The Politics of Waste Incineration in Beijing: The Limits of a Top-Down Approach?

Abstract

The siting of waste incinerators is often a highly contentious issue. Although most studies have focused on Western countries, municipal solid waste management has become an extremely pressing issue in China. Incineration is being strongly promoted by government officials, yet this has resulted in strong societal opposition. Through documentary analysis and in-depth stakeholder interviews, this article analyses three anti-incineration campaigns in Beijing, focusing on outcomes and campaigner strategies. Anti-incineration campaigns have partly undermined the government's top-down, non-consultative approach to waste management. In developing an ‘expert strategy’, campaigners have exploited government weakness whilst depoliticizing the issue. Yet rather than lead to a more open and consultative incineration policy, it is more likely that officials will circumvent unrest through increasing opacity and by choosing sites in locations where opposition is less likely to emerge.

Keywords:

• Public participation
• campaigns
• environmental politics
• China

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the following people for their comments and suggestions: Genia Kostka, Arthur Mol, Rachel Stern, colleagues from the City University of Hong Kong Governance in Asia Research Centre, and the anonymous reviewers. Any errors remain the author's alone. The work described in this paper was fully supported by a grant from the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, City University of Hong Kong (Project No. 9610162).

Notes

The 2% incineration figure apparently refers to a small-scale, informal incineration. One government-affiliated expert expressed doubt about the reliability of these statistics (Interview with waste expert, Beijing 7 June 2011).

The ‘city area’ generates over two-thirds of Beijing's MSW.

According to The Guardian, less than 4% of Beijing's waste is recycled (The Guardian, 2010).

Although the decision to build an incinerator was made in 2005, residents reportedly only became aware of it in November 2006 after they saw the Beijing Municipality 11th FYP (Beijing Haidian District Residents and Enterprise Staff, 2009).

In using the term ‘unscientific’, campaigners invoked the language of President Hu Jintao and his calls for ‘Scientific Development’.

Authorities are only required to release abridged versions of EIA reports to the public.

According to one resident, they converged on SEPA headquarters not to protest but to ‘celebrate World Environment Day’ (Interview with Liulitun resident, 4 July 2012). However, the intention was undoubtedly to place pressure on the government.

This is the conclusion reached by a meeting of anti-incineration experts and NGO representatives (meeting minutes on file with author).

No evidence was provided to support this claim.

Without prior approval from the authorities, protests are technically illegal. Urban residents try to get around this by dubbing their actions ‘strolls’.

According to one Liulitun resident, Gaoantun had to deal with much more waste during the Olympics, as the government was reluctant to send extra waste to Liulitun for fear of provoking unrest (Interview with Liulitun campaigner, 6 June 2011).

In contrast, Fletcher (2003) has documented how activists in Toronto used the city's bid to host the 2008 Olympics to apply pressure to the city government.

Furthermore, Pan Yue was reportedly sidelined during 2008, apparently because of his outspokenness and willingness to go after large-scale projects that had violated EIA procedures.

This account draws heavily from Business Watch (2010).

According to one waste expert, this was a sign that government officials had learned from the Liulitun and Gaoantun cases by making themselves (at least appear to be) more accessible to local residents (Interview with waste expert, Beijing, 7 June 2011).