Competing and Co-Existing Constructions of Europe as Turkey's ‘Other(s)’ in Turkish Political Discourse

Abstract

The paper analyses the various ways in which Europe/the EU is represented as Turkey's Other in the discourse of the four main Turkish political parties. The analysis is carried out according to the definition of five forms of Othering in International Relations proposed by Diez (2005) and Manners (2006) as well as the conception of Other as superior proposed, for instance, by Zarakol (2011). In contrast to traditional Kemalist discourse, which tends to view Europe as both threat and civilisational model, AKP discourse in particular tends to frame Europe as inferior and as belonging to a different civilisation, thus revealing a more self-confident, inclusive and Islamist national identity discourse.

Keywords:

• EU
• Turkey
• identity
• discourse
• Othering

Notes

¹ Essentialist concepts of collective identities argue that cultural variables are givens which then develop into national identities during the process of nation building. Thus, in this view, identities are fixed and the creation of supranational or postnational identities is impossible (Risse, 2004, p. 166).

² While there is some evidence that CHP's attitude to EU-related reforms is becoming more positive under its new leader Kılıçdaroğlu it is still too early to know this for sure (Celep, 2011, p. 431).

³ Political reaction.

⁴ A memorandum written by Lord Curzon just before the Sevres conference is illustrative, ‘The opportunity for which Europeans waited five hundred years to expel Turks from Europe and Istanbul has come; by no means should we miss this opportunity’ (cited in Ilhan, 2002, p. 101).

⁵ Guida (2008, p. 46) notes, for instance, that the protests organised by the Islamist Saadet Party against the visit of Pope Benedict XVI to Istanbul on 26 November 2006 went by the name of Haçlı Ittifakına Hayır Mitingi [Demonstration Against the Crusaders' Alliance].

⁶ Bardakçı (2010, p. 28) notes that the descriptions of political parties as ‘left’ or ‘right’ in the Turkish context do not correspond with those in Europe as, in Turkey, they are not based on their position on socio-economic policies. Instead the ‘right’ refers to a commitment to religious, conservative and nationalist values, and is therefore more society-oriented while the ‘left’, at least the centre-left, is closely associated to the State.

⁷ The Lausanne treaty, which replaced the Sevres treaty, only recognised non-Muslim minorities including Armenians, Greeks and Jews; large Muslim minorities, such as Kurds and Alevis, as well as smaller Christian minorities including Assyrians, Chaldeans, Catholics and Protestants were not recognised as such (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 138).

⁸ The ‘Working Group on Minority Rights and Cultural Rights’ was a committee working under the Office of the Prime Minister. Its report, which advocated a purely civic national identity, became public on 17 October 2004 (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 143).

⁹ Tsar Nicholas 1 actually referred to the Ottoman Empire as a ‘sick man’ which Europe ‘had on its hands’ (cited in Neumann, 1999, p. 55).

¹⁰ The legal term pacta sunt servanda refers to the principle that ‘agreements must be kept’.

¹¹ The political Copenhagen criteria, which candidates for EU accession are expected to fulfil before the opening of accession negotiations, are as follows: the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (European Council, 1993).

¹² It should be emphasised that European constructions of Turkey as its Other and Turkish Othering of the EU interact with each other, causing a re-evaluation of Self-identity and new Othering discourses, or an entrenchment of old ones in response. In particular, constructions of the Other as threat, in the form of the securitisation of Turkish full-membership by right-wing European politicians or the Tanzimat and Sevres syndromes in Turkish Kemalist discourse appear to be particularly damaging in this respect. The proposal of the so-called ‘Privileged Partnership’ idea, for instance, serves to reinforce negative stereotypes of Europe in Turkey, while the Sevres syndrome can slow down Turkey's reform process, thus reinforcing negative European stereotypes about Turkey.