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Original Articles

The Five Power Defence Arrangements and Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

Pages 271-286 | Published online: 25 Oct 2012
 

Abstract

The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) marked its 40th year of existence on November 1, 2011. What explains the durability of a collection of bilateral consultative arrangements initially conceived in the context of the British military withdrawal from East of Suez? Examining the FPDA as an institutional expression of defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia sheds light on its longevity. The arrangements have successfully operated as a defense diplomacy instrument by fulfilling three core functions. The FPDA has traditionally acted as a psychological deterrent with the fear of an assertive Indonesia in mind. It has performed a confidence-building role in the Singapore–Malaysian relationship. Finally, it has provided Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom with an instrument to be engaged in Southeast Asian security.

Notes

1. See Khoo How San, “The Five Power Defense Arrangements: If It Ain't Broke …,” Pointer: Quarterly Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces Vol. 26, No. 4 (October–December 2000), pp. 107–114.

2. Bhubhindar Singh and See Seng Tan, “Introduction: Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” in Bhubhindar Singh and See Seng Tan, eds., From ‘Boots’ to ‘Brogues’: The Rise of Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, RSIS Monograph 21 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2011), pp. 1–2.

3. Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defense Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance, Adelphi Paper 365 (London: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 6–8.

4. “Banyan: Echoes of Dreamland,” The Economist, November 5, 2011, p. 42.

5. See also Tim Huxley, “The Future of the FPDA in an Evolving Regional Strategic Environment,” in Ian Storey, Ralf Emmers, and Daljit Singh, eds., The Five Power Defense Arrangements at Forty (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), pp. 119–120.

6. Peter Ho, “FPDA Still Relevant at 40 Years On,” The Straits Times, December 7, 2011.

7. Chin Kin Wah, “The Five Power Defense Arrangements: Twenty Years After,” The Pacific Review Vol. 4, No. 3 (1991), p. 193.

8. Besides the AMDA, the FPDA should also be contrasted to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) created in February 1955 as a result of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Pact, of September 1954. SEATO included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States but never played an active military role.

9. Ho, “FPDA Still Relevant at 40 Years On.”

10. Ho, “FPDA Still Relevant at 40 Years On.”

11. Paragraph 5, Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Five Power Ministerial Meeting on the External Defense of Malaysia and Singapore, London, April 15–16, 1971.

12. Khoo, “The Five Power Defense Arrangements,” pp. 107–114.

13. Michael Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 106.

14. Ang Wee Han, “Five Power Defense Arrangements: A Singapore Perspective,” Pointer: Quarterly Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces Vol. 24, No. 2 (April–June 2008), pp. 49–59.

15. Malaysia has since the early 1970s continued to adopt a foreign policy based on self-reliance and strong ties with Asian and other developing nations, seeking its independence from Western foreign-policy models at least rhetorically.

16. Chin Kin Wah, The Defense of Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a Security System, 1957–1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 174.

17. Jim Rolfe, Anachronistic Past or Positive Future? New Zealand and the Five Power Defense Arrangements, Working Paper (Wellington, New Zealand: Center for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 1995), p. 7.

18. Five Power Ministerial Meeting on Defense: Five Power Consultative Arrangements After 1971, FPM (L) (P) 2/71, in Ministry of Defense file 1/2/4: Treaties and Agreements: Five Power Arrangements.

19. Rolfe, “Anachronistic Past or Positive Future?” p. 7.

20. Rolfe, “Anachronistic Past or Positive Future?” p. 7.

21. Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia, p. 106.

22. Ho, “FPDA Still Relevant at 40 Years On.”

23. Huxley, “The Future of the FPDA in an Evolving Regional Strategic Environment,” p. 119.

24. Quoted in Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 144.

25. See Michael Leifer, Singapore's Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London: Routledge, 2000).

26. Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 64.

27. Rolfe, “Anachronistic Past or Positive Future?” p. 14; Ho, “FPDA Still Relevant at 40 Years On.”

28. Chin, “The Five Power Defense Arrangements,” p. 201.

29. Chin, “The Five Power Defense Arrangements,” p. 200.

30. General Benny Murdani, former Indonesian Armed Forces commander and former Minister of Defense and Security at a seminar on Australia's Defense White Paper, Australian Defense Forces Academy, December 1994.

31. Leszek Buszynski, “Post–Cold War Security in the ASEAN Region,” in Gary Klintworth. ed., Asia-Pacific Security: Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities? (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996), p. 121.

32. Robert Go, “Singapore Strait Patrols Keep Pirates at Bay,” The Straits Times, May 16, 2002.

33. Ralf Emmers, Non-Traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific: The Dynamics of Securitization (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2004), pp. 39–49.

34. Huxley, “The Future of the FPDA in an Evolving Regional Strategic Environment,” p. 119.

35. Asad Latif and Karen Wong, “Danger of Terror Attack Not Over Yet,” The Straits Times, February 18, 2002.

36. Zakaria Ahmad, “A Quasi-Pact of Enduring Value: A Malaysian Perspective on the FPDA,” in Storey, Emmers, and Singh, eds., The Five Power Defense Arrangements at Forty, p. 102.

37. Ho, “FPDA Still Relevant at 40 Years On.”

38. Johan Saravananuttu, “Malaysian Foreign Policy and the Five Power Defense Arrangements,” in Storey, Emmers, and Singh, eds., The Five Power Defense Arrangements at Forty, p. 43.

39. Saravananuttu, “Malaysian Foreign Policy and the Five Power Defense Arrangements,” pp. 43–44.

40. Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia, p. 106.

41. Andrew T. H. Tan, “The Five Power Defense Arrangements: The Continuing Relevance,” Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 29, No. 2 (2008), p. 292.

42. Damon Bristow, “The Five Power Defense Arrangements: Southeast Asia's Unknown Regional Security Organization,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 27, No. 1 (April 2005), p. 6.

43. Huxley, “The Future of the FPDA in an Evolving Regional Strategic Environment,” p. 119.

44. Ho, “FPDA Still Relevant at 40 Years On.”

45. Kate Boswood, “Engaging Our Interests: The Five Power Defense Arrangements and Its Contribution to Regional Security,” Defense Magazine Issue 9 (August 2007), p. 36.

46. J. M. Jamaluddin, “FPDA Expanding Its Role beyond Security Concerns,” Asian Defense Journal Issue 5 (July/August 2006), p. 7.

47. “Second FPDA Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting,” Ministry of Defense News Release, Singapore, June 7, 2004. Available at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2004/jun/07jun04_nr.html

48. Sam Bateman, “The FPDA's Contribution to Regional Security: The Maritime Dimension,” in Storey, Emmers, and Singh, eds., The Five Power Defense Arrangements at Forty, p. 73.

49. For example, at the 2003 Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister (DPM), Dr. Tony Tan, declared: “Singapore views the regional piracy situation and the possibility of maritime terrorism in regional waters very seriously.” Remarks by Dr. Tony Tan, DPM and minister for defense, at the plenary session on “Maritime Security after September 11th,” the Second IISS Asia Security Conference, Singapore, May 30–June 1, 2003.

50. J. N. Mak, “Securitizing Piracy in Southeast Asia: Malaysia, the International Maritime Bureau and Singapore,” in Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers, and Amitav Acharya, eds., Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitization (London: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 66–92.

51. “FPDA Understands Our Position on Foreign Forces in Straits,” The Star (Malaysia), June 8, 2004.

52. Established in Tokyo in 2004, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) brings together China, Bangladesh, Denmark, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and all the ASEAN countries, with the notable exception of Indonesia and Malaysia. ReCAAP focuses on the exchange of information but does not include joint exercises.

53. Tan, “The Five Power Defense Arrangements,” p. 295.

54. Quoted in Tunku Ya'acob Tunku Abdullah, “FPDA Remains Relevant with Broadened Role to Reflect New Security Threats,” Asian Defense Journal Issue 5 (July/August, 2006), p. 6.

55. Zakaria Ahmad, “A Quasi-Pact of Enduring Value,” p. 102.

56. Zakaria Ahmad, “A Quasi-Pact of Enduring Value,” p. 102; Saravananuttu, “Malaysian Foreign Policy and the Five Power Defense Arrangements,” p. 46.

57. Australian Government, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030, Defense White Paper (Canberra: Department of Defense, 2009), paragraph 5.12, pp. 42–43.

58. Australian Government, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century, paragraph 11.24, p. 97.

59. Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Five Power Defense Arrangements Exercises and Regional Security, 2004–10,” in Storey, Emmers, and Singh, The Five Power Defense Arrangements at Forty, p. 62.

60. “Singapore and Australia Share Common Strategic View: MM,” The Straits Times, March 29, 2007, p. 25.

61. Leifer, Singapore's Foreign Policy, p. 129.

62. Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Framework for Security Cooperation, Mataram, Lombok, November 13, 2006.

63. Bateman, “The FPDA's Contribution to Regional Security,” p. 79.

64. Geoffrey Till, “A Little Ray of Sunshine: Britain, and the Origins of the FPDA – A Retrospective on Objectives, Problems and Solutions,” in Storey, Emmers, and Singh, The Five Power Defense Arrangements at Forty, pp. 18–19.

65. Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Five Power Defense Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever,” Security Challenges Vol. 3, No. 1 (February 2007), p. 94.

66. Geoffrey Till, “Britain's Future Defense: Impact on the FPDA,” RSIS Commentaries, November 10, 2010, p. 2.

67. Defense White Paper 2010 (Wellington, New Zealand: Ministry of Defense, November 2010), p. 30.

68. Mark G. Rolls, “The FPDA and Asia's Changing Strategic Environment: A View from New Zealand,” in Storey, Emmers, and Singh, The Five Power Defense Arrangements at Forty, pp. 107–108.

69. Bristow, “The Five Power Defense Arrangements,” p. 11.

70. Ho, “FPDA Still Relevant at 40 Years On.”

71. “Banyan: Echoes of Dreamland,” p. 42.

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