![Sample our Law journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5942/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Law.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
While cyberattacks are a persistent problem, particularly web defacements, it is unclear what factors differentiate the likelihood of these attacks based on the type of institution that could be targeted. Military and government entities are high-visibility targets for some attackers, though it is unclear whether they are more likely to be defaced on the basis of their operational characteristics or the motives of the attacker. The same is true for educational institutions, which are frequently targeted by ideologically motivated hackers and others seeking to abuse their IT infrastructure. The current study attempted to address this gap in the literature through the application of routine activities theory to identify the factors significantly associated with web defacements against military, government, and educational web domains. Using a sample of 2.2 million web defacements, we examined the perceived value, inertia, visibility, and accessibility of the targets and the attack methods employed in each defacement. The implications of this analysis for our understanding of cyberattacks against high-visibility institutions are discussed in detail.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Jin R. Lee
Jin R. Lee is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminology, Law and Society at George Mason University. His research interests are in cybercrime, online interpersonal violence, cybersecurity, cyberpsychology, computer-mediated communications, and big data.
Thomas J. Holt
Thomas J. Holt is a Professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. His research focuses on computer hacking, malware, and the role of the Internet in facilitating all manner of crime and deviance. He received his PhD from the University of Missouri-St. Louis in 2005.