Liquid Nationalism and State Partitions in Europe

Stefano Bianchini’s recent volume takes on a daunting challenge, namely, to analyse the shifting nature and shape(s) of the relationship(s) between political systems, state borders, identities and securities in modern Europe (1). The key coordinate is nationalism qua political ideology which has ‘shown an extraordinary ability of adaptation’ and ‘has acquired a supremacy in state-building and identity processes’ (178). Impressive in terms of temporal and geographical breadth, Bianchini’s book essentially maps the co-constitutive relationship between agency, structure and process in the making and then revamping of European states. On a theoretical level, albeit not outwardly specified, the book follows two well-established coordinates in the literature: on the one hand, the spread of the modular nation-state as the container of modernity (see further Goswami 2002); on the other hand, nationalism as a competing set of discourses (see further Brubaker 1996).

Although the main focus of analysis is Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), with a particular emphasis on the Balkans, the book is also sensitive to transnational dynamics as it acknowledges the interconnected nature of modern states owing to ‘commercial exchanges, communications routes and channels, people’s mobility and cultural mainstream intersections’ across Europe (3). Part I thus maps the transition from the ‘multiple and contradictory understandings about freedom, individuals, collectives and state organization that empowered nationalism since the 19th century’ (22), towards the more exclusivist and undemocratic understandings of the early 20th century (80). Analysing in depth the role of World War 1 as a catalyst, Bianchini shows that at the end of a long destabilizing period, numerous actors in CEE got the opportunity to elaborate alternative state- and nation-building projects, each of them very intricate blends of old 19th century inheritances and new 20th century inward turns (75). The central coordinate for pre–World War 2 Europe was that ‘national and social claims coexisted, conflicted and interacted with predominant imperialist interests of the victors and the resentments of the defeated countries’ (63).

Part II takes on a more theoretical role as the author ventures into the highly contested debates on state partitions: the Yugoslav wars and international settlements; the Czechoslovak velvet separation; Baltic experiences and secessionist movements within a supranational European Union (EU). The major coordinates for analysis are drawn from the Yugoslav experience which illustrates the consequences of meeting long periods of economic crisis with austerity measures devoid of investments for growth and coupled with degrees of ethno-national mobilization (188). Although these coordinates do not always generate the same result due to context specificities (e.g. no violence in the Czechoslovak case), they are nonetheless shown to be central to understanding developments in CEE since the late-communist period (147). For Bianchini there seems to be an obvious tension between a seemingly revamped nation-state, as a result of network interdependencies across Europe (244), and a shared ‘national language’, obvious in the Dayton agreement, which effectively restricted statehood within the cultural perimeters of the nation-state (246). It is in this line of thought that the book re-emphasizes that many multiculturalist policies in fact reify elements of national homogeneities, leading to a ‘plural monoculturalism’ (concept borrowed from Sen, 287).

According to Bianchini, because of globalization it seems quite likely that 19th century categories of nation-building and ‘freedom of the people’ have become obsolete at the dawn of the 21st century (181). Again, however, there is a paradox at play leading to what the book identifies as neo-nationalism – the coexistence between an attractive supranational EU and a narrative (re)affirming national sovereignty (226). What must also be held in mind is the increasing worldwide competition offered by political giants such as Russia and China (226). This, however, opens up a thorny question – has democracy reached a limit within a discourse verging around the nation as a point of reference, or does it offer enough analytical space for a dynamic expansion or rights and freedoms outside the modular nation-state container? (292). Although prima facie the book’s answer seems on the sceptical side; Bianchini is, however, careful in noting that bearing in mind the fluid and flexible nature of the EU, there may yet be avenues for favourable resolutions to nationalist tensions.

Broadly speaking, Bianchini’s book impresses in historical scope as it offers an in-depth analysis of the intricacies of nationalist histories in Eastern Europe. Although at times the narrative seems slightly too dense, the level of detail offered by the author is instrumental in showing the fluid nature of nationalist movements. At the same time, however, there is a lingering sense that the book’s dialogue with nationalism studies could have been further explored. For instance, while Bianchini’s analysis is sensitive to nationalist movements that do not necessarily aim just for statehood, the broader discussion on EU and globalization could have benefited from an analysis of new forms of banal nationalism (see for instance Billig 1995). Further embedding in more recent understandings of discursive nationalism would have also helped better integrate the more theoretical final chapters, which, albeit welcomed and littered with interesting avenues forward, are slightly disconnected from the main thrust of the historical narrative.