ABSTRACT
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) established in 2015 has developed an institutional framework that on the paper largely mimics the European Union’s. The article suggests that a closer examination of the economic interdependence in the region adds valuable knowledge regarding the development of the organization. The analysis follows a (post)-functionalist model and highlights how the integration process responds to economic interdependence, and that the integration process has the potential of generating spillovers. The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) has initiated work targeting the removal of non-tariff barriers, and business associations in the region are paying attention to the organization. Yet, there are also several constraints to integration in the region linked to the member states’ reluctance to delegate substantial powers to the EEC, and their insistence on the cooperation as being merely economic. These limitations are in line with previous suggestions in the literature regarding non-democratic regional organizations.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. The research was financed by the Czech Science Foundation (standard research grant no. GA21-14665S). We would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for useful comments and suggestions to earlier versions of this article.
2. The term non-democratic regional organization is used to describe a regional organization ‘either established by non-democracies or at least centered around a non-democratic leading state’ (Obydenkova and Libman 2019, 2).
3. The member states of the EAEU are the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation.
4. Only Armenia is listed as partly free by Freedom house - https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores.
5. Sidorsky Sergey, quoted in Lowry 2019, 210.
6. The figures for Kazakhstan are 23.2%; Armenia 34% and Kyrgyzstan 42.5% (Eurasian Economic Commission 2021).
7. The share on non-primary goods in the total exports of the EAEU accounted for 60–65% in the EAEU and 25–27% in exports outside of the region (Spartak 2021, 41).
8. None of the other EAEU members recognized the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 or the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008.
9. The other EAEU countries have to adapt their external tariffs to the ones stipulated by Russia’s WTO membership.
10. The IMF, 2019, estimates the government participation in the Russian economy at 33% in 2016. The public sector in Belarus generates about 70% of GDP, in Kazakhstan 35%, and in Kyrgyzstan 15%.
11. Belarus signed the Code without achieving its objective in July 2010 but there was a deal made on oil in late 2010.
12. The Eurasian Economic Commission Council 14 October 2015 no. 59.
13. In Lukashenko’s Izvestia article from 2011, he stressed the intergovernmental nature of the cooperation - https://iz.ru/news/504081.
14. Sergey Glazyev, Member of the Board (Minister) for Integration and Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic Commission, for instance, claimed that ‘The number of controversial decisions on which the parties used the veto right can be counted on one hand‘ (https://www.belta.by/politics/view/strany-eaes-polzovalis-pravom-veto-v-edinichnyh-sluchajah-glazjev-435320–2021/).
15. ‘Eurasian Economic Commission is a permanent supranational regulatory body of the Union’ http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about-administration.
16. See e.g. Valdai Club 2019 - https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/pyat-let-eaes.
17. Eurasian Economic Commission - https://barriers.eaeunion.org/en-us/Pages/obstacles.aspx.