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ABSTRACT
In contrast to the scenario depicted by Carl Schmitt, contemporary theory has contradicted the “thesis of differentiation” between aesthetics and “the political.” Critical theorists claimed aesthetic analysis’ relevance for grasping aspects of the political realm. And political thought took an “aesthetic turn.” Hannah Arendt and Jacques Rancière have been influential figures in this turn. Their thought offers a clear response to the challenges to the aesthetico-political Schmitt poses. To approach Arendt and Rancière’s responses, this essay proceeds in three parts. The first section analyses Arendt’s reading of the connection between aesthetics and politics. Focusing on a major shift in her perspective on judgement, I argue that her account is influenced by the ungrounded character of politics. The second section thematises the role that the relationship of aesthetics and politics has in Rancière’s work. I claim that his writings might be read as a challenge to Arendt’s attempt to “stabilise” politics by distinguishing it from the social question. Finally, the third section explicitly contrasts Arendt and Rancière’s accounts of the aesthetic-political. I conclude by arguing that their projects are crucial resources for formulating a critical theory that should resist the exceptionalist temptation to conceive “the political” as an incontestable nature.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. ‘Today we see that utopia and science became synchronised a long time. Utopia becomes scientific – “quels savants que les poètes!,” the great mathematician Henri Poincaré (died 1912) exclaimed, at a time when Jorge Luis Borges’ (the writer lauded in 1961) current relevance could not have been predicted – and science becomes utopian, as is particularly pronounced in the statements of celebrated biologists, biochemists, and evolutionists’ (Schmitt, Citation2011, p. 20). My translation. See, also: Dotti (Citation2009, pp. 149–163).
2. See, among others: (Bennett, Citation1994, pp. 650–670; Citation2001, Citation2010; Connolly, Citation2011, pp. 791–798; Euben, Citation1990; Frank, Citation2010, pp. 182–208; Citation2009, pp. 69–98; Honig, Citation2013; Panagia, Citation2006, Citation2009; Zerilli, Citation2005b, pp. 158–188). See also, notably: (Kompridis, Citation2014).
3. By ‘exceptionalism’ I mean the consecration of extraordinary, foundational political moments as the primary lens through which to comprehend political life. Admittedly, exceptionalist political theories seek to react against the essentialisation of the politically ordinary. But by extolling – rather than acknowledging – political exception, paradoxically, ‘exceptionalism’ can jeopardise the very meaning of the non-ordinary, hypostatising the political realm. See, among others: (Schmitt, Citation1922, Citation1963). See also: (Kalyvas, Citation2008; Frank & McNulty, Citation2007, pp. 3–10).
4. See, among others: (Canovan, Citation1992, pp. 146–147; Honig, Citation2009, pp. 89–93; Kalyvas, Citation2008, pp. 202–210).
5. Theatre transposes the political sphere of human life into art, Arendt suggests, given that ‘it is the only art whose sole subject is man in his relationship to others’ (Citation1958, p. 188; see also Pirro, Citation2001; Euben, Citation2001, pp. 151–164; Taminiaux, Citation2001, pp. 165–177).
6. Later, Arendt claims that ‘the art of politics teaches men how to bring forth what is great and radiant…; as long as the polis is there to inspire men to dare the extraordinary, all things are safe; if it perishes, everything is lost’ (Citation1958, pp. 205–206. Emphasis added).
7. On a different understanding over spectatorship, one relevant for this essay, see: (Rancière, Citation2008b).
8. ‘It is by virtue of this idea of mankind, present in every single man, that men are human…It is at this point that actor and spectator become united…’ (Arendt, Citation1989, p. 75. Emphasis added. See also: Zerilli, Citation2005b, pp. 172–174).
9. According to Beiner, ‘we are forced to consider The Life of the Mind, without Judging, as a tale without an ending’ (Citation1989, p. 90).
10. In this context, for Arendt, ‘freedom is portrayed as a predicate of the power of imagination and not of the will…’ (Arendt, Citation1961, p. 207).
11. See, among others: (Beiner, Citation1989, pp. 87–156; Beiner & Nedelsky, Citation2001, pp. vii-xxvi; Passerin d’Entrèves, Citation2000, pp. 245–260).
12. ‘The confrontation of Aristotle with Kant raises the following very serious questions,’ Beiner notes, ‘first, does the spectator possess a monopoly of judgement, or does the political agent, too, exercise a faculty of judging? And, if the latter, how is the burden of judgement distributed between actor and spectator? Second, is disinterestedness the decisive criterion of judgement, or are other criteria, such as prudence, equally requisite?’ (Beiner, Citation1989, P. 135).
13. See, also: (Robson, Citation2005, pp. 77–95; Bolmain, Citation2010, pp. 219–253; Dikeç, Citation2012, pp. 262–279).
14. See, also: (May, Citation2008, pp. 38–77; Citation2010, pp. 69–79).
15. See, also: (Chambers, Citation2010, pp. 57–68; Kuiken, Citation2016, pp. 6–21).
16. See, among others: (Rancière, Citation2000a, pp. 113–126; Citation2005, pp. 13–25, Citation2008a, pp. 172–190; Robson, Citation2005, pp. 77–95; Citation2009, pp. 88–101; Chambers, Citation2005, pp. 18–43; Citation2011, p. 309; Kollias, Citation2007, pp. 82–97; Ross, Citation2009, pp. 128–150; Citation2010, pp. 133–150).
17. On this theatrical dimension of Rancière’s politics, see: (Hallward, Citation2009, pp. 140–157).
18. On Rancière’s account of ‘postdemocracy’ vis-à-vis Arendt’s political thought, see: (Meyer, Citation2011, pp. 21–38).
19. In Rancière’s terms: ‘The reason for the dilemma, for Arendt, resides in the confusion between political and non-political life, the confusion between two different lives (bios and zoe). From my point of view, politics exists at precisely the point at which this division is put into question. And the interval between man and citizen is the operator of this re-division. If, on the other hand, the aim really is to separate out these two forms of life, to make an actual distinction between politics and the social, then it can only result in an assimilation of “pure politics” with the sphere of state action. This may be done in the gentle way through promoting the “return” of the political and launching tirades about living together and the common good, which aim, in the last instance, at exulting the Juppé plan. This may be done in the more pessimistic tones of the theory of the state of exception according to which habeas corpus and the Rights of Man reveal their truth in the Nazi genocide, itself ultimately also homogeneous to our democratic normality. The concepts of state of exception and of bare life are, then, names for a modernity in which all intervals are abolished and no interval is left open for political practice’ (Citation2010, p. 214. Emphasis in the original). On this issue, see also: (Schaap, Citation2011, p. 22; Pitkin, Citation1998).
20. See: (Rancière, Citation1998b, pp. 174–177; Citation2010, pp. 35–37, see, also, Citation2000c, p. 12, Citation2011, pp. 10–33).
21. See, also, among others: (Bosteels, Citation2010, pp. 80–92; Citation2009, pp. 158–175; Deranty, Citation2010, pp. 116–130).
22. As Linda Zerilli suggests, nonetheless, ‘“spectator” is not another person, but simply a different mode of relating to, or being in, the common world’ (Citation2005b, p. 179).
23. See, among others: (Beiner, Citation1989, pp. 139–140).
24. However, critics such as Margaret Canovan call into question this type of depiction of Arendt’s ‘purification of the political’ (Citation1985, p. 636).
25. This argument complicates the rendition of Rancière’s work as an example of the ‘political difference,’ that is, the distinction between la politique and le politique. See: (Chambers, Citation2011, pp. 306–313, see, also Marchart, Citation2007; Deranty, Citation2003).
26. See, also: (Ingram, Citation2006, pp. 229–245; Deranty, Citation2003; Deranty & Renault, Citation2013, p. 46).
27. Other critics have theorised on Arendt’s account of sensus communis, arguing that her portrayal of Kant cannot be subsumed under the communitarian spectrum. See, among others: (Villa, Citation2001, pp. 301–302).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Facundo Vega
Facundo Vega specialises in contemporary continental philosophy and critical theory. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell University in 2018. Facundo is currently completing his first book, titled Extraordinary Matters: The Political after Martin Heidegger, which breaks with contemporary readings of Heidegger to argue that the “onto- political moment” in current critical theory epitomizes a pervasive hostility toward ordinariness. This project has been supported by fellowships and awards from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD), the Martin-Heidegger-Stiftung, the American Friends of Marbach, the Society for the Humanities, the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies, the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, and the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
Facundo’s articles have appeared or are forthcoming in, among other journals, Philosophy Today and diacritics, for which he is co-editing a special volume on “Heidegger Today?” He has been a visiting scholar at Columbia University, The New School for Social Research, and the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg. In September 2018, he joined the ICI Berlin as a postdoctoral fellow.