aydın, M. & Erhan, C. (Eds) Turkish–American Relations: 200 years of Divergence and Convergence, pp. 151–180 (London: Routledge); Martin, L. G. (2004) Turkey's Middle East foreign policy, in: Martin L. G. & D. Kerides (Ed.) The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 157–189 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press); Robins, P. (2003) Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, ch. 9 (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press).
3 When the Saddam regime suppressed the uprising that erupted after the 1991 War in the north of Iraq, about half-a-million Iraqi Kurds crossed over the border to Turkey in search of safety. The humanitarian crisis led to the establishment of Operation Provide Comfort and the imposition of a no-fly zone over the 36th parallel.
4 See note 2.
5 In the 1990s Turkey provided diplomatic passports to the leaders of the KDP (Barzani) and PUK (Talabani), and became their link to the outside world. The two parties opened their representations in Ankara. In addition to allowing border trade, Ankara also provided economic aid. Turkey also mediated between the two sides when they engaged in armed conflict. Most importantly, however, by allowing US and UK forces to use İncirlik airbase Turkey became the key to the continuation of the north's de facto independence from Baghdad. The KDP in return at times helped Turkey in its war against the PKK in northern Iraq.
6 Radikal (Istanbul), 2002, 24 December, p. 1.
7 Fisher, I. (2002) Turkey grows more worried every day about a US attack on Iraq, New York Times, 28 October, p. A11.
8 Yetkin, M. (2004) Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü (The Motion: The Real Story of the Iraqi Crisis), pp. 41–42 (Ankara, Turkey: Remzi Kitabevi).
9 Yetkin, pp. 66–67.
10 What follows is a summary of the positions in this debate as represented in the Turkish media during this period.
11 Milliyet (Istanbul), 2002, 24 December, p. 1.
12 CNN.com, 2002, 16 October.
13 The AKP got 34.27% of the votes and became the first political party to win enough seats to form a single party majority government since 1987.
14 Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), 2002, 17 December, p. 1
15 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the AKP, was barred from holding political office because of an earlier conviction for reading a poem ‘inciting religious hatred’ at a rally. Abdullah Gül therefore took over as Prime Minister. The AKP then pushed through parliament a constitutional amendment which would allow Erdoğan to run for office. As the AKP was still viewed with suspicion by most of the secular establishment, the invitation of Erdogan to the White House, when he was still banned from holding political office, may have contributed to the atmosphere of mistrust as far as Turkey's foreign and security establishment was concerned.
16 Donat, Y. (2003) Ankara'nın Fotografı (The Panorama of Ankara), Sabah (Istanbul), 24 February, p. 3.
17 Among 363 AKP parliamentarians, 22 voted no and 9 abstained, thus giving the first signs of a willingness to defy party discipline.
18 Particularly the op-ed pieces in the journal Yeni Safak, which is pro-AKP, were quite vocal in their criticism of US policy and the possibility of a war against Iraq.
19 The previous parties established by Islamists in Turkey since the Gulf War, beginning with the Welfare Party, were quite critical of US policy towards Iraq and would oppose Turkey's participation alongside the USA in a war against a Muslim nation.. These parties were among the most vocal critics of Operation Northern Watch (formerly Operation Provide Comfort). Erbakan called it a ‘second Sevres’, referring to the peace agreement imposed on the Ottoman Empire by the Allied powers after World War I, which effectively carved up the remaining territories into several states.
20 Yetkin, p. 117.
21 Yetkin, pp. 120–121.
22 Starting in the mid 1990s, Turkey stationed a permanent military presence of about 2000 Special Forces in northern Iraq.
23 Bila, F., Milliyet (Istanbul), 2002, 24 December, p. 6.
24 Sabah (Istanbul), 2003, 24 February, p. 1.
25 Identity politics influenced the votes of the AKP deputies. Deputies with roots in the previous Islamist parties and movements, as well as those representing those regions of the country with large Kurdish populations, voted against the motion.
26 The divisions within the AKP led some commentators to argue that the party was in fact a coalition of diverse groups. See, for instance, Alkan, T. (2003) Savasin ilk yaralısı: AKP (AKP: the first casualty of the war), Radikal (Istanbul), 4 March, p. 5.
27 Yetkin, M. (2003) Tezkere dersleri (The lesons of the failed motion), Radikal (Istanbul), 4 March, p. 4.
28 This distinction was very much in line with the AKP's characterization of itself as a conservative democratic party, emphasizing religious and moral values in social life and focusing on realpolitik in economics, politics and foreign policy.
29 CNNTurk, 2003, 6 June.
30 During the negotiations between Ankara and Washington several Kurdish officials thereatened war if the Turkish army intervened in northern Iraq. For instance, KDP International Relations Director Hoshyar Zebari, who is currently Iraq's Foreign Minister, said that any intervention by Turkey would lead to clashes between Kurds and Turks [Sabah (Istanbul), 2003, 24 February, p. 1].
31 ‘Kurds’ looting sweeps across liberated Kirkuk: US forces take action late in day, Washington Post, 2003, 12 April, p. A23.
32 Turkey's response was seen as a step back from its previous threats of military incursion. Pan, P. (2003) Turkish officials back away from threats to invade northern Iraq, Washington Post, 12 April, p. A23.
33 Hürriyet (Istanbul), 2003, 7 July, p. 1.
34 Ozdag, U. (2003) Türk–Amerikan ılişkilerinde Irak krizi (The Iraqi crisis in Turkish–American relations), Stratejik Analiz, August, pp. 3–5.
35 Turkey was given the choice of three regions: the Salah Al-Din Governorate, including Tikrit; the al-Anbar Euphrates coast area; the northern area of al Anbar province (in west central Iraq).
36 Press Conference of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Hürriyet (Istanbul), 2003, 13 October, p. 1].
37 Marquardt, E. (2003) Deployment of necessity: Turkish military involvement in Iraq, Power and Interest News Report, 10 October, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac = view_report&report_id = 101&language_id = 1 (accessed 23 August 2006).
38 al-Marashi, I. (2004) A new chapter in Iraqi–Turkish relations? Examining Iraqi and Arab reactions to the Turkish deployment to Iraq', Insight Turkey, 6(1), pp. 119–128.
39 Although Turkey's relations with the EU and the USA put serious limitations on unilateral use of military force, it is safe to argue that it is not completely out of the question, as shown by recent reports in the Turkish media about the existence of such plans in the case of Kurdish incorporation of Kirkuk into Iraqi Kurdistan. See, for instance the Turkish dailies Sabah (2004, 30 October, p. 1) and Milliyet (2004, 1 November, p. 1).
40 For the impact of the EU on Turkish foreign policy see Kirişçi, K. (2004) Between Europe and the Middle East: the transformation of Turkish policy', MERIA Journal, 8(1). Available at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal (accessed 14 January 2005).
41 For the problems and tensions in Kirkuk see Human Rights Watch (2004) Claims In Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq. http://hrw.org/reports/2004/iraq0804/ (accessed 14 August 2006).
42 Alpay, S. (2004) Türkiye'nin Irak politikası değişiyor mu?' (Is Turkey's policy towards Iraq changing?), Zaman (Istanbul), 5 June, p. 5.
43 Saideman, S. (2004) Thinking theoretically about identity and foreign policy, in: Telhami, S. & Barnett, M. (Eds) Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, p. 171 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
44 The support given to the PKK by Syria and Iran, despite the existence of Kurdish minorities in these countries, does not seem to support the argument that such vulnerability would prevent interference in the form of supporting dissidents across the border (Saideman, pp. 172–173).