Abstract
The emotions shame and guilt may represent a critical stepping stone in the rehabilitation process. Often referred to as ‘moral’ emotions owing to their presumed role in promoting altruistic behavior and inhibiting antisocial behaviors, shame and guilt provide potentially exciting points of intervention with offenders. In this article, we describe current psychological theory and research that underscores important differences between shame and guilt. We note parallels between psychologists’ conceptions of guilt and shame, and criminologists’ conceptions of reintegrative and disintegrative shaming. We summarize recent research investigating the implications of these moral emotions for criminal and risky behavior, with special emphasis on the handful of studies conducted with actual offenders. We conclude with a discussion of implications for treatment in criminal justice settings.
Notes
1. Recently, Zeelenberg and Breugelmans (2008) examined situational antecedents of guilt and regret. They found that regret was experienced in response to both situations involving harm to self and situations involving harm to others, whereas guilt was predominantly experienced in situations involving harm to others.
2. Some psychologists (Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Luyten et al., 2002) have suggested that the TOSCA family of measures fail to capture pathological forms of guilt. It is important to note that these measures tap feelings of shame and guilt with respect to failures or transgressions for which the person was responsible. The measures do not capture problematic tendencies to take responsibility for situations that are beyond one's reasonable control (e.g. many instances of survivor guilt, O'Connor, Berry, Weiss, Bush, & Sampson, 1997). We agree that problems with guilt are apt to arise when people have an exaggerated or distorted sense of responsibility for events, or when guilt becomes fused with shame (Dearing & Tangney, 2011; Tangney & Dearing, 2002).