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Articles

“Spicy Taiwanese sister” against the rise of China: gender, identity politics, and elections in Taiwan

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Pages 271-288 | Received 27 May 2020, Accepted 08 Jun 2021, Published online: 30 Jun 2022
 

ABSTRACT

In recent cultural studies scholarship, native terms have been used to understand the affective state of a society. Accordingly, this paper focuses on the term “spicy Taiwanese sister,” regarding its derogatory gender implications in the context of Taiwan’s popular culture. Then, it discloses the strategic appropriation of the gendered term in the presidential campaign from 2019 to 2020. This analysis reveals why the affective campaigning led to a triumph of Taiwan’s democracy. The affect and effect of this presidential campaign could not have been fulfilled without the China factor.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The 92 Consensus is the alleged outcome of a meeting in 1992 between the People’s Republic China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), the formal name of Taiwan. The PRC and the ROC attempted to use this framework to negotiate on other matters without worrying about the political dispute.

2 For more information about China–Taiwan relations and the history of the 92 Consensus, see Nancy B. Tucker, ed., Dangerous Strait: The US–Taiwan–China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

3 Teddy Ng and Lawrence Chung, “Chinese President Xi Jinping Urges Taiwan to Follow Hong Kong Model for Unification,” South China Morning Post, January 2, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2180391/chinese-president-xi-jinping-urges-taiwan-follow-hong-kong-model.

4 Kuei-hsiang Wen and Flor Wang, “Taiwan Will Never Accept ‘One Country, Two System’ Scheme: Tsai,” Focus Taiwan, January 2, 2019, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/201901020021.

5 Lawrence Chung, “Poll Boost for Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen after Tough Stand against Beijing,” South China Morning Post, January 21, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2183001/poll-boost-taiwans-president-tsai-ing-wen-after-tough-stance.

6 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the formal name for China. In this paper, I use “the PRC” and “China” interchangeably to refer to the country that is currently governed by the Communist Party of China.

7 David Morley and Kuan-hsing Chen, eds., Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies (London: Routledge, 1996), 131–50.

8 James Hay, Stuart Hall, and Lawrence Grossberg, “Interview with Stuart Hall,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 10, no. 1 (2013): 18.

9 Donovan O. Schaefer, “Whiteness and Civilization: Shame, Race, and the Rhetoric of Donald Trump,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 17, no. 1 (2020): 3.

10 Lawrence Grossberg, Anthony Fung, and Joseph Chan, “Cultural Studies Taking Roots in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of Communication and Society 11 (2010): 1–27.

11 Ien Ang, “On Cultural Studies, Again,” International Journal of Cultural Studies 23, no. 3 (2020): 288.

12 Grossberg et al., “Cultural Studies,” 21.

13 Chih-ming Wang, “Affective Rearticulations: Cultural Studies in and from Taiwan,” Cultural Studies 31, no. 6 (2017): 740.

14 Stephen J. Hartnett, Patrick Shaou-whea Dodge, and Lisa B. Keränen, “Postcolonial Remembering in Taiwan: 228 and Transitional Justice as ‘The End of Fear,’” Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 13, no. 3 (2020): 238–56.

15 Leo T. S. Ching, Anti-Japan: The Politics of Sentiment in Postcolonial East Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019), 118.

16 Dominic Meng-hsuan Yang, The Great Exodus from China: Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Modern Taiwan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

17 Melissa Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

18 George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (Upland, CA: Taiwan Publishing Co., 1992).

19 Hui-ling Chen, “Taiwanese/Chinese Identity (1992/06-2020/06),” Election Study Center, National Chengchi University.

20 Hartnett et al., “Postcolonial Remembering,” 241.

21 Jonathan Sullivan and James Smyth, “The KMT’s China Policy: Gains and Failures,” in Assessing the Presidency of Ma Ying-jiu in Taiwan: Hopeful Beginning, Hopeless End?, eds. André Beckershoff and Gunter Schubert (London: Routledge, 2018), 1–20.

22 John F. Helliwell et al., “Social Environments for World Happiness,” World Happiness Report, March 20, 2020, https://worldhappiness.report/ed/2020/social-environments-for-world-happiness/.

23 Violet Law, “Taiwan’s Female Politicians Forge Path to Equality,” Aljazeera, January 31, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/taiwan-female-politicians-forge-path-equality-200131033602459.html.

24 See Kevin Ponniah, “Taiwan: How China is Poaching the Island’s Diplomatic Allies,” BBC News, June 4, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40263581; Erin Handley, “Why Will Taiwan Compete as Chinese Taipei at the Olympics in Tokyo,” ABC News, July 25, 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-26/taiwan-chinese-taipei-olympics-compromise-china/100304262; Cindy Sui, “China Warns Western Firms over Taiwan,” BBC News, June 29, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-44614106.

25 Chih-ming Wang, “‘The Future that Belongs to Us’: Affective Politics, Neoliberalism, and the Sunflower Movement,” International Journal of Cultural Studies 20, no. 2 (2017): 180.

26 The more accurate name for Taiwan’s “Chinese” language should be “Taiwan Mandarin,” as this form of the language has been localized and “creolized” since 1949, which makes it different from “Beijing Mandarin.” One-soon Her, “Language and Group Identity: On Taiwan Mainlander’s Mother Tongues and Taiwan Mandarin,” Language and Linguistics 10, no. 2 (2009): 375–419.

27 Tung-hung Ho, “Taike Rock and Its Discontent,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 10, no. 4 (2009): 565–84.

28 Hsi-yao Su, “The Meaning Contestation of Tai: Language Ideologies and the Global–Local Ambivalence,” Concentric: Studies in Linguistics 37, no. 2 (2011): 283–308.

29 LTK Commune, 台客的復仇 [Taike’s Eye for an Eye], Taiwan: Keboyin Music, 1999.

30 Tung-hung Ho, “Profiling a Postwar Trajectory of Taiwanese Popular Music: Nativism in Metamorphosis and Its Alternatives,” in Made in Taiwan: Studies in Popular Music, eds. Eva Tsai, Tung-hung Ho, and Miaoju Jian (London: Routledge, 2019), 23–42.

31 Monga. Directed by Doze Niu. Taipei: Qingchunsuiyue, 2010; Cape No. 7. Directed by Te-sheng Wei. Taipei: Arsfilm, 2008.

32 Ching-ting Liao, “從土台客到台客: 台客文化的敘事分析 [From Vulgar Taike to Taike: A Narrative Analysis of Taike Culture],” 研究與動態 [Research and Movement] 15 (2007): 35–72.

33 Shih-lun Chang, “The Face of Independence? A Visual Record of Taiwanese Indie Music Scene,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 11, no. 1 (2010): 89–99.

34 Todd L. Sandel, Hsin-i Sydney Yueh, and Peih-ying Lu, “Some Distinctive Taiwanese Communication Practices and Their Cultural Meanings,” in The Handbook of Communication in Cross-Cultural Perspective, ed. Donal Carbaugh (New York: Routledge, 2016), 118–28.

35 MC Hotdog, “我愛台妹” [I Love Taiwanese Girls], YouTube, Jun 13, 2006, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZQ8mn5fS5_M.

36 Hsin-i Sydney Yueh, Identity Politics and Popular Culture in Taiwan: A Sajiao Generation (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017), 151–54.

37 Hsiao-Hung Chang, 假全球化 [Fake Globalization] (Taipei: Linking Publishing, 2007), 256.

38 Chang, Fake Globalization, 260.

39 Yueh, Identity Politics, 145.

40 Shu-wen Hu, 哀豔是童年 [Sorrow and Brightness of My Childhood] (Taipei: Yinke, 2006), 217–22.

41 Hsi-yao Su, “Contested Words, Gender Norms, and Language Ideologies: The Gendered Meaning of Tai,” Gender and Language 12, no. 1 (2018): 21–60.

42 Jian-tin Albert Lin, “The Cultural Politics of Techno in Taiwan: The Case of Shining 3 Girls,” Situations 1 (2007): 60–81.

43 Eva Tsai, “Tacky and World-Class: Hsieh Jin-yen, Taiwan EDM, and the Reinvigoration of Tai,” in Made in Taiwan: Studies in Popular Music, eds. Eva Tsai, Tung-hung Ho, and Miaoju Jian (London: Routledge, 2019), 150.

44 MJ116, Big Thing (Taiwan: Rock Records, 2017).

45 MJ116, Big Thing.

46 Momogaga, “廢塗 [Casual Drawing],” Facebook, January 3, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/momogaga0/posts/2271600829741116.

47 Dwagie, “辣台妹/錄音室 freestyle 版本 [Studio Freestyle Version: Spicy Taiwanese Sister],” YouTube, January 9, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=utcFDrOg4L4.

48 Shannon Tiezzi, “Facing Chinese Pressure, Taiwan’s President Tsai Seeks ‘Survival Niche,’” The Diplomat, October 10, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/facing-chinese-pressure-taiwans-president-tsai-seeks-survival-niche/.

49 Liang-jun Chien, “小英撿到槍啦! [President Tsai Must’ve Picked up a Gun],” Taro News, January 7, 2019, https://taronews.tw/2019/01/07/220875/.

50 Dwagie, “Spicy Taiwanese Sister.”

51 This post is translated by the author. Ing-wen Tsai, “最近我看留言常出現辣台妹 [Recently I noticed the term Spicy Taiwanese Sister appearing frequently on my Facebook page],” Facebook, January 9, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/tsaiingwen/posts/10155591860726065/.

52 Fang-yu Chen, “什麼是台獨? [What is Taiwanese Independence?],” Who Governs Taiwan, October 20, 2017, https://whogovernstw.org/2017/10/20/fangyuchen22/.

53 Sean Lin, “Tsai Asked Not to Run for Re-Election,” Taipei Times, January 4, 2019, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/01/04/2003707304.

54 Yung-yao Su and Sherry Hsiao, “Rejecting Framework is Consensus: Tsai,” Taipei Times, January 9, 2019, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/01/09/2003707598.

55 Dafydd J. Fell and Isabelle Cheng, “Testing the Market-Oriented Model of Political Parties in a Non-Western Context: The Case of Taiwan,” in Global Political Marketing, eds. Jennifer Lees-Marshment, Jesper Strömbäck and Chris Rudd (London: Routledge, 2010), 181–82.

56 Dafydd Fell, “Putting on a Show and Electoral Fortunes in Taiwan’s Multi-Party Elections,” in Staging Politics: Power and Performance in Asia and Africa, eds. Julia Strauss and Donal Cruise O’Brien (London: IB Taurus, 2007), 142.

57 Wan-ying Yang and Pei-ting Lin, “Do Women Transfer Their Votes to Tsai? The Change of Gender Gap from 2008 to 2012,” 選舉研究 [Journal of Electoral Studies] 20, no. 2 (2013): 37–71.

58 See Hung-mao Tien, ed., Taiwan’s Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition (Armonk, M.E. Sharpe, 1996); Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (New York, Routledge, 1999); Gary Rawnsley and Qian Gong, “Political Communications in Democratic Taiwan: The Relationship between Politicians and Journalists,” Political Communication 28, no. 3 (2011): 323–40.

59 The Pew Research Center also released a report on Taiwan’s views of China on May 12, 2020, showing that 66 percent of people in Taiwan identify as Taiwanese. Kat Devlin and Christine Huang, “In Taiwan, Views of Mainland China Mostly Negative,” Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/05/12/in-taiwan-views-of-mainland-china-mostly-negative/.

60 Kuan-ying Chen, 我的老闆是總統 [The President is My Boss] (Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing, 2020).

61 “The Hong Kong Protests Explained in 100 and 500 Words,” BBC, November 28, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49317695.

62 Daniel Victor and Tiffany May, “The Murder Case That Lit the Fuse in Hong Kong,” The New York Times, June 15, 2019.

63 Micah McCartney, “Thousands March in Taipei in Solidarity with Hong Kong Protesters,” Taiwan News, October 1, 2019, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3787331.

64 Brian Hioe, “The Dried Mango Strips of National Doom,” Popula, November 6, 2019, https://popula.com/2019/11/06/the-dried-mango-strips-of-national-doom/.

65 Yuan-rong Chang, “亡國感引年輕共鳴 [The Youth Feel the Sense of National Doom],” Awakening News Networks, November 28, 2019, https://anntw.com/articles/20191028-gNey.

66 Ing-wen Tsai, “Stand with Hong Kong,” Facebook, November 12, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/tsaiingwen/posts/10156218715956065

67 Yimou Lee and Ben Blanchard, “Don’t Read Too Much into Election Results, Taiwan Tells China before Vote,” Reuters, January 8, 2020.

68 Ing-wen Tsai, “三個堅定 [Three Firm Commitments],” Facebook, January 15, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/tsaiingwen/photos/a.390960786064/10155600909351065.

69 Wang, “Sunflower Movement,” 185–87.

70 ibid., 186.

71 ibid., 187.

72 Tsai Ing-wen’s 2020 presidential campaign website, https://ec.iing.tw/.

73 Yin C. Chuang, “Kawaii in Taiwan Politics,” International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies 7, no. 3 (2011): 1–17.

74 Kawaii is the Japanese word for “cute.”

75 Yueh, Identity Politics, 117.

76 Ien Ang, “Chinatowns and the Rise of China,” Modern Asian Studies 54, no. 4 (2020): 1367–93.

77 Ang, “Chinatowns,” 1392–3.

78 Shu-mei Shih, “Against Diaspora: The Sinophone as Places of Cultural Production,” in Sinophone Studies: A Critical Reader, eds. Shu-mei Shih, Chien-hsin Tsai, and Brian Bernards (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 25–42.

79 Ang, “Chinatowns,” 1393.

80 Leila Madge, “Capitalizing on ‘Cuteness’: The Aesthetics of Social Relations in a New Postwar Japanese Order,” Japanstudien 9 (1997): 155–74.

81 John Protevi, “Political Emotion,” in Collective Emotions, eds. Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela (Oxford University Press, 2013), 336.

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