![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
Do noncombatants in warfare receive immunity because of their subjective or objective characteristics? Can a noncombatant be ‘weaponized’, and if so, how does this weaponization change the noncombatant's moral status as protected from direct attack? The purpose of this article is to analyze the moral issues that arise when noncombatants are made into weapons, specifically as delivery systems for biological weaponry. Examining such a tactic, I go on to explore how the problems that arise from ‘weaponized’ noncombatants illustrate deeper problems in the (under-)theorization of noncombatant status.
Notes
1. The complexities of discussions of ‘deep morality’ in war become great when moving beyond straightforward cases of conflicts between generally symmetrical nation states. Even noting differences in the personnel who are fighting – such as private military security companies (see Pattison Citation2010: 429–433) – can complicate matters greatly. As such, we must leave this discussion to the side.
2. For the difficulties in the concept of proportionality in military situations, see Franck (Citation2008: 719–737). See also Gardam (Citation1993).
3. The author thanks an anonymous reviewer for the Journal of Military Ethics for emphasizing this issue.
4. Throughout this work, I will use the term ‘noncombatant’ instead of ‘civilian’. While these may seem synonymous, ‘civilian’ usually implies (even unintentionally) the notion of ‘innocence’. Although this commingling of noncombatant, civilian and innocence is important, addressing the complex interactions between these terms is beyond the scope of this work. For an enlightening discussion on the notion of ‘civilian’ versus combatant, see Kinsella (Citation2011).
5. This is particularly the case in the present, where advancements in weapons technology can permit those previously considered ‘incapable’ of assisting – children, the disabled, the old – to provide assistance. Children can be issued AK-47s, the disabled can serve at computer stations, and the old can provide intelligence to forces with a simple cell phone. Although there will be populations that are incapable of any assistance – perhaps the severely autistic, quadriplegics, or others – we leave these outliers to the side for the present.
6. My thanks to Sara R. Jordan of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University for this notion.
7. Note that, in this discussion, I am focusing on the ‘international community’ as it is reflected in public opinion and the global ‘civil society’, while leaving to the side international institutions such as the United Nations or others. For a focus on these institutions, see Lucas (Citation2003).
8. Whether, and to what extent, such a duty does exist is beyond the scope of this article.
9. Whether international pressure would be a similar benefit of the tactic in cases where different major (but not hegemonic) states are involved is unclear. For instance, if Y were instead aided by the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China (powerful countries, but not hegemonic), this type of pressure may or may not be as likely.
10. The scenario presented in this paper perhaps understates the ‘pressure of circumstance’ that the military of Y and the USA would face. Such pressure is more evident if dealing with a different bioweapon, one with a similar delay in symptom onset but great mortality. If a weaponized form of the Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) coronavirus, which kills over 50 per cent of those infected, were used instead, one can envision that the pressure of the circumstances would make dealing with the refugees as an objective threat more likely, even with the moral horror attached.
11. For a discussion of these differences in the specific area of civil service ethics, see Jordan and Gray (Citation2011: 347–353).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Phillip W. Gray
Phillip W. Gray is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Texas A&M University at Qatar. He holds a PhD from Texas A&M University (College Station), and has previously taught at the United States Coast Guard Academy as well as at various universities in Hong Kong. His research interests include epistemology within extremist organizations, morality in warfare, and the role of professional ethics in globalization.