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ABSTRACT
This article explores Hizbullah’s attempts to negotiate its double identity as both a religious resistance group and a Lebanese nationalist movement in Dahiya in the southern suburbs of Beirut. By reading Dahiya through the lens of literature on promotion and branding as well as Lefebvre’s spatial triad of perceived, conceived and lived spaces, the article examines how Dahiya’s physical landscape and the choreographed lived experiences within it both serve to promote Hizbullah’s distinct religious resistance identity. Finally, the article argues that these same places and spaces serve to emphasise the Party’s Lebanese identity because Dahiya is also presented as an extension of Beirut, by mimicking the spatial dynamics and practices of the nation’s capital. In order to support these ideas, I will examine Dahiya from 2016 until the present day.
KEYWORDS:
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. This article adopts Michael De Certeau’s (Citation1984), definitions of place and space whereby the former is the physical landscape, the building or the structure. In contrast, space involves meaning, activities and practices.
2. It is clear from interviews with Hizbullah designers and media experts that the Party is increasingly focusing on communication strategies and that it has a sophisticated web of interrelated messages and techniques. By adopting branding as a theoretical approach, this article uncovers the level of sophistication, value driven approach and consistency in messages among others.
3. I adopt the terms used by Deeb and Harb (Citation2013) in their study of Dahiya’s entertainment sites.
4. Hadi Nasrullah is Sayyed Nasrullah’s son, who was killed in military action; Abbas al-Musawi was the former secretary general of Hizbullah; Ragheb Harb was a Muslim cleric known for leading regional resistance against Israel; Rawdat al Chahidayn is a reference to Imam Hasan and Hussein, and the Master of Martyr complex is a reference to Imam Hussein.
5. The Party’s logo is composed of ‘Hizbullah,’ chosen intentionally from a verse in the Qurʾan, written with an arm carrying a rifle extending from the text thus emphasising the Party’s religious and resistance ideologies.
6. See Deeb and Harb (Citation2013) for the reactions of Dahiya’s inhabitants to the lack of pubs and clubs.
7. It is unclear how Hizbullah controls the display of advertisements in Dahiya but it is safe to assume that they require approval from the municipality and which in Dahiya is controlled by a Hizbullah affiliated member.
8. Amal is a Shiʿa group that was founded by Musa al-Sadr. Following al-Sadr’s disappearance in Libya and Amal’s moderate stance towards Israeli’s occupation, the party split into two groups, one of which eventually led to the birth of Hizbullah. During the civil war, Amal and Hizbullah were at opposing camps but have since reconciled and become political allies.
9. Rafic Hariri was a prominent Sunni businessman, politician and former Prime Minister of Lebanon. Following his assassination in 2005, his son Saad was elected to fill his position.
10. I received the email in December 2006 following the 33-day war with Israel from an acquaintance who opposes Hizbullah. The email mainly mocked Shiʿas, especially those who belong to the Party’s ranks and who follow their religious and political discourse. The points affirmed stereotypical framings of Shiʿas as a sect and mocked them for their clothing, appearance, smell and areas of residence among others.
11. Verdun and Biel are affluent areas in central Beirut and ‘Al Mourabba[ʿ] Al Amni is the security zone in Dahiya.
12. Such attempts also emphasise Hizbullah’s endeavour to counter charges that it functions as a state within a state – charges which only increased following the 2006 war. This reputation has proven particularly damaging for Hizbullah, especially because it brings to mind the historic resentment towards the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Lebanon on precisely the same grounds. In 1982, for example, the PLO had expanded to the point of functioning as a ‘para-state’ within Lebanon with its own independent networks of institutions and services (including military police, security services, matériel and utilities) – a privileged status which many Lebanese believed led to Israeli attacks (Brynen, Citation1989).
13. The FPM is a Maronite Christian group headed by General Michel Aoun, the current president of Lebanon. In February 2006, Hizbullah and the FPM formed a political alliance that survives until this day.
14. A large population of Dahiya consists of Amal supporters, especially the Ghobeiri area.
15. Nabih Berri became the head of the Amal party following al-Sadr’s disappearance. He has also been the speaker of parliament since 1992.
16. Badreddine was a prominent military leader of Hizbullah who was killed in an explosion in Syria in May 2016.
17. Dahiya was an Amal protected area before Hizbullah’s control.
18. Similar findings are also discussed by Deeb and Harb (Citation2013) who explain that the Party has launched ‘a network of neighbourhood committees’ who report on any unacceptable activities. In the case of ‘immoral’ activities within these cafés, Hizbullah will attempt to destroy the reputation of the establishment to run the business down and will, in many cases, convince the owner’s relatives to pressure the owner to interfere and close the business (pp. 73–74).
19. The only exception to this rule occurred when an Iranian orchestra with two female musicians played at Rissalat theatre.
20. The phrase used here by Hajj Daher not only reflects Hizbullah’s Islamic character – and thus also the limits of the Party’s willingness to open up and mimic central Beirut – but also draws attention to the difference between Hizbullah and Iran. If the prevailing assumption is that Hizbullah is the religious ‘mirror’ of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we find here that the former, with regards to its own constituents and as a much smaller entity compared to Iran, can actually be more conservative and less liberal. In the same way, his use of the term ‘mukawama’ (resistance) instead of Hizbullah again serves to emphasise the intertwining of religion and resistance within the Party’s identity.
21. See Deeb and Harb (Citation2013) for the complete list of the reasons behind the leisure and culture sites.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Sarah Hamdar
Sarah Hamdar is a part time lecturer at the American University of Beirut. She holds a PhD in ‘Media and Communications’ from Goldsmiths and an MA in ‘Book Art’ from Camberwell college. Sarah worked as a graphic designer prior to joining academia.