US Preventive War against China

Abstract

This article evaluates the claim that strategic theory of preventive war cannot account for US decision not to attack China in the early 1960s despite that country's moves to arm itself with atomic bombs. I argue that this critique is misguided since Washington during this period did not face those strategic conditions which the theory views as providing compelling incentives for a preventive attack. The United States neither foresaw a major shift in the balance of power nor possessed effective maneuver strategies available to it. Considering these circumstances, the Chinese case in fact confirms strategic theory.

Notes

1. Andreas Jarblad, “Testing the Strategic Theory of Preventive War: The Case of the Chinese Nuclear Weapons Program,” Asian Security Vol. 3, No. 2 (2007).

2. Gordon H. Chang, “JFK, China, and the Bomb,” The Journal of American History Vol. 74, No. 4 (1988), pp. 1287–1310.

3. “A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability,” June 17, 1963, RG 59, PPCR, box 276, S/P Papers June–July 1963.

4. “Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–63: Arms Control and Disarmament, Vol. 7 (hereinafter FRUS, with appropriate year, volume, and page number) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 691; “Memorandum from the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for National Estimates to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,” July 8, 1963, FRUS, 1961–63: Arms Control and Disarmament, Vol. 7, p. 771; “Memorandum for the Record,” October 17, 1964, FRUS, 1964–68: China, Vol. 30, p. 111.

5. Robert H. Johnson, State Department PPC, “The Implications of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability,” April 17, 1964, US National Archives, RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1964–66, DEF 12-1 Chicom.

6. “A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability,” June 17, 1963, RG 59, PPCR, box 276, S/P Papers June–July 1963. Also see William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64,” International Security Vol. 25, No. 3 (2000/01), pp. 80–81.

7. Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’,” p. 76.

8. Worst-case scenarios continued to emerge, however. For example, see “China as a Nuclear Power (Some Thoughts Prior to the Chinese Test),” October 7, 1964, the Office of International Security Affairs, the Department of Defense.

9. For examples of non-alarmist assessments, see Chang, “JFK, China, and the Bomb,” p. 1309.

10. President Kennedy probably did not see Robert Johnson's 1963 study. Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’,” pp. 56, 72–73, 76, 96.

11. Jarblad, “Testing the Strategic Theory of Preventive War.”

12. For a typology of maneuver and attrition strategies, see Dong Sun Lee, “Committing Suicide for Fear of Death: Power Shifts and Preventive War” (Ph.D. dissertation: The University of Chicago, 2004), chapter 2.

13. Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’,” pp. 72–83.

14. Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’,” p. 82.

15. “An Exploration of the Possible Bases for Action against the Chinese Communist Nuclear Facilities,” April 14, 1964, FRUS, 1964–68, Vol. 30, pp. 39–40. Also see George W. Rathjens, ACDA, “Destruction of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities,” December 14, 1964. Rathjens offers a critique, as well as a summary, of Robert Johnson's analysis.

16. Lyle J. Goldstein, “When China was a ‘Rogue State’: The Impact of China's Nuclear Weapons Program on US–China Relations during the 1960s,” Journal of Contemporary China Vol. 12, No. 37 (2003), pp. 751–752.

17. General Curtis LeMay, acting chairman of the JCS, acknowledged this risk in his April 29, 1963 memo and recommended seeking Soviet cooperation to minimize it. See Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’,” p. 69.

18. Goldstein, “When China was a ‘Rogue State’,” pp. 755–756.

19. Dong Sun Lee, “US Preventive War against North Korea,” Asian Security Vol. 2, No. 1 (2006), pp. 4–5.

20. Lee, “US Preventive War against North Korea,” p. 16.

21. On this problem, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).