The Akademik Lomonosov and the Arctic legal regime: geopolitics versus international law?

ABSTRACT

This article investigates the case of the Akademik Lomonosov with the aim to contribute to the research on the interplay between geopolitics and international law, which has not been sufficiently investigated, yet. To this aim, two sectors strictly linked to each other, namely energy and environment, have been taken into consideration. Both of them are relevant in the analysis of the Akademik Lomonosov because it is a floating nuclear power plant (FNPP) that has raised several environmental concerns. Additionally, the Akademik Lomonosov is not regulated by international law. It is functional to the geopolitical aim of Russia to economically develop the Arctic, which is necessary to modernise the whole state and thus to affirm its great power status both regionally and internationally. The analysis, which is conducted from the classical geopolitics perspective, shows that the employment of the Akademik Lomonosov responds to the energy security goals of Russia. At the same time, Russia’s approach to international law also derives from its geopolitical aims.

KEYWORDS:

• Arctic
• environment
• nuclear energy
• geopolitics
• international law
• Russia

Introduction

The Akademik Lomonosov,¹ Russia’s first floating nuclear power plant (FNPP), is an emblematic example of the interplay between geopolitics and international law. It is a kind of technology that has been reintroduced by Russia for geopolitical and economic reasons and that is not regulated by international law although it is subject to international law regulations on nuclear energy and maritime vessels.

The Akademik Lomonosov is one of the eleven Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) operating in Russia that is a leading state in nuclear power energy (IAEA 2021). It is an autonomous power facility, manufactured as a non-self-propelled vessel towed by two tugboats and owned by Russian Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation. The Sevmash & Baltic shipyard began its construction in 2007 and completed it in 2013 (Power Technology 2019). It became operational in 2019 with the aim to provide electricity and heat to port cities, industrial enterprises, gas and oil platforms in Russia’s mineral-rich Chukotka region (NS Energy 2019). It is fundamental for the energy fuelling of the Arctic, which is an essential part of Russia’s geopolitical strategy aiming at making Russia a great power on the international scene.

Given this background, this article analyses the interplay between geopolitics and international law, which is a topic that has not been sufficiently investigated yet, by taking the Akademik Lomonosov into consideration as a case study. The analysis has the concept of power at its core. Power is defined in terms of economic capability, territory, population and military power. Power links the two sectors that this article takes into consideration to analyse the Akademik Lomonosov case, namely energy and environment. Energy and environment are two sectors that are strictly linked to each other because the production, transportation, and consumption of energy can have a significant impact on the environment. At the same time, energy and environment can be tools used by states to achieve their geopolitical goals like in the case of Russia.

From a theoretical perspective, this article uses classical geopolitics that ‘consists of the study of states as spatial phenomena with a view to reaching an understanding of the bases of their power and the nature of their interactions with one another’ (Parker 1998). Classical geopolitics combines geography and technology and analyses the political and strategic implications that result from that combination (Zhengyu 2018). Geography and technology are dynamic because new technologies could alter the political and strategic implications of geography (Zhengyu 2018). Changes in technology and the emergence of new centres of natural resources and economic power can cause power shift in the international system (Zhengyu 2018). At the same time, changes in geography can cause changes in the power potential of states (Wegge and Keil 2018).

Also, classical geopolitics considers states, which are egoistic and self-help actors, as spatial objects whose interaction produces spatial phenomena (Zhengyu 2018). Great powers are the most important actors in the international system and are defined by geographic location, territorial size and material resources (Zhengyu 2018). Therefore, classical geopolitics describes the international system in materialistic terms as characterised by power politics (Zhengyu 2018).

This article is divided into two sections. The first one will analyse the case of the Akademik Lomonosov through the lenses of classical geopolitics and with a focus on energy security defined from the Russian perspective. The second section, which is also based on the concept of power that is central in the classical geopolitics approach, will analyse the Akademik Lomonosov in the context of international law as well as the Russian approach to international law with particular emphasis on environmental law.

The Akademik Lomonosov and energy security

The Akademik Lomonosov is an expression of the energy power of Russia, which is considered an energy superpower, but it is also an example of the possible geopolitical implications of the interplay between geography and technology.

Geography is dynamic. The geography of the Arctic is changing because of ice melting caused by climate change. Ice melting is making shipping routes and natural resources (e.g. energy resources) increasingly accessible. This is changing the geopolitics of the Arctic as the new economic opportunities have increased the interest of states inside and outside the region in being involved in the Arctic affairs. This is impacting the relations among states at both the regional and the international level. In this context, Russia is one of the major actors as it is the state with the longest coast in the region and a great power both regionally and internationally. Therefore, it is in the interest of Russia to take advantage of the economic opportunities brought about by the changing geography in the Arctic in order to increase its power at both levels. Changing geography in the Arctic has the potential to empower Russia but the extent to which Russia can increase its power by intensifying its exploitation of energy resources and shipping routes also depends on the development of infrastructures along its Arctic coasts. To this aim, the role played by the Akademik Lomonosov is very important. It’s not a new technology, but a technology that has been reintroduced because Russia considers it as a good solution to pursue its geopolitical and economic interests. It will contribute to the development of the Arctic and this is functional to the Russian aims of economic growth and to the enhancement of its geopolitical strategies not only in the Arctic but on the international scene as well.

The Akademik Lomonosov can be considered as the successor of the Sturgis, an American former World War II Liberty Ship that was converted into a floating nuclear power plant capable of generating 10 megawatts (MW) of electricity. Sturgis’ reactor,² which became operational in 1967 (until 1976), was towed to the Panama Canal Zone where a water shortage had made hydroelectric generation impractical, since water was needed for the operation of the canal’s locks (American Merchant Marine at War 2002; Power Technology 2019). Like the Akademik Lomonosov, the Sturgis could not propel itself and was towed by tugboats. However, the Sturgis definitely had a smaller capacity than the Akademik Lomonosov, which has an installed capacity of 70 MW (Power Technology 2019). In spite of this, the technologies employed to build the Russian barge are obsolete and its operational reliability is not satisfactory (Nikitin and Andreyev 2011, 7).

Nevertheless, the employment of the Akademik Lomonosov is perfectly in line with the energy and the Arctic policies adopted by Russia as outlined in four documents, namely the ‘Doctrine of energy security of the Russian Federation’ (hereinafter ‘the Doctrine’) of 2019, the ‘Energy Strategy 2035 (hereinafter ES-2035) of 2020, the ‘Strategy for the development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and ensuring national security for the period up to 2035’ (hereinafter the ‘Strategy’) and the ‘Foundations of the Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic for the period up to 2035’ (hereinafter ‘the Foundations’) of 2020. All documents refer to the national security of the state, which Russia defines as ‘the security of its multinational people as the bearer of sovereignty and as the only source of power in the Russian Federation’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2000). The ES-2035 clearly states that it has been adopted in order to implement the ‘Strategy on the national security of the Russian Federation’ approved by decree of the President in 2015 (Government of the Russian Federation 2020). The Doctrine, the Strategy and the Foundations stress that they have been adopted to ensure the national security of the state, which can be ensured only through sustainable economic development (Garant 2019; President of the Russian Federation 2020). Therefore, ‘Russia’s national interests in this sphere are of key importance’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2000). In this context, the close link between national and energy security is crucial and is clearly stated in the Doctrine (Garant 2019). This latter intends energy security as ‘the state of protection of the economy and of the population of the country from the threats to the national security in the energy sphere, which ensures the fulfilment of the legal obligations of the Russian Federation, of the needs of fuel and energy to consumers as well as the execution of the export contracts and of the international obligations of the Russian Federation’ (Garant 2019). This definition includes the two dimensions of the national and the international sphere. On the one hand, it stresses the necessity to satisfy the energy needs of the population. On the other one, it refers to the energy relations between Russia and the other states. In this context, it is interesting to note that the national security concept states that ‘Russia’s national interests in the international sphere lie in upholding its sovereignty and strengthening its positions as a great power and as one of the influential centers of a multipolar world’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2000). To this aim, the development of the Arctic is of utmost importance. Indeed, the Foundations stresses that it is a primary national interest to develop the Arctic zone of Russia ‘as a strategic resource base, and its sustainable use to accelerate the economic growth of the Russian Federation’ (President of the Russian Federation 2020). Additionally, the ES-2035 recognises the key role played by Russia internationally as it is a producer, consumer and exporter of energy (Government of the Russian Federation 2020). Also, the ES-2035 underlines that one of the aims of Russia in the sector is to efficiently building infrastructure especially in areas like the Arctic as well as in eastern Siberia and the Far East (Government of the Russian Federation 2020).

The Akademik Lomonosov is an important technological instrument necessary to develop the infrastructure of the Arctic thus allowing Russia to economically develop the region as well as the whole state according to the aims outlined in the documents briefly discussed above. Therefore, the Akademik Lomonosov is also a tool used by Russia to achieve the national objectives as defined in the ‘Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation’ of 2016. In particular, the ‘scientific and technological development of the Russian Federation means the transformation of science and technologies into the key factor of Russia’s development and the guarantee of the country’s capability to efficiently meet major challenges’ (President of the Russian Federation 2016).

The Akademik Lomonosov is a technological tool that Russia uses to meet some of these challenges such as the ‘exhaustion of Russia’s economic growth opportunities based on extensive exploitation of raw materials’ due to the development of digital economy and new production technologies based on renewable resources (President of the Russian Federation 2016). Russia, together with the US (Alaska), is estimated to be the state with the highest percentage of energy resources in the Arctic (USGS 2008). In particular, it is estimated that Alaska is especially rich of oil while the highest percentage of natural gas is estimated to be found in Russia (USGS 2008). Currently, the Arctic produces about one tenth of the world’s oil and a quarter of its natural gas (The Arctic 2021). The Russian Arctic provides about 80% of this oil and virtually all of the natural gas (The Arctic 2021). Natural gas is one of the ‘mainstays of global energy’ and it replaces polluting fuels by improving air quality and limiting emissions of carbon dioxide (IEA 2019). For this reason, it is in the interest of Russia to increase its production of natural gas. In this way, Russia could successfully participate in the international transition to more clean energy (natural gas is a relatively clean burning fossil fuel) by having an economic reward.

Furthermore, another important challenge mentioned in the Strategy of 2016 is ‘the need for the efficient spatial development, eliminating disproportions in the social and economic development of the national territory, consolidating Russia’s positions in the economic, scientific, and military development of outer space and airspace, the world ocean, the Arctic and the Antarctic regions’ (President of the Russian Federation 2016).

In order to face these challenges, Russia aims at economically and socially develop the Arctic region by modernising it and by constructing new infrastructures. The Strategy of 2020 clearly states that developing the Arctic as ‘a strategic resource base’ and its ‘sustainable use to accelerate the economic growth of the Russian Federation’ is a national interest of Russia (President of the Russian Federation 2020). Indeed, oil and gas represent about 60% of Russian’s export revenues and 30% of its federal budget (Rumer, Sololsky, and Stronsky 2021).

In this context, the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) project and the employment of the Akademik Lomonosov to this aim play a key role. The NSR is a shipping lane between the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean along the Russian coast of Siberia and the Far East.³ It is supposed to be the first shipping route to be free from ice thus having the highest commercial potential (Wegge and Keil 2018; Intesa Sanpaolo 2020). It is much shorter than the ‘traditional’ Suez Canal route as it cuts the shipping voyage by 10–15 days (Intesa Sanpaolo 2020). As a result, the traffic will be reduced by about 34% compared to the one of the Suez Canal (Rosatom 2020). Additionally, the NSR is traditionally associated with the industrial key clusters of Russia like the Norilsk Combine, the East-Siberian Oil and Gas Complex, the enterprises of Yakutia, Magadan, Chukotka producing gold, non-ferrous and rare metals (Fedorov et al. 2020). At the same time, the exploitation of the energy resources of the Gulf of Ob, Yamal and the Gyda Peninsula, the Barents and the Kara Sea also depend on the NRS development (Fedorov et al. 2020).

The importance of the NSR is clearly stated in the last Decree on the Russian Arctic policy of May 2020. It states that developing the Northern Sea Route as the Russian Federation’s competitive national transportation passage in the world market is one of the most important national priorities of Russia (President of the Russian Federation 2020). For this reason, the construction of infrastructures along the NSR is of key importance. The Decree states indeed that Russia considers essential the ‘construction of a sufficient number of icebreaker, rescue, and auxiliary fleets with the capabilities necessary to ensure year-round, safe, uninterrupted, and cost-effective navigation in the waters of the Northern Sea Route and other maritime transportation passages’ (President of the Russian Federation 2020). This Decree is the starting point of the ‘Plan for the development of infrastructures of the NSR until 2035’ that was proposed by Rosatom and signed by former Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev at the end of December 2019. The fulfilment of the Presidential Decree is the aim of the first five years of the Plan from 2020 until 2025. The second stage in 2025–2030 envisages a year-round navigation throughout the Northern Sea route water area and the implementation of plans for combining the Arctic Sea routes with the cargo flow through the new infrastructures that are under construction along the NSR. The last stage in 2030–2035 aims at making the NSR a competitive transport corridor (Fedorov et al. 2020).

The development of the NSR is facilitated by the Akademik Lomonosov that provides energy to Russian Arctic. Thus, it represents a unique opportunity for Russia to develop and modernise its Arctic region. This has increased the value that the NSR has in its geopolitical strategies aiming to keep its position as a great power both at the regional and at the international levels. The NSR is indeed very important for the Russian internal shipping not only because it is the only navigable route connecting all Russian Arctic and subarctic regions (Fedorov et al. 2020) but also because the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Yamal project⁴ is located along it. This is one of the largest and complex LNG projects in the world and one of the most competitive ones because it manages the immense onshore gas resources of the Yamal peninsula that is sold to Europe and Asia (Total 2021). Furthermore, another important reason why the development of the NSR is geopolitically important for Russia is that it will allow it to diversify its energy policy by linking its Arctic areas to Asian markets thus reducing its dependence on Europe as its major energy market and its reliance on Ukraine as a transit state for its gas on its way to Europe (Rumer, Sololsky, and Stronsky 2021).

It is therefore clear that a changing geography is empowering Russia in two ways. First, the interplay between geography (more accessible areas due to ice melting) and technology (Akademik Lomonosov) is allowing Russia to increase its economic power. Second, the proximity of many of its areas to the Russian coast (the NSR is constituted of areas with different status) gives Russia the opportunity to set norms and rules regulating shipping through the NSR (Wegge and Keil 2018). For instance, in 2012 President Putin signed a federal bill formalising the NSR as a national transport route (the NSR is the object of a dispute between Russia and the US that considers it an international route), lays down the requirements to sailing along it, to protect the Arctic environment and envisages a federal NSR administration body (Wegge and Keil 2018). In 2013, the new Administration of the NSR was established to regulate navigation in its waters and in 2016 Russia launched the Development Plan for the NSR 2015–2030 with the aim to continue controlling it (Wegge and Keil 2018). Furthermore, changing geography demonstrates that geography is dynamic but also that ‘geography defines limits and opportunities in international politics: states can realize their geopolitical opportunities or become victims of their geopolitical situation’ (Owens 2015).

Moreover, another element that explains Russia’s strong interest in the Arctic is history, which is a part of geopolitical thinking (and of classical geopolitics). Russia considers the region as part of its history and national identity. Russian interest in the Arctic is ancient and is motivated by the never-ending quest for more resources and secure trading routes (Rumer, Sololsky, and Stronsky 2021). Russia has made a number of explorations in the Arctic over time and the NSR was used as a national shipping route already in the 1980s (Zenzinov 1944; Wegge and Keil 2018). The highest amount of cargo volume transported through the NSR was during the 1980s and it decline after the break-up of the Soviet Union and in the late 1990s (Wegge and Keil 2018). Additionally, the discovery of gas and oil in Siberia in the twentieth century meant wealth for the state and increased domestic consumption of these resources but it also funded the Soviet military machine and provided the economic foundations of the Soviet foreign policy (Rumer, Sololsky, and Stronsky 2021). The exploitation of energy resources was intensified in the 2000s (Rumer, Sololsky, and Stronsky 2021). Oil and gas in particular played a ‘pivotal role in restoring the country’s economic fortunes in the early 2000s, underwriting domestic stability, fostering Putin’s rise as the country’s undisputed leader, and returning Russia to the world stage as an aspiring great power intent upon recouping its losses in Europe and reclaiming its rightful place in the international system’ (Rumer, Sololsky, and Stronsky 2021). In 2006, the role of oil and gas in the foreign policy of Russia was included in the agenda of the Kremlin that aims at establishing Russia as an ‘energy superpower’ (Rumer, Sololsky, and Stronsky 2021). Energy superpowers can ‘influence the political choices of other states via energy exports, by producing dependencies through energy infrastructures and economic benefits produced by the energy trade (Tynkkynen and Tynkkynen 2018).

Furthermore, another dimension that is strictly linked to importance of the exploitation of energy resources as an economic source of the state is the military one. Military force is essential to the power of a state and depends on its economic power. For this reason, the economic wealth stemming from the exploitation of energy resources present in the Arctic is essential both for increasing military strength and for ensuring military operations for which energy is fundamental. In this context, three observations are interesting. First, ‘ensuring the military security’ and ‘guarding and defending the state border’ of the Russian Federation are two of the ‘main trends for implementation’ of the State Policy of Russia in the Arctic (the Strategy). Second, since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the militarisation of the Arctic has increased as a reaction to the aggressive behaviour of Russia. Russia itself has increased its military presence in the Arctic. For instance, it has reopened 50 previously closed Soviet-era military posts (Melino and Conley 2021). Additionally, the Northern Fleet has its headquarters in Severomorsk in the Murmask Oblast in the Arctic. Second, Russia has 29 nuclear-powered submarines of which 11 are nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and 18 other nuclear-powered attack submarines (Gaurav 2021). Also, Russia is the state owning the largest area in the Arctic and therefore possessing most of the energy resources of the region. It also has the largest icebreaker fleet in the world that is constituted of 40 vessels with eleven planned or under construction (Gady 2019). Some of them are nuclear-powered like Arktika, which is a civilian icebreaker though and is considered the world’s largest and most powerful one as well as ‘the physical representation’ of Russia’ s ambition to increase its presence in the region (Odynova 2020). In an interview in 2020 President Putin stated that Russia has ‘a unique icebreaker fleet that holds a leading position in the development and study of Arctic territories’ and that Russia ‘must reaffirm this superiority constantly, every day. We must build up our positions, strengthen and update our fleet, introduce new advanced technologies in the construction of icebreakers and other vessels of that class’ (Woody 2020).

In conclusion, the Akademik Lomonosov is part of the energy security strategy of Russia as it is an essential instrument to ensure the Russian national security by economically developing the Arctic that is essential to strengthen the political, economic, and military power of Russia.

The Akademik Lomonosov between international law and geopolitics

As explained in the previous section, the Akademik Lomonosov is used by Russia for the achievement of its geopolitical aims. Nevertheless, although the Akademik Lomonosov can be considered a good solution to provide energy to remote regions, its deployment raises two sets of questions.

The first set of questions raised by the deployment of the Akademik Lomonosov concerns the negative environmental impact that it might have. In particular, Greenpeace, a major international environmental organisation, has expressed many concerns about the disastrous consequences that an accident could have for the environment in the Arctic. According to Greenpeace, while the risks of drilling for oil in such a fragile environment are very serious, the ones coming from a floating nuclear reactor are dramatic (Haverkamp 2018). For this reason, Greenpeace affirms that a floating nuclear power plant in the Arctic is a terrible idea’ and defined the Akademik Lomonosov ‘a catastrophe waiting to happen’ as well as ‘floating Chernobyl’ (Haverkamp 2018). Greenpeace also underlines that the FNPP are particularly vulnerable to tsunamis and cyclones.⁵ If such natural events occur, there could be dramatic environmental consequences as the FNPP could be seriously damaged and radioactive substances could be released into the environment contaminating the marine wildlife for many decades. The tremendous consequences of nuclear accidents are well-known. The cases of the Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011) nuclear power plants, among others, very well illustrate the dramatic impact that the explosion of the reactors caused to the environment (and of course to people as well). In both cases, radioactivity was released into the atmosphere, the land and water negatively impacting the ecosystem.

Furthermore, in the Akademik Lomonosov case, another risk comes from the fact that nuclear wastes are stored until FNPPs return after 12 years of operation. FNPP are smaller than conventional land based nuclear plants and need to be refuelled every two or three years (Haverkamp 2018).

Rosatom has obviously a different perspective than Greenpeace on the safety of the Akademik Lomonosov. It argues that ‘the FNPP is designed in such a way that even in the face of a severe accident the probability of radioactive substance leaking into the environment is absolutely negligible’ (Rosatom 2020). Rosatom explains that FNPP and nuclear icebreakers have been tested for decades and they have been proved to be safe. In comparison with the ‘traditional’ FNPP, the Akademik Lomonosov has the advantage of operating in safer conditions because it will never be in motion as it is moored to a special pier and stay there while icebreakers float through thick ice many kilometres from the coastline. Also, the fact that it is moored to a special pier makes it even safer than nuclear icebreakers (and nuclear submarines) because the absence of in-built motion capabilities means that there is no risk to the FNPP of any self-propelling system failure or any other emergency situations related to mobility functions (Rosatom 2020).

The second set of questions concerns which legal instruments can be applied to the Akademik Lomosov as it is a special kind of vessel because it is neither a purely fixed nuclear fuel cycle activity nor a purely transportation-based nuclear fuel cycle activity (Williams and Osborn 2020). The term ‘vessel’ itself is not without problems. The United Nations on the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, which is the foundation of the law of the sea, does not contain a definition of ‘vessel’ but several definitions are provided by international law treaties. According to Gauci (2016), the least ‘problematic’ definition (because it’s a wide one) is maybe contained in the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea of 1972, which gives guidance in relation to the ‘traffic separation schemes’ in order to determine safe speed, the risk of collision and the conduct of vessels. According to the Regulations, ‘the word “vessel” includes every description of water craft, including non-displacement craft and seaplanes, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water’ (Gauci 2016). Therefore, it is clear that the Akademik Lomonosov belongs to the vessel category as defined by these Regulations. Additionally, international law treaties often provide specific definitions of the vessels to which they apply. In particular, they usually refer to ships. ‘Ship’, which is the object of all maritime law, is one of the most used wording in international treaties. In spite of this, this term is quite vague as a consensual legal definition of ‘ship’ does not exist. Like in the case of ‘vessel’, the UNCLOS does not contain a definition of ‘ship’, which automatically includes the Akademik Lomonosov in its provisions, although not in all of them. Furthermore, neither the UNCLOS nor the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) of 1974, which is one of the most important international agreements on the law of the sea regulating the safety of merchant ships, contain specific norms on FNPPs. Both of them concern nuclear-powered ships. Article 23 of UNCLOS refers to ‘foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances’ (UNCLOS 1982). SOLAS dedicates Chapter VIII to nuclear ships defining the basic requirements of nuclear-powered ships and gives special attention to radiation hazards (IMO 2019; Lysenko, Bedenko, and Dalnoki-Veress 2019). It also refers to the Code of Safety for Nuclear Merchant Ships that was adopted by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 1981 and that contains specific regulations on nuclear ships (Lysenko, Bedenko, and Dalnoki-Veress 2019). Chapter 6 of this Code contains the necessary measures that nuclear ships shall respect in relation to radiation safety (IAEA 2020). These important legal provisions exclude the Akademik Lomonosov from their application scope as it is not a nuclear-powered ship but a barge towed by two tugboats. Additionally, in the case of the Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-level Radioactive Wastes on Board Ships (INF Code) it is not clear whether the Akademik Lomonosov can be classified as an INF ship or not. The reason is that the fuel in the reactor core is not designed to be removed at destination (Tscherning 2012).

By contrast, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, which provides recommendations and guidance to its member states on how to comply with safety requirements, can be applied to the Akademik Lomonosov because this latter is included in its definition of ‘vessels’. According to the Regulations, in fact, a vessel ‘shall mean any sea-going vessel or inland waterway craft used for carrying cargo’ (IAEA 2018).

These examples demonstrate that it is difficult to always define with certainty which international provisions can be applied to the Akademik Lomonosov case. This latter is thus similar to the case of nuclear submarines that are neither envisaged by specific legal regulations. For instance, the UNCLOS contains provisions on nuclear-powered ships and on submarines (articles 20, 14(6), 19(2)) but not specifically on nuclear submarines. For this reason, also in the case of nuclear submarines, it is not always clear which international legislation might be applied. Nevertheless, the UNCLOS and SOLAS are the main conventions regulating nuclear submarines although they do not provide specific norms.

Consequently, the difficulties encountered in defining which international provisions can be applied to the Akademik Lomonosov case make it quite challenging to clearly understand which legal environmental norms it shall respect. In this regard, it is interesting to note that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has demonstrated an increasing attention to the protection of the environment and has committed more actively in the international effort to protect the environment. Nevertheless, Russia’s involvement in the international environmental politics is first of all determined by geopolitical considerations. Having a say in the major international environmental problems and in the international decision-making process to find possible strategies and solutions to them is an important part of having the status of a great power. At the same time, economic incentives in engaging in environmental protection internationally also play a role. An excellent example is the Kyoto Protocol, which aims at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and which was ratified by Russia in 2004. Russia had both political and economic incentives for participation (Tynkkynen 2010). Russia’s decisive role in the enforcement of global climate policy, due to the fact that it was the only state with sufficient emissions that could bring the Kyoto Protocol into force, gave it political leverage (Tynkkynen 2010; Martus 2021). In exchange for ratification, Russia received the European Union’s support for its membership in the World Trade Organisation (Tynkkynen 2010). However, according to other authors, ratification was influenced by international incentives in other policy areas and by the concern for Russia’s image of a great power (Tynkkynen 2010). Accordingly, discussions on the Kyoto Protocol were influenced by the idea of Russia being a ‘Great Ecological Power’ whose environment determines the future of the earth (Tynkkynen 2010; Martus 2021). Additionally, according to Russian politicians and scholars, Russia has an ‘ecological potential’ as it is ‘a source for environmental solutions’ with its ecological reserves and declined emissions since the 1990s (Tynkkynen 2010).

The Kyoto Protocol example also explains Russia’s approach to international law. This is very well explained by Oleg Nikolaevich Khlestov, former Professor of International Law and Head of the Soviet delegation at the Vienna conference on the law of international treaties in 1969. In an article on the Russian doctrine of international law published in 2013 he wrote that

International legal doctrine is closely connected with the foreign policy doctrine of the state, its foreign policy, and usually reflects the goals and tasks that the latter pursues in the international arena … Depending on the character of the foreign policy of the state, the doctrine gives bigger or smaller importance to certain or other norms of international law (Mälksoo 2015).

He also wrote that ‘contemporary international law’, namely the United Nations (UN) Charter and the UN Security Council Resolutions on which Russia bases its approach to international law (Remler 2020), ‘corresponds to the national interests of Russia’ (Mälksoo 2015). Being a permanent member of the UN Security Council ‘boosts its claim to be part of a global oligarchy and grants it the power to veto or undermine initiatives that it deems contrary to its interests’ (Remler 2020).

In this context, the Arctic gives Russia a double possibility to achieve its geopolitical aim to be considered a great power not only in the Arctic but also internationally. The Arctic makes it possible to change the image of Russia from a polluting industrial power paying no attention to environmental issues and without a public stance on climate change, which was typical of the Soviet Union, into a clean power (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2014). The Akademik Lomonosov is a part of the new image. Additionally, the Strategy for Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security through 2035 adopted in October 2020 is a good example of the Russian awareness of the importance that the protection of the environment has in constructing its great power image internationally. The Strategy proposes, inter alia, to expand special environmental regimes and environmental protection regulations, upgrade sensitive infrastructure to cope with climate change and monitor pollution in the Russian Arctic regularly (President of the Russian Federation 2020). Also, at the international forum ‘The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue’ held in Arkhangelsk in 2017, President Putin argued that ‘the attention of many nations is focused on the Arctic as a region whose wellbeing determines the global climate, a treasure trove of unique nature and, of course, a region with a huge economic potential and opportunities’ (Martus 2021). Therefore, Putin described the Arctic as an important region from both an environmental and economic point of view. Indeed, the Arctic gives Russia the chance to reassert its role of a great power in the international arena, which diminished after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when Russia went through a political and economic crisis that reduced its geopolitical influence internationally. Russia is the state owning the largest area in the Arctic and therefore possessing most of the energy resources of the region. It also has the largest icebreaker fleet in the world that is constituted of 40 vessels (some of which are nuclear ones) with eleven planned or under construction (Gady 2019). This makes Russia one of the major powers in the region with implications at the international level. Indeed, the large amount of energy resources at disposal makes it an energy superpower while its vast territories, its powerful fleet and the economic reward stemming from its energy resources wealth make it a great power. Furthermore, energy resources are functional to the modernization of Russia. This latter is strongly linked to environmental reforms in which the introduction of new technologies plays a key role, as Putin stated in 2013 (Martus 2021). He also stated that ‘in order to rid our economy of outdated, inefficient and harmful technology, we must finally put together a modern technical and environmental regulation system’ (Martus 2021).

In conclusion, the case of the Akademik Lomonosov represents a challenge to international law. Additionally, Russia’s approach to international law and to international environmental law more specifically, reflects its geopolitical aim of keeping its status of a great power.

Conclusion

This article has analysed the case of the Akademik Lomonosov with the aim to add food for thought to an issue that is under-researched, namely the interplay between geopolitics and international law. In order to do so, the analysis has mainly focused on two sectors that are strictly intertwined, energy and environment, which have been investigated from the perspective of classical geopolitics having the concept of power as its main focus.

The starting point of the analysis is that Russia’s employment of the Akademik Lomonosov is functional to its status of great power both regionally and internationally. In fact, the Akademik Lomonosov plays a key role in the modernisation of the Arctic, which is crucial for the economic development of the whole state. The Akademik Lomonosov is indeed functional to energy security that Russia pursues by increasing the exploitation of the energy resources present in the Arctic and by developing the NSR along which the Yamal LNG project is located.

These goals can be achieved because of the changing geography of the Arctic, which is making energy resources and transportation routes increasingly accessible. Consequently, the re-introduction of a kind of technology like the Akademik Lomonosov is due not only to the fact that Russia is a leading state in nuclear power energy, but also to the changing geography of the Arctic that is opening the way to new economic opportunities.

However, the introduction of this technology in the Russian Arctic has raised several questions mainly concerning the environmental risks that it brings about and the legal regulation of this kind of vessel. These two issues are strictly linked because the environmental regulations that the Akademik Lomonosov shall respect depend on its classification according to international law. As this kind of vessel is not legally regulated, understanding which provisions might be applied is not straightforward. UNCLOS, the foundation of the law of the sea, and SOLAS, one of the main agreements in the field, do not provide a definition of ship or vessels that could be generally applied.

Furthermore, this article has investigated Russia’s approach to international law with an emphasis on environmental law. The analysis has showed that if on the one hand Russia pays more attention to the protection of the environment since the collapse of the Soviet Union, on the other hand its commitment to it is dictated above all by geopolitical and economic aims. The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is a good example.

Therefore, the Akademik Lomonosov is an interesting case-study that clearly shows that geopolitics and international law are strictly intertwined. The national interests of Russia affect its understanding of the relationship between geopolitics and international law.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Prof. Christina Eckes, my supervisor, for the time that she has spent reading my article. She has provided me with very useful and insightful comments that have been precious to improve my article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship [grant number 897084]Seventh Framework Programme;

Notes

_1. Michail Vasil’evič Lomonosov was a famous Russian scientist, poet and grammarian. He lived between 1711 and 1765. (Britannica Encyclopedia 2020).

_2. The Sturgis was dismantled in 2014 (Power Technology 2019).

_3. The NSR crosses five Arctic Seas: the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea and the Chukchi Sea (Arctic Bulk 2020).

_4. The Yamal Project, which is developed by Russian Gazprom, is an integrated project for natural gas production, liquefaction and marketing. The project is located in Sabetta, in the Yamal peninsula in the Russian Arctic. It became operational in 2017, when the first LNG tanker started its voyage through the NSR route (Novatek 2020).

_5. According to scientists, one of the main causes of tsunamis in the Arctic is to be found in the melting permafrost due to global warming (McKittrick 2020). Furthermore, earthquakes are another cause of tsunamis in the Arctic. In particular, ‘the analysis of available geological, geophysical and seismological data for the period of instrumental observations (1918–2015) shows that the highest earthquake potential within the Arctic region is associated with the underwater Mid-Arctic zone of ocean bottom spreading (interplate boundary between Eurasia and North American plates) as well as with some areas of continental slope within the marginal seas’ (Kulikov, Medvedev, and Ivashenko 2017). In the case of the Russian Arctic, the greatest tsunami danger of seismotectonic origin comes from the earthquakes occurring in the underwater Gakkel Ridge zone, the north-eastern part of the Mid-Arctic zone (Kulikov, Medvedev, and Ivashenko 2017).

Like in the case of tsunamis, cyclones are mainly due to global warming, according to scientists. Indeed, the frequency of extreme cyclones has increased over the last decades (Rinke et al. 2017, 1). Arctic storms can have a huge impact on the sea ice causing it to melt quite rapidly. Their frequency and their linkage to climate warming are significant for ship traffic safety as well as for their impact on coastal ecosystems and infrastructure (NASA 2012).