Achieving Human Security after Intra-State Conflict: The Lessons of Kosovo

Abstract

Following the 1999 conflict in the Kosovo, the task of building a future for the province fell to the international community in the form of the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO. Almost immediately, the challenges of building a secure environment for a population divided by ethnic conflict became apparent, as did the diversity of these problems. Human security is affected by many imperatives and every one impacts on the perception of the population as to its safety. Despite good intensions, the international community often delays the return to normalcy and local ownership of the security sector and, therefore, security sector reform (SSR) becomes difficult to achieve. This article examines the efforts of the international community to resolve the security problems of Kosovo, over the last six years, and points to the conflicting SSR agendas which occurred. It examines how UNMIK and NATO tried to contain the problems in the province and, as the decision on the final status of Kosovo draws near, suggests how the EU might learn from what has gone before.

Keywords:

• Kosovo
• Human Security
• Security Sector Reform

Notes

¹ The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

² In August 2005 the UN exhumed 41 graves in Pristina which contained the bodies of Serbs killed soon after the arrival of NATO troops six years before (Robinson, 2005, p. 2). Two Serbs were killed and two wounded in a shooting in Shtërpce on 29 August 2005 in an attack which was condemned by EU High Representative Javier Solana (Kadrui, 2005, p. 4).

³ The full text of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe can be found at http://www.stabilitypact.org/constituent/990610-cologne.asp.

⁴ The USA is not alone, even European nations have cut back on aid to Kosovo. DFID's Kosovo budget has fallen from a post-conflict high of £210 million in 1999/2000 to £2.7 million in 2005/2006 (DFID Office, Pristina, September 2005).

⁵ The Party List system has been condemned by many Kosovar Albanians interviewed by KIPRED and the OSCE as part of the Internal Security Sector Review process. There is a widely held belief that politicians do not listen to their constituents but work hard to retain favour within their political parties (see Peci & Dugoli, 2006, pp. 51–53).

⁶ An example of this attitude is the recent landslide which blocked the main road to FYROM. The Provisional Institutes of Self-Government (PISG) found the problem too great for them to handle and turned to UNMIK and KFOR to solve it. A task which should have been dealt with swiftly has, at the time of writing, meant that the main artery for goods, fuel, food and travel to FYROM, Greece and beyond has been blocked for 60 days. The problem was, of course, exacerbated by the fact that free movement through Serbia and Montenegro continues to be restricted.

⁷ ‘The responsibility to rebuild … must be directed towards returning the society in question to those who live in it and who, in the last instance, must take responsibility together for its future destiny’ (Evans et al., 2001, p. 45).

⁸ The author experienced this for himself in winter 2005/2006. Water was often not available in Pristina between the hours of midnight and 5.00 a.m. Electricity was rationed, throughout the province, with breaks occurring for up to 12–15 hours at a time. In November 2005 a new system was introduced that rewarded areas that had paid their power bills whilst penalizing those that had not. Names of offenders were published in local newspapers. However, this system became a source of instability, in February 2006, when demonstrations in several towns over the lack of electricity threatened to spread throughout the province. Six years after the international community commenced work to improve the public utilities system in the province the lack of power has become an acute security problem.

⁹ Peci and Dugoli (2006, pp. 32–33).

¹⁰ In 2000 some 70,000 households were receiving regular stipends paid to unemployed public sector workers (World Bank, 2001, p. 39). The author was told, in September 2005, that this situation has not significantly changed.

¹¹ Interviews, in September 2005, with both Albanian and Serb Kosovo residents revealed that the inability to travel out of the province without undergoing time-consuming and degrading visa application processes was a major frustration to ordinary citizens. ‘What we need is the freedom to travel, the freedom to study and the freedom to be treated like ordinary people’ (senior member of the AAK Parliamentary Group, Assembly of Kosovo).

¹² Agim Ceku, Prime Minister of Kosovo and late Commander of the Kosovo Protection Corps, revealed to the author his concern about a small but worrying rise in religious fundamentalism in Kosovo. He stated that he was aware of an increasing interest in militant Islam among young adults in the province (2005, September 23).

¹³ Trafficking remains a serious problem. Kosovo is mainly a destination point, but also serves as a transit station for women and children trafficked for the purpose of prostitution (United States Office in Pristina, 2003, 31 March).

¹⁴ Erhard Busek (2005) noted that ‘in the Balkans, a bribe of less that 20% is considered baksheesh, more than 20% is deemed to be a crime’.

¹⁵ A Pristina businessman told the author that in order to grow his business he needs links with the ‘outside world and that can only be achieved if we have a good highway to the port of Durres in Albania so our goods can be easily and cheaply moved to the European market. Trade is the only thing that can make the new Kosovo work’ (2005, 20 September).

¹⁶ ‘There is no real construction, development, so what are they going to do? I talk with many young people, they ask “Where can I get scholarships to go abroad?” … if I talk with ten young people during the day, eight of them, I have this question. So that indicates that very soon we are going to have massive young Kosovars that will leave Kosovo’ (Albanian Social Worker in Pristina, 2006, 13 January).

¹⁷ ‘The UN have done nothing but fill their own pockets, they should leave’ (Serbian Schoolteacher, Zubin Potok, 2005, 21 September). ‘FUND’—graffito pained on the side of UN Vehicles. The ‘UN’ logos on the car doors have had an ‘F’ and a ‘D’ added to make the Albanian word ‘FUND’ (end).

¹⁸ A Kosovar Albanian businessman, a long-term resident in the Republic of Germany, told the author that he had legally purchased land on the outskirts of Pristina to build a hotel and leisure area. He was assured by UNMIK that planning permission would be forthcoming. Four years later he was still waiting (2005, 22 September).

¹⁹ An Albanian woman in Pristina referring to the psychological effects of the 2004 riots (2005, 17 January).

²⁰ Interview with 18 mixed gender youths in Pristina and with 10 mixed ethnicity/gender youths in Mitrovica.

²¹ ‘The politicians are not respected because they are ex-KLA. There is prejudice against the Serbs and the UN presence has not changed this’ (Serb in Zubin Potok). ‘Mitrovica citizens will never attack us because we lived fine together before the war, and now on both sides of the city we are tired of those villagers who come here’ (a Serb in North Mitrovica) (International Crisis Group, 2005b, p. 14). ‘Villagers’ is a term used by both Albanians and Serbs to denote an unsophisticated or hoodlum element.

²² ‘Security is where anyone who wishes harm to others is stopped and all citizens are equal and free’ (female teacher in Zubin Potok, 2005, 21 September).

²³ Quote from an Albanian student in Shtime (2006, 18 January).

²⁴ Albanian journalist in Pristina (2005, 23 September).

²⁵ Doctor in the Serbian IDP Information Centre.

²⁶ A laid-off Trepca miner (2005, 21 September).

²⁷ Presenting a report, published on 27 September 2005, Kanthan Shankar the World Bank representative in Kosovo said around 37% of Kosovars live on less than €1.42 a day, whereas some 15% live in extreme poverty on less than €0.93 a day. The Report went on to say that the Kosovo population is facing a great political challenge; therefore more commitment is required from Government policy-makers to implement the programmes for economic growth (World Bank, 2005).

²⁸ Unemployment among the minority population in some areas has reached 90% (UNDP, 2003).

²⁹ ‘UNMIK has promised a lot and delivered nothing. I would be happy to see the UN go but the EU stay—once the world sees we are Europeans then the economy and jobs will follow’ (Albanian male in Pristina, 2005, 29 January).

³⁰ ‘There is no positive feeling for KFOR, they came as NATO and bombed us. Now they say that they want to bring peace to Kosovo. But at least they are keeping us safe from Albanians’(Serbian male in Zubin Potok, (2005, 21 September).

³¹ ‘Kosovo will need at least a decade before economic strategies kick in. They will be bumping along the bottom until then’(an EU Adviser to the Minister for Trade and Industry, Kosovo Assembly, 2006, 6 January).

³² This term was used by a Kosovar Albanian to describe her feelings about living in Kosovo today. She concluded, ‘and, from there, we view the world outside our borders’ (Interview in Pristina, 2005, 20 September).

³³ Serbian male in Zubin Potok (2005, 21 September).

³⁴ Albanian male in Vushtri (2005, 18 September).

³⁵ ‘The military today have been infused with a zero defect mentality, which means that commanders on the ground are fearful of making mistakes and losing men. They therefore place force protection high on their list of priorities’ (US naval officer, US Embassy, Sofia, 2005, 15 September).

³⁶ In Svinjare Village, on 18 March 2004, 286 Serb inhabitants were ordered to leave by KFOR troops as they could not protect them. Only five Serbs have returned to the village since 2004, even though KFOR says they will now ensure their safety (ex-Svinjare resident, interviewed in Mitrovica North, 2005, September).

³⁷ A CIVPOL officer stated that, during the 2001 riots, KFOR failed to support the police on a number of occasions. He believed that a major consideration was the need to minimize both physical and political risk to KFOR troops (discussion in Mitrovica, 2005, September).

³⁸ A paramilitary structure created by Serbs in summer 1999 to defend the bridge over the River Ibar against Kosovo Albanian incursions. Despite numerous attempts by UNMIK, KFOR and CIVPOL to remove them the ‘bridgewatchers’ remain.

³⁹ The ‘Ten Principles of War’ are: selection and maintenance of the aim, maintenance of morale, security, surprise, offensive action, concentration of force, economy of effort, flexibility, cooperation and sustainability (Ministry of Defence, 1997, Annex A). See Appendix 5 for the evolution of Peace Support Principles.

⁴⁰ British Defence Doctrine is quoted in this article, however, many of the NATO Member States Defence Doctrines are very similar. The author has examined the US, Dutch and German equivalents and finds them to be generally the same as the British version.

⁴¹ ‘I am well aware that my career would move into the slow lane if I were to lose soldiers on the streets of Kosovo’ (British army officer, 2005, January 14). ‘Causalities in peacekeeping operations are less acceptable to higher command than they would be in battle’ (French officer, Mitrovica, 2005, 14 January).

⁴² Martti Ahtisaari is a former President of Finland, Secretary of State in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and Under Secretary-General of the United Nations for Administration and Management. He directed the UN approach to Iraq in the aftermath of the first Gulf War but his moderate stance is believed to have cost him American support in the election for UN Secretary-General. In 2005 Ahtisaari successfully led peace negotiations between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian Government.