China and Lilliputians: Small States in a Big Power’s Evolving Foreign Policy

ABSTRACT

Some scholars believe that as China’s power grows more preponderant, it will leverage its growing might to impose its will on others in the international system. This article engages this debate by probing China’s relationship with small states, going beyond those in its region. Small states are particularly apposite because their size and power deficiencies suggest they are among the most vulnerable to pressure or coercion from big powers such as China. Beijing’s diplomacy towards small states, therefore, represents a barometer of Chinese restraint and exercise of its power in a situation of clear power superiority. The article studies this dynamic, unpacking the contours and shape of China’s relations with small states, as well as the narratives and rationales that drive this relationship.

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1. Odd A. Westad, “Memo to China: Size Isn’t Everything,” Bloomberg, October 18, 2012.

2. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, January 22, 2015 Available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1230645.shtml

3. Xi Jinping, The Governance of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014).

4. Li Yonghui, “中国国际战略中的关键性小国” (Strategic Small States in China’s International Strategy), 现代国际关系 (Contemporary International Relations), Vol. 2 (2015), p. 21.

5. For prominent examples of such perspectives, see John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton & Company, 2001); Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: Norton & Company, 2011); Stephen Walt, “Dealing with a Chinese Monroe Doctrine,” The New York Times, August 26, 2013; Yong Deng, “China: The Post-Responsible Power,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2015), pp. 117–132. For a perspective of Chinese assertiveness, see Hoo Tiang Boon, “Hardening the Hard, Softening the Soft: Assertiveness and China’s Regional Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies (2017). http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1221820

6. See, for examples, Yoram Evron, “Israel’s Response to China’s Rise: A Dependent State’s Dilemma,” Asian Survey, Vol. 56, No. 2 (March/April 2016), pp. 392–414; Lee Lai To, “The Lion and the Dragon: A View on Singapore-China Relations,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 28 (2001), pp. 415–425; Yang Jian, The Pacific Islands in China’s Grand Strategy: Small States, Big Games (New York: Palgrave, 2011).

7. Hu Qing, “Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Seychelles Route Revived,” China Daily, May 22, 2015; “China’s President Xi Jinping Wins Backing from the Maldives for Maritime Silk Road,” The Straits Times, September 15, 2014; “DPFZA Signs Milestone Agreement to Make Djibouti Key Entry Point to Africa on China’s New Silk Road,” Somaliland Informer, January 25, 2016; Sara Birkenthal, “Bahrain’s Dragon City,” Foreign Affairs, May 5, 2016; “FM: China Takes Qatar as a Key Partner for Belt and Road Initiative,” Xinhua, May 11, 2016.

8. For an account of Chinese diplomacy under Xi, see Hoo Tiang Boon, ed., Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi (New York & London: Routledge, 2017); “China Promotes All-Dimensional Diplomacy,” Xinhua, May 31, 2013.

9. Patricia Rey Mallen, “China’s Stake In Suriname: Why Is Beijing Interested In This Small South American Country?,” International Business Times, January 6, 2013.

10. See, for examples, Michael Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 32 (2010), pp. 1–19; Westad, “Memo to China: Size Isn’t Everything”; “Obama Says Concerned China Uses Size To Bully Others In Region,” Reuters, September 4, 2015; Chua Mui Hoong, “China: Bully or Misunderstood New Boy?,” The Straits Times, July 17, 2016; Felicia Sonmez, “China Bully Diplomacy May Backfire,” Agence-France Presse, January 23, 2014.

11. Erling Bjol, “The Small State in International Politics,”,in Small States in International Relations, August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland, eds. (New York: Wiley & Sons 1971).

12. This is why Kuik Cheng Chwee describes some of these states as “smaller states” rather than small states. See Kuik Cheng Chwee, Smaller States’ Alignment Choices: A Comparative Study of Malaysia and Singapore’s Hedging Behaviour in the Face of a Rising China, PhD Dissertation, John Hopkins University, 2010.

13. Christine Ingebritsen, Iver Neumann, Sieglinde Gstohl, and Jessica Beyer, eds., Small States in International Relations (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), pp. 5–9.

14. Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 29.

15. Robert Keohane, “Lilliputians Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” International Organisation, Vol. XXIII (Spring 1969), pp. 291–310.

16. Jeanne Hey, Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp 3–4.

17. This has been publicly highlighted by South Korean diplomats. See Opening Remarks by HE Han Seung-soo President of the 56^th UN General Assembly at the Forum of Small States, New York, September 10, 2001.

18. David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of Small Power in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

19. “Defining a Small Economy,” World Bank. Available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:21512464~pagePK:41367~piPK:51533~theSitePK:40941,00.html; and “Small States,” The Commonwealth, Available at http://thecommonwealth.org/our-work/small-states.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. “Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s Speech on China’s Diplomacy in 2014,” Xinhua, December 26, 2014.

23. Wu Jianmin, “重视小国” (Value Small States), 中国观察 (China Observer), 2015, p. 12.

24. He Liang, “小国的对外战略模式研究” (Studying the External Strategy Models of Small States), 改革开放 (Reform and Opening Up), Vol. 1 (2015), pp.44–46.

25. Li Shaojun, “大国何以开展小国外交?” (How Should Big Countries Conduct Small State Diplomacy?), 社会观察 (Social Outlook),Vol. 12 (2013), pp. 40–41.

26. Chen Xiang, “关键性小国与中国的支点外交” (Small States of Strategic Importance and the Pivot Diplomacy of China), 江南社会学院学报 (Journal of Jiangnan Social University), Vol. 17, No. 1 (2015), pp. 28–33.

27. Xiong Guangqing, “鼠戏象并非中国外交真相” (Mouse Gaming the Elephant is Not the Truth in Chinese Foreign Policy), 人民论坛 (People’s Tribune), August 2012, p. 5; Ding Yuan, “国家核心利益与亚太“小国”外交战略研究” (China’s Core Interest and the Study of the Foreign Policy Strategies of Asia-Pacific “Small States”), 东南大学学报 (Journal of Southeast University, Vol. 15 (2013), p. 175.

28. See Gu Wei, “地区成略与大国崛起起时对周边小国的争夺” (Rising Great Powers’ Regional Strategy and Their Tactics of Wooing Small Peripheral States), 世界经济与政治 (World Economics & Politics), Vol.1 (2015), pp. 40–60; Chen, “关键性小国与中国的支点外交” (Small States of Strategic Importance and the Pivot Diplomacy of China); Ding, “国家核心利益与亚太“小国”外交战略研究” (China’s Core Interest and the Study of the Foreign Policy Strategies of Asia-Pacific “Small States”).

29. Jonathan Kaiman, “China’s Urban Sprawl Raises Key Question: Can it Feed its People?” February 16, 2015.Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/16/china-mega-airport-symbol-flight-agriculture-urbanisation.

30. Martin Jacques, When China Rules The World: the end of the western world and the birth of a new global order (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), p. 208.

31. Jenifer Huang McBeath and Jerry Mcbeath, Environmental Change and Food Security in China (The Netherlands: Springer, 2010), Chapter 10.

32. John Wong, “How Secure is China’s Food Security?” in Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian, eds., China: Development And Governance (Singapore: World Scientific, 2012), pp. 66–67.

33. “The Hungry and Forgotten,” The Economist, June 14, 2014.

34. Chuin-Wei Yap, “China Sees Food Need Rising,” The Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2011. Available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703784004576220291166000526.

35. Gerald Chan, “China and Small States in Food Security Governance,” African and Asian Studies, Vol. 13 (2014), pp. 59–79.

36. David Barboza, “In China, Farming Fish in Toxic Waters,” The New York Times, December 15, 2007; Mark Godfrey, “Chinese Demand Changing Terms of Global Competition for Seafood,” South China Morning Post, August 23, 2014.

37. Shannon Van Sant, “China Expands Global Fishing Fleet,” Voice of America, June 10, 2015. Available at http://www.voanews.com/content/china-expands-global-fishing-fleet/2815656.html.

38. Erica Strecker Downs, China’s Quest For Energy Security (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2000).

39. ‘Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions,’ Xinhua, 30 June 2015. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-06/30/c_134369837.htm

40. Zhiqun Zhu, China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), pp 28–29; “Building on Ambition: China Helps Cape Verde after Independence,” Macauhub. Available at http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/2013/12/13/building-on-ambition-china-helps-build-cape verde-after-independence/

41. Ana Cristina Alves, “Chinese Economic and Trade Cooperation Zones in Africa,” South Africa Institute of International Affairs Occasional Paper, No. 74 (January 2011), pp. 5–15;

42. “Xi Urges More Vigor for Ties with Caribbean Nations,” Xinhua, June 3, 2013; “China’s President Xi Jinping Wins Backing from the Maldives for Maritime Silk Road.”

43. “President Xi Jinping Meets with Prime Minister Perry Christie,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, June 9, 2013; Hilton McDavid, “The Caribbean: the Third US Border,” The Canadian Foundation for the Americas Commentary, February 2011.

44. Randal Archibold, “China Buys Inroads in the Caribbean, Catching US Notice,” The New York Times, April 7, 2012.

45. Hoo Tiang Boon, “The Hedging Prong in India’s Evolving China Strategy,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 25, No.101 (2016), pp. 792–804.

46. Darshana Baruah, “Modi’s Trip and China’s Islands: The Battle for the Indian Ocean,” The Diplomat, March 11, 2015.

47. See, for example, Abhijit Singh, “A PLA-N for Chinese maritime bases in the Indian Ocean,” Pacific Forum CSIS PacNet, No. 7 (January 26, 2015), pp. 1–2.

48. “Chinese Navy May Dock in Seychelles for Supplies,” Xinhua, December 12, 2011.

49. “外交部：中国和吉布提正就在吉建设保障设施进行协商” (Foreign Ministry: China and Djibouti Are Discussing the Construction of a Support Facility), Xinhua, November 26, 2015; Katrina Manson, “China Military to Set Up First Overseas Base in Horn of Africa,” Financial Times, March 31, 2016.

50. Hoo Tiang Boon, “Reassessing the Taiwan-China Rapprochement: A Constrained Romance of the Two Kingdoms,” St Antony’s International Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 (February 2012), pp. 164–181.

51. Timothy Rich, “Status for Sale: Taiwan and the Competition for Diplomatic Recognition,” Issue & Studies, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 2009), pp. 159–188.

52. Czeslaw Tubilewicz, Taiwan and Post-Communist Europe (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 10–11.

53. Philippa Brant, “China–Taiwan Diplomatic Rivalry Gives Way to New Maturity,” The Interpreter, November 25, 2013.

54. Hu Shaohua, “Small State Foreign Policy: The Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan,” China: An International Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2 (August 2015), pp. 1–23.

55. Ibid.

56. Hoo Tiang Boon, “Cross-Strait Position since 2008: Assessing Intra-Position Politics,” International Journal of China Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2014), pp. 137–152.

57. Jessica Drun, “China–Taiwan Diplomatic Truce Holds Despite Gambia”, The Diplomat, March 29, 2014; Joel Atkinson, “Time for Taiwan to Rethink its Diplomacy,” The Diplomat, June 25, 2014.

58. “The Gambia Gambit,” The Economist, March 26, 2016.

59. “Tiny Gambia Finds Itself Used as a Pawn as China Moves to Asset its Global Power,” Bloomberg, March 18, 2016.

60. Shawn Aritta, Summer La Croix, and Christopher Edmonds, “Effect of Approved Destination Status on Mainland Chinese Travel Abroad,” Asian Economic Journal, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2014), p. 221.

61. Joey Aguilar, “China-Qatar Relations Get a Boost,” Gulf Times, March 13, 2013.

62. “China Promotes All-Dimensional Diplomacy.”

63. “Xi Jinping Arrives in Male, Starting His State Visit to Maldives,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 15, 2014. Available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/zjpcxshzzcygyslshdsschybdtjkstmedfsllkydjxgsfw/t1191505.shtml

64. Mallen, “China’s Stake In Suriname: Why Is Beijing Interested In This Small South American Country?”

65. “Trindad & Tobago PM Hails Chinese Dream,” Xinhua, June 2, 2013.

66. “FM: China Takes Qatar as a Key Partner for Belt and Road Initiative.”

67. Manson, “China Military to Set Up First Overseas Base in Horn of Africa”; “China Cannot be Blamed for its Presence in Africa: Mauritius PM Anerood Jugnauth,” The Economic Times, November 1, 2015.

68. Baruah, “Modi’s Trip and China’s Islands: The Battle for the Indian Ocean.”

69. “The Ghosts of Baha Mar: How a $3.5 Billion Paradise Went Bust,” Bloomberg, January 4, 2016.

70. Cecilia Jamasmie, “China’s Bosai Minerals Group Ponders Leaving Guyana due to Hostility” Available at http://www.mining.com/chinas-bosai-minerals-group-ponders-leaving-guyana-due-to-hostility/

71. Archibold, “China Buys Inroads in the Caribbean, Catching US Notice.”

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Hoo Tiang Boon

Hoo Tiang Boon is Assistant Professor, China Program and Coordinator of the M.Sc. (Asian Studies) Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

Charles Ardy

Charles Ardy is a civil servant in the Singapore government. The views expressed in the article are made in his personal capacity.