The Western Balkan counter-terrorism initiative (WBCTi) and the capability of the EU as a counter-terrorism actor

ABSTRACT

In less than twenty years, the European Union (EU) developed a range of policy documents, instruments and institutional structures enabling it to combat terrorism outside its borders. The concentration of operational capabilities on the member-state-level, however, combined with a complex external institutional infrastructure on counter-terrorism led to poor understanding of the ability of the Union to influence the global fight against terrorism. The current paper contributes to the discussion of the EU’s capability as an actor in the field by investigating an Integrative and Complementary Approach to Counter-Terrorism and Violent Extremism in the Western Balkans, commonly known as the Western Balkan counter-terrorism initiative (WBCTi). The initiative, launched in 2015, promised a response to the growing threats of terrorism and violent extremism, emanating from the Western Balkans, through consistent and coherent action. The conducted analysis, however, reveals that although conceptually the WBCTi has the potential to improve the consistency and coherence of the EU’s counter-terrorism action, in practice it is unable to do so due to the non-binding nature of the approach and its dependence on non-EU actors.

Abbreviations: Western Balkan counter-terrorism initiative (WBCTi); European Union (EU)

KEYWORDS:

• Western Balkans
• counter-terrorism
• violent extremism
• Western Balkan counter-terrorism initiative
• European Union

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Western Balkans region includes all post-Yugoslav states with the exception of Slovenia and addition of Albania.

2. For a detailed discussion of the origins of terrorism in the region, see Bieber (2003), for Islamic terrorism specifically, see Tziampiris (2009).

3. Interviews with high-ranking security personnel and security experts conducted by the author in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in autumn 2016.

4. Interview with a security official in Serbia in October 2016.

5. Interview with a security expert in BiH in September 2016.

6. For example, see Allen and Smith (1990) and Hill (1993).

7. For example, see Brattberg and Rhinard (2012) and Koops (2011).

8. See Brattberg and Rhinard (2012), Agromaniz, Bures and Kaunert (2015) and Monar (2015).

9. This document was updated on several occasions, e.g. see Council of the EU (2008a) and Council of the EU (2014).

10. For the discussion of roles of each of the EU institutions involved in the EU counter-terrorism policy, see Wensink et al. (2017, 45–50.)

11. For the development of the EU-Western Balkan relations after 1999, see Batt (2004) and Radeljic (2013).

12. Interview with a leading security expert conducted by the author in Zagreb in September 2016.

13. For the list of objectives and EU commitments, see EC (2018).

14. Moldova was included into the WBCTi’s first integrative plan of action, while was omitted from later documents on the initiative, e.g. see IISG (2018).