The Energy Community and Europeanization of South East Europe and beyond: a rational choice - historical institutionalist explanation

ABSTRACT

There has been an organisational transfer from the European Union to the Energy Community, while, at the same time, the transposition of EU law into the contracting parties of South East Europe and beyond has also proceeded. Thus far, the Energy Community has been the subject of relatively few theoretical explanations. This study aims at introducing a new alternative one (rational choice-historical institutionalist explanation) in order to conceptualize the role of the Community. This article consists of three sections. The first section compiles and evaluates the theoretical literature regarding the Energy Community. The second section explores rational choice and historical institutionalism’s potential to explain the Community’s evolution. The third section deals both with the Community’s impact on the EU’s external energy policy and the Europeanization of energy policies of the contracting parties. Institutional improvements within the Community for better implementation results are foreseen as policy implications.

KEYWORDS:

• Energy community
• historical institutionalism
• rational choice institutionalism
• Europeanization

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Energy cooperation among EU countries was triggered by the oil crises in 1973/74. As a consequence, in 1974 the ‘Council Resolution concerning a new energy policy strategy for the Community’ was passed, which was shortly after enhanced with energy goals for 1985. With this the Council not only emphasised the added value of close coordination among Member States to tackle energy problems, but also adopted guidelines concerning energy supply (promotion of nuclear energy, hydrocarbon and solid fuels in the Community; diversification) and energy demand (using energy more rationally). See Council Resolution of 17 September 1974 concerning a new energy policy strategy for the Community. Official Journal C 153, 09/07/1975 P. 0001–0002.URL:http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31975Y0709%2801%29:EN:HTML.

2. Both the 2005–2006 and 2009 gas crises resulted from bilateral contract disputes related to gas supply, pricing and Ukraine’s former debts to Russia. In the 2009 gas crisis, Russia blamed Ukraine for closing the valves toward the EU, while Ukraine blamed Russia for cutting off the gas flow.

3. The EU’s most prominent energy documents are the Energy 2020 Strategy (2010), the Energy 2050 Strategy (2011) and the Energy Union Package (2015).

4. Although Europeanization is an eclectic concept, throughout the article ‘Europeanization’ refers to transferring of a particular EU policy to several non-EU countries.

5. For a study of the challenges and obstacles to Europeanization within the Energy Community see L. Deitz, S. Lindsay, and K. Wright. 2007. The Energy Community of South East Europe: Challenges of, and Obstacles to, Europeanization, CCP Working Paper, Accessed 3 January 2020. http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107587/ccp08-4.pdf For a detailed study of rule transfer and conditionality within the Energy Community see S. Padgett (2012). ‘Multilateral Institutions, Accession Conditionality and Rule Transfer in the European Union: The Energy Community in South East Europe’, Journal of Public Policy, 32(3): 262–282.

6. Ernst B. Haas stated in 1975 that neo-functionalist theory had already become obsolete in Western Europe. The ‘empty chair crisis’ had a significant impact on Haas’s subsequent decision to discard the neo-functionalist approach.

7. The European Defence Community, European Political Community and Constitutional Treaty of 2004 exemplify this situation. In August 1954, a plan developed in 1952 by Jean Monnet and the French Prime Minister, René Pleven, to set up a European defence force under a single European military and political authority was rejected by the French National Assembly. In line with this, the European Political Community, under which the proposed European defence force would operate, was stillborn. Since any founding or amending treaty in the EU must be ratified by Member States, either via national parliament ratification or through national referendums, the Constitutional Treaty of 2004 was rejected both in France (by 54.87%) and in the Netherlands (by 61.6%) by referendums; these two states were among the founding and driving powers of the Union.

8. For a thorough discussion of ‘critical junctures’ see R.B. Collier and D. Collier, 1991. Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America, Chapter 1, Princeton.: Princeton University Press.

9. For Energy Community Implementation Reports, please visit https://www.energy-community.org/implementation/IR2019/reports.html.

10. Implementation scores are calculated in accordance with a special methodology based on certain indicators. For this methodology, please see 2018 Implementation Report, p. 197.

11. All legislative acts available at https://www.energy-community.org/.

12. For a detailed analysis of the impact of the European Court of Justice on the Energy Community, see Karova (2015). ‘The Application of EU Constitutional Principles in the Energy Community,’ European Networks Law & Regulation Quarterly, 3(3): 176–186.