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Abstract
EU–Russia relations constitute an interesting case through which to examine the way the EU affects how member states operate in external relations with third countries, and to what extent the member states can shape EU policy. All 27 member states partake in EU decision-making, and all of them also maintain bilateral relations with Russia. This article examines why it is that EU member states struggle to speak with one voice. In particular it investigates whether a convergence of member states' individual policies has developed into an EU policy or, alternatively, if their bilateral relations with Russia prevent a common policy from developing. Different avenues through which individual states' national preferences can shape EU policy towards Russia are examined in the first part of this article, while the second part addresses the perennial debates about the trade-off between the ‘shared values’ and the individual national interests of member states. It is argued that member states are split on matters of principle, effectively supporting contrasting approaches which are intrinsically difficult to reconcile. This study of the EU's relationship with its most important neighbour on the continent opens a window onto whether the EU is developing as a viable foreign policy actor.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the University Association of Contemporary European Studies and the European Commission for a UACES scholarship supporting empirical research in Berlin (spring 2007) and Brussels (summer 2007) and the Department of Politics at the University of Glasgow for a grant supporting further research in Brussels in autumn 2007. Conclusions drawn here are based on the author's interviews with EU officials, primarily from the European Commission DG Relex, and diplomats of 21 of the 27 member states in London, Berlin and Brussels conducted between March and December 2007.
Notes
1 ‘All for one, one for all’, the Three Musketeers’ motto in Alexandre Dumas, Les Trois Mousquetaire (1844).
2 Concerns about the lack of unity and lack of success in withstanding an outside party's ‘divide and rule’ strategy have also been raised with regard to the USA and the People's Republic of China, two states that are arguably of similar importance to the EU, but geographically more remote (Bretherton & Vogler, Citation2006, pp. 82 & 84).
3 Author's interview with a member state diplomat in Brussels (5 December 2007).
4 Author's e-mail correspondence with a high ranking Commission official, DG Relex, 20 August 2007.
5 This view was shared by Commission officials and member state diplomats interviewed by the author in Berlin (June 2007) and Brussels (July and November/December 2007). Authors like Soetendorp (Citation1999) speak of them as ‘first rank’ states—all other states are considered to be ‘second rank’.
6 This means ‘cosying up’ to Russia (see Adomeit, Citation2005).
7 Author's interviews in Brussels with a Commission official, DG Relex (18 July 2007) and a member state diplomat (3 December 2007).
8 Author's interview with a high ranking diplomat of one of the new member states in Brussels (3 December 2007).
9 Further evidence of the ability of presiding countries to shape the EU's Russia policy according to their own special interests is the agreement on stepping up the dialogue on Russian participation in ESDP missions during the French Presidency in 2000, the ND Environmental Partnership under the Swedish EU presidency in 2001 and the ND Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being, as well as the launch of the ‘Artic Window’ of the ND and conclusion of the Kaliningrad Transit agreement under the Danish presidency in 2002, and agreement on the start of biannual EU–Russia consultations on human rights, including the rights of minorities, and fundamental freedoms between the EU and Russia during the Dutch Presidency in November 2004.
10 He was later granted asylum in the UK, a decision which triggered UK–Russian political disputes.
11 Author's interviews with member state representatives in Berlin (13 and 19 June 2007) and Brussels (16 and 23 July 2007).
12 Portugal is the UK's oldest European ally.
13 Author's interviews with member state diplomats in Berlin (20 and 26 June 2007) and Brussels (31 July 2007).
14 Author's interviews with officials in Brussels (22 November and 5 December 2007).
15 Author's interviews with member state diplomats in London (27 March 2007), Berlin (18–20 June 2007) and Brussels (16, 20 and 25 July and 3 December 2007).
16 See Feklyunina (Citation2008) regarding the role that the international image plays in Russian foreign policy actions.
17 Initially known as the Northern European Gas Pipeline (NEGP).
18 Author's interviews with member state diplomats, Berlin (7, 20 and 26 June 2007).
19 See Larsson (Citation2007) regarding linkages between political events and economic ‘sanctions’ imposed by Russia.
20 See, for example, the public speeches by Adamkus and Ušackas (both 2008).
21 Author's interviews in Brussels with Commission officials, DG Relex (18 and 31 July and 19 November 2007) and member state diplomats (16 July, 20 November and 3 December 2007).
22 At the time of writing Lithuania insisted on maintaining its veto until its concerns were addressed and included in a revised version of the negotiating mandate that had been agreed upon by all bar Poland in 2006.
23 Author's interviews in Brussels with member state diplomats (20 November and 3 December 2007) and a Commission official, DG Relex (5 December 2007).
24 There are indications that a diplomatic ‘twinning’ of Estonia with Finland determined to some extent the Estonian approach to EU decision-making. Author's interviews with member state officials of the two countries, Brussels (16 July and 31 July 2007).
25 The set of specific concerns that Lithuania wanted the mandate to address include the Medininkai killings of 1991 and the disappearance of the President of the Lithuanian business club in the Kaliningrad Region in April 2007. Lithuania argued that these issues were of broader reach and addressing them as illustrative examples of generic problems with Russia was in the interest of the whole of the EU (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c).
26 See the transcript (in German) of the German state TV channel ARD's talkshow Beckmann of 22 November 2004 at http://www.daserste.de/beckmann/sendung_dyn∼uid,0udyga1kbwqyw4dabx4yxhec∼cm.asp (accessed 10 January 2008).
27 Author's interviews with diplomats from Central and Eastern European member states in Berlin (20 June 2007) and officials and MEPs in Brussels (16 and 25 July, 26 and 28 November, 3 and 6 December 2007).
28 See also Council of the European Union (2001, p. 7) regarding ‘consistency’ between member states and EU institutions.
29 This is also an issue that has been raised frequently in debates about the policies towards the People's Republic of China (see, for example, European Commission, Citation2001; Belder, Citation2004, pp. 18–19), and in particular the lifting of the arms trade embargo imposed in 1989. See Declaration of the European Council of the EC, Madrid, 27 June 1989, available online at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/measures.htm#1 (accessed 5 March 2008).
30 Götz (Citation2004) developed this argument with the catchy title ‘silence for gas’.
31 This draws on Mearsheimer's (Citation2001, pp. 46–48) ‘hierarchy of state goals’ and his distinction between security versus non-security goals.
32 Compare Mearsheimer's (Citation2001, pp. 13, 157–162 & 267–272) discussion of states’ strategy of ‘buck-passing’. Although his discussion focuses on the military-security point of view, it can also be applied to the economic and political spheres.
33 Author's interviews in Brussels with member state diplomats (16 July, 20 and 26 November and 3 and 6 December 2007) and EU officials, DG Relex (21 and 29 November and 5 December 2007).
34 See Energy Mix Fact Sheets for all member states, available online at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/facts_en.htm (updated 22 June 2007; accessed 1 December 2007).
35 Author's interviews in Brussels with a Commission official, DG Relex (18 July 2007) and a member state diplomat (13 November 2007).
36 Author's interview in Brussels with European Commission official, DG Relex (5 December 2007).
37 Author's interview in Brussels with a representative of one of the new member states (3 December 2007).
38 This included limitation of TACIS aid to human rights and democracy projects and delay of a scientific and technological cooperation agreement.
39 This is essentially a continuation of the German Social Democrat tradition of the 1970s in a different guise. The aim of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik (eastern policy) of ‘Wandel durch Annäherung’, i.e. transformation through (political) rapprochement, was to overcome ideological divisions between the Eastern and Western blocs through engagement with the Soviet Union, with the end goal of enabling German reunification. The ‘new’ Ostpolitik of Verflechtung launched by Foreign Minister Steinmeier in 2007 places its emphasis on close cooperation with securing of energy supplies amongst its main goals.
40 Author's interview in Brussels with a Commission official (19 July 2007).