Transboundary marine spatial planning: a reflexive marine governance experiment?

ABSTRACT

Because seas and coastlines are shared between states, the formulation and implementation of marine spatial planning (MSP) should be transboundary by nature. The main argument of this paper is that MSP should be organized as a transboundary policy-making process, but this is hampered by the conceptual and institutional fragmentation MSP is facing. Based on an analysis of four transboundary planning processes in different European seas, the paper gives insight into the possibilities to develop and implement transboundary marine spatial planning (TMSP). To overcome the conceptual and institutional challenges, TMSP should be developed as a reflexive governance arrangement, in which the actors involved are able to change the rules of the game and to challenge the existing (national-oriented) MSP discourses. The paper develops four forms of reflexivity (unreflectiveness; performative reflectiveness; structural reflectiveness; and reflexivity) to assess TMSP processes and to formulate conditions which are crucial to develop TMSP as a reflexive marine governance arrangement.

KEYWORDS:

• Marine governance
• transboundary marine spatial planning
• reflexive governance
• reflexivity

1. Introduction

Seas and oceans are interconnected and coastlines are shared between states. This makes marine governance – more specifically, the formulation and implementation of marine spatial planning (MSP) – transboundary by nature. The reason for this is that the borders of marine ecosystems and the dynamics of some maritime activities, such as navigation, are not restricted and bound by specific political and administrative borders. However, there is a tension between the institutionalization of MSP processes, which are organized on sub-national and national level and the (transnational) borders of marine ecosystems and activities (Van Tatenhove, 2013, 2016). MSP is regarded as a tool or instrument to deal with conflicts between maritime uses and the marine space/environment, as well as to balance different interests in a sustainable way (Douvere, 2008; Douvere & Ehler, 2009). Individual states are responsible for the formulation and implementation of marine spatial plans for their territorial waters and for the exclusive economic zones.

The main argument of this paper is that MSP should be organized as a transboundary policy- and decision-making process, in order to deal with environmental, spatial and socio-economic problems at sea. This differs from current practice for various reasons. One of them is that MSP processes are organized on the national and/or sub-national level. Looking beyond national territorial seas and nation-state borders, transboundary aspects and elements have to be taken into consideration in regional marine planning processes. This is where MSP is faced with institutional and conceptual fragmentation (Hassan, Kuokkanen, & Soininen, 2015). In this paper, I will give insight into the possibilities to develop and to implement transboundary marine spatial planning (TMSP). To overcome the problems related to institutional and conceptual fragmentation, TMSP should be developed as a reflexive governance arrangement, in which actors are able to challenge dominant (nationalistic) discourses of MSP, in order to change the institutional rules of the game and to develop new institutional rule systems.

Section 2 will first sketch this conceptual and institutional fragmentation from a marine governance perspective. After that, in Section 3, four examples of TMSP pilot projects in European seas and oceans will be presented: ‘Preparatory action on Maritime Spatial Planning in the North Sea’ (MASPNOSE) in the North Sea; ‘Plan Bothnia’ and ‘BaltSeaPlan’ in the Baltic Sea and ‘Transboundary Planning in the European Atlantic’ (TPEA) in the Atlantic Ocean. From these projects, it can be concluded that there is a growing urgency to develop transboundary initiatives, but at the same time, they show the difficulties and complexities to do just that. This raises the question: how realistic TMSP actually is? To answer this question, in Section 4, I firstly discuss under which conditions the conceptual and institutional challenges of TMSP are addressed and what could be learnt from the TMSP examples. To complete the analysis, in Section 5, the concepts of reflexivity and reflexive governance are introduced. In this section, four forms of reflexivity are distinguished to assess the reflexivity of transboundary planning projects. In Section 6, the main question of this paper will be answered: under what conditions could TMSP be a reflexive marine governance arrangement? In this concluding section, three conditions are formulated to implement TMSP as a reflexive marine governance arrangement capable of dealing with the conceptual and institutional challenges it is facing.

2. Conceptual and institutional fragmentation

2.1. Conceptual fragmentation

Conceptual fragmentation refers to the diversity of approaches of MSP, and the differences in implementing MSP in different institutional contexts.

A well-known definition of MSP is the definition of Douvere who defines MSP as

the rational organization of the use of marine space and the interactions between its uses, to balance demands for development with the need to protect the environment, and to achieve social and economic objectives in an open and planned way. (Douvere, 2008, p. 766)

MSP aims at achieving sustainable development, emphasizing and trying to mediate between different concepts of sustainability. Recently, MSP has been connected to the emerging concept of the ‘Blue Economy’ and marine and coastal communities, stressing the economic and social aspects of sustainability, while others see MSP as an instrument of environmental protection, emphasizing environmental sustainability with the goal of ecosystem-based management (Soininen & Hassan, 2015).

In literature, there seems to be a broad consensus about a rationalist conception of MSP as a tool or instrument to allocate and distribute marine space to different (competing) uses and to manage the marine environment in a sustainable way. This is reflected in definitions of, for example, the ‘United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’ (UNESCO) (UNESCO, 2009) and the European Union (EU) (Commission of the European Community, 2008), which emphasize MSP as a tool for improved decision-making (EU), to arbitrate between (conflicting) sectoral interests in a political process (UNESCO), and to achieve sustainable use of marine resources.

The dominant MSP paradigm consists of the following characteristics (Douvere & Ehler, 2009; Jay et al., 2013; Flannery et al., 2016; Van Tatenhove, 2016):

1. it is an ordered and rational approach to managing the threat of overexploitation in territorial seas of individual states;

2. it enables sectoral integration and incorporates hierarchical policies from different layers of government, offering opportunities for a more strategic and forward-looking framework for all uses at sea, based on a higher order protection of marine ecosystems;

3. it anticipates and addresses future resources demands in a sustainable manner;

4. it is promoted as a way of overcoming the ‘inefficiencies’ that arise from fragmented governance regimes;

5. it offers a mechanism for increasing stakeholder participation in marine governance.

The responsibility of MSP rests with national states, a number of which have already developed marine spatial plans for their Exclusive Economic Zones.¹ Within the EU, the role of MSP has been discussed for the last 10 years. In 2013, this resulted in an Marine Spatial Planning Directive (2014/89/EU), which declares that Member States bordering a coastal zone or maritime area of another Member State ‘shall cooperate with the aim of ensuring that maritime spatial plans are coherent and coordinated across the marine region concerned. Such cooperation shall take into account, in particular, issues of a transnational nature’ (art. 11(1)). This cooperation shall be pursued through ‘(a) existing regional institutional cooperation structures such as Regional Sea Conventions; and/or (b) networks or structures of Member States’ competent authorities and/or (c) […] in the context of sea-basin strategies’ (art. 11(2)). However, the wish to cooperate and to take steps to develop transboundary marine planning initiatives is not further specified other than the broad agreement on the need for a common approach on MSP.

In reaction to this dominant paradigm, critical and radical approaches of MSP are being developed (Flannery et al., 2016), emphasizing equity and distributional issues, the unequal access of actors to planning processes; cultural differences, the missing layer of the social landscape (St. Martin & Hall-Arber, 2008), the coexistence of different governance systems in which MSP has to be implemented, and difficulties to deal with cross-border and transboundary problems and issues.

In the past few years, both in academia and in EU-funded pilot projects, ideas of transboundary MSP have been developed. Soininen and Hassan (2015, p. 11) define TMSP as ‘a process in which at least two states, sharing a boundary on the Territorial Sea on the Exclusive Economic Zone, jointly manage a marine area’. TMSP requires the development of a common vision from regional actors in assessing, evaluating and monitoring marine spatial plans (Soininen & Hassan, 2015, p. 11). According to Jay et al. (2016), the imperative for transboundary planning is arguably much stronger at sea than on land, because, firstly the natural environment is fluid, with much greater material movement across administrative borders. Secondly, many marine resources and marine activities are cross-border and mobile in nature. Their effective planning and management require a collaborative approach for neighbouring jurisdictions. Third, physical boundaries are generally absent in this remote, dynamic and graded environment, making it difficult to contain many activities and their impacts within administrative territories, and lastly, MSP is generally conducted at larger geographical scales, including considerations of regional and land–sea interaction. Transboundary thinking is therefore becoming part of the rationale of MSP and an expression of the distinctive nature of the space to be planned.

2.2. Institutional fragmentation

Institutional fragmentation refers to fragmented responsibilities and the patchwork of institutions, policies and regulations at the level of the regional seas (Raakjaer, Van Leeuwen, Van Tatenhove, & Hadjimichael, 2014; Van Tatenhove, 2013). No single authority is responsible for the problems caused by maritime activities or land-based activities affecting the marine environment, whereas there is a tension between the different rule systems of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), International Maritime Organization (IMO), Regional Sea Conventions, the EU, nation states and sub-national authorities. At the regional sea level, these different rules and regulations come together in clusters, which describe the aggregation of attempts to improve governance of the regional seas, and are the collection of international environmental institutions, regimes and complexes (DiMento & Hickman, 2012, pp. 8, 15). Characteristic of these clusters is their institutional ambiguity, which describes the mismatch between the institutional settings and the territory of the regional seas. As no generally accepted rules and norms exist in the overlapping zones of these institutional settings, actors have the opportunity to negotiate and change the existing institutional rules of the game (Van Leeuwen, Van Hoof, & Van Tatenhove, 2012).

The development and implementation of TMSP have to take place within the institutional setting of regional seas. A characteristic of this institutional setting is that it consists of different regime complexes and what Castells (2009) calls emerging network states. First, a regime complex is ‘an array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue area’ (Raustiala & Victor, 2004, p. 279). Such a complex would fall somewhere in the middle of a continuum running from fully integrated institutional arrangements at one extreme, to a highly fragmented collection of arrangements at the other (Keohane & Victor, 2011). Examples of regime complexes at sea are shipping, fishing, and oil & gas regimes. Each of these regime complexes has its own institutional dynamics, system of rules and expectations. This reflects the different levels on which sectoral maritime activities are organized and regulated. For example, dominant actors in the governing of the shipping regime complex are the IMO, nation states (as flag, port and coastal states), ship owners, harbour authorities, and so on, while the EU fisheries regime complex is predominantly regulated by the EU, scientists, fisheries organizations and Advisory Councils. The development and implementation of (transboundary) marine spatial plans are dependent and are affected by the coexistence of different regime complexes in a certain territory. Second, processes of MSP and more general political decision-making at sea operate in a network of interaction between local, national, supranational, international and regional governmental institutions in consultations with representatives of NGOs, economic maritime activities (ship owners, electricity companies, fisheries organizations, etc.), scientists and civil society organizations. According to Castells (2009), in this process, we witness the transformation of the sovereign nation-state into a network state. The emerging network state is ‘characterised by shared sovereignty and responsibility between different states and levels of government and a flexibility of governance procedures […]’ (Castells, 2009, p. 40).

The institutional setting at sea could be conceptualized as what Ansell (2000) calls a ‘networked polity’. This is a governance structure in which both network states and maritime regime complexes (Van Tatenhove, 2016) are linked by cooperative exchange in, for example, transboundary marine planning projects oriented towards institutional solutions for conflicting spatial claims (for example, between shipping (lanes), off-shore wind parks, fisheries and marine protected areas (MPAs)) in a specific sea-basin. In this networked polity at sea, two different forms of power making are dominant (Castells, 2009, pp. 45–47). First, the ability to constitute transboundary planning arrangements in the specific networked polity of a regional sea and to programme these planning arrangements in terms of objectives and solutions. Second, the ability and capability to connect and ensure the cooperation of different regime complexes by sharing and defining common goals and setting up strategic cooperation in order to find institutional solutions for transboundary problems in a cooperative exchange. Castells (2009, p. 45) defines the holders of the first power position the programmers, and the holders of the second position, the switchers.

3. TMSP: experiences from European seas and oceans

TMSP has to be developed and implemented in a fragmented institutional setting, in Section 2.2 conceptualized as a ‘networked polity’ at sea. Does this ‘networked polity’ hamper or constrain transboundary cooperation and planning? And if so in what way? To answer these questions, this section will present and briefly discuss four examples of transboundary marine pilot planning processes in the North Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. These projects are selected because they deal with transboundary planning processes in which different governmental institutions and regime complexes are involved, and they represent the variation of European seas. In the following sections, the main characteristics of each of these projects are presented, followed in Section 4 by an initial evaluation of the success of these projects in realizing transboundary MSP within the context of the networked polity of different European seas.

3.1. The North Sea: MASPNOSE

The preparatory action on MASPNOSE started in December 2010 as a co-funded project by the EU Directorate General of Maritime Affairs (DG MARE). The aim of MASPNOSE was to facilitate concrete cross-border cooperation between European countries on an ecosystem-based MSP (Pastoors et al., 2012). The project explored opportunities and constraints for collaboration and cooperation among the North Sea states by focusing on two transboundary case studies (Hommes, 2012): the Thornton Bank (an area consisting of sand banks between Belgium and the Netherlands) and the Dogger Bank (a shallow sea area in the southern central North Sea in the Exclusive Economic Zones of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark).

The aim of MASPNOSE was to test different aspects and elements of cross-border MSP in practice by involving representatives of governments, maritime activities, NGOs and scientists.

In the Thornton Bank case, Dutch and Belgium civil servants explored the opportunities and constraints for transboundary cooperation. This resulted in common objectives and the identification of potential interferences between offshore wind parks and shipping. Private actors were not invited because the governmental actors feared that their presence would prevent them to freely express and exchange ideas.

The aim of the Dogger Bank case was to improve ongoing and planned transboundary spatial planning processes, by organizing a workshop with stakeholders to develop management proposals about fisheries management in relation to nature conservation, to investigate transboundary issues (sand eel fisheries and wind energy) and to compare national plans.

The MASPNOSE project resulted in conditions for cross-border MSP (Hommes, 2012; Pastoors et al., 2012), such as stakeholder involvement, coherent planning and permitting systems in the respective member states, and the development of interactive geo-spatial tools for joint fact-finding.

3.2. The Baltic Sea: Plan Bothnia and BaltSeaPlan

The Baltic Sea region is a front-runner in TMSP initiatives, such as Plan Bothnia and BaltSeaPlan.

3.2.1. Plan Bothnia

Plan Bothnia (Backer et al., 2013) is an EU-funded pilot project to try out strategic transboundary spatial planning approaches in the sea between Sweden and Finland. Swedish and Finnish authorities, coordinated by the HELCOM secretariat and in partnership with VASAB (regional cooperation body among spatial planning ministries of the Baltic Sea countries),² started the project in 2010. The main challenges for this initiative were: combining the planning and permit-granting systems of both countries; adjusting national data sets; dealing with the different Swedish and Finnish planning traditions and procedures in relation to international agreements for the Baltic Sea, such as traffic separation schemes of IMO, EU fisheries management; the regional network of HELCOM MPAs, Baltic Sea Protected Areas, EU habitats and birds directive sites and Emerald sites.

Plan Bothnia aimed at realizing long-term transboundary cooperation³ between Sweden and Finland, instead of a politically accepted plan.

3.2.2. BaltSeaPlan

The project BaltSeaPlan, financed by the Baltic Sea Region programme, was started in 2009 with 14 partners to (1) improve the information base for maritime spatial planning; (2) include spatial planning in national maritime strategies; (3) develop a vision for maritime spatial planning in the Baltic Sea 2030; (4) start MSP processes in 8 pilot areas⁴ and (5) lobby and build capacity for MSP. The ambition of the project was to gather as much practical experience as possible. This involved real data gathering, analysis of existing strategies for the sea, developing draft maritime spatial plans for concrete pilot areas, and hands-on stakeholder engagement.

The focus of the project was on integrated maritime spatial planning, ‘seeking to extend the principles of terrestrial spatial planning and Integrated Coastal Zone Management to the open sea’ (Schultz-Zehden & Gee, 2013, p. 12), as well as ‘a transnational exchange of experience between planners’ (Schultz-Zehden & Gee, 2013, p. 18). Four of the 8 pilot projects produced draft marine spatial plans for areas where no such plan had ever existed before. Besides these maritime plans, also two transboundary draft maritime spatial plans were produced, one for the Pomeranian Bight/Arkona Basin area and the other for the Middle Bank area (Schultz-Zehden & Gee, 2013, pp. 131–132; Käppeler et al., 2012).

The BaltSeaPlan Vision 2030 (Gee, Kannen, & Heinrichs, 2013) outlines three key planning principles that are instrumental in ensuring that Baltic Sea space is planned sustainably:

• – Pan-Baltic thinking (‘Think Baltic, act regionally’) regards the Baltic Sea as ONE planning space and ecosystem at all stages of the MSP process.⁵

• – Spatial efficiency. Sea space should be utilized as efficiently as possible.⁶

• – Connectivity thinking in terms of bundling linear infrastructure,⁷ corridors and patches⁸ for the entire Baltic Sea region. Planners should focus on existing connections to other areas or uses.

In 2030, a ministerial institutional body for endorsing pan-Baltic MSP should be established ‘to approve (updates of) the common vision, to review the results of socio-economic and ecological monitoring, and to formally agree on the common principles and common targets for Baltic Sea space’ (Gee et al., 2013, pp. 40–41).

3.3. The Atlantic Ocean: TPEA

As opposed to the other ilot projects, in the ‘TPEA’ project, focusing on areas in Portugal–Spain and Ireland–United Kingdom, MSP authorities did have a central involvement. Precondition of this project was that it should be a realistic planning exercise, in which the statutory responsibilities of the authorities and national sovereignty needed to be respected. The project recognized ‘that transboundary MSP is unlikely to lead to a joint plan, but should offer effective links between national MSP processes’ (Jay et al., 2016, p. 87). Jay et al. (2016, pp. 87–95) formulate the following key lessons to adopt a transboundary approach to MSP. First, it is crucial to define transboundary areas and issues. Second, transboundary data management requires the development of cross-jurisdictional institutional relations and the development of agreed processes, building on existing measures for data sharing. Third, differences in culture, awareness and institutional arrangements across the region and between neighbouring jurisdictions required stakeholder engagement activities to be tailored to each context. The project adopted common principles (inclusivity, equity, flexibility, transparency and integration) to guide engagement. Fourth, it is crucial to understand the different governance systems.

4. Lessons learnt from these pilot projects

What could be learnt from these four pilot projects? First, MASPNOSE, Plan Bothnia, BaltSeaPlan and TPEA show that there is a growing urgency and interest to develop transboundary initiatives to deal with problems at the regional sea level, but that developing joint plans is perceived as not realistic. Civil servants, practitioners and scientists do acknowledge that geographical, ecological, cultural, social, and governance variations of different jurisdictions of shared seas need to be addressed. However, transboundary initiatives are hampered by the tension between jurisdictional rights and responsibilities, on the one hand, and the regional dynamics of marine regime complexes and ecosystems, on the other. Second, all the projects show how national sovereignty, interests, rules and discourses hampered transboundary cooperation and planning. Nation states remain responsible for planning activities in their territorial waters and many governmental representatives and scientists are sceptical about transboundary or cross-border cooperation and joint planning initiatives. In her comment on Plan Bothnia, Douvere (in Backer et al., 2013, p. 134) stated that TMSP remains an experiment.

A problem with transboundary MSP is its lack of specificity of why MSP needs to be done across borders or, in other words, what is the added value to both countries and what will be gained concretely that cannot be obtained when carrying out MSP on an individual country basis.

Third, these projects show that because of tensions between national interests, differences of governance structures, and procedural obstacles, it is not easy to turn a transboundary approach into practice (Jay et al., 2016). Scholars such as Jay et al. (2016), Flannery, O’Hagan, O’Mahony, Ritchie, and Twomey (2015) and Soininen and Hassan (2015) argue in favour of exploring the possibilities of TMSP, especially how to organize institutional exchange and, cooperation and collaboration between neighbouring jurisdictions, but also how to represent and involve different interests within the fragmented institutional governance setting of regional seas. Several suggestions have been made as to an effective implementation of TMSP, such as learning from best practices of terrestrial transboundary planning, making use of existing formal and informal transboundary institutions (Flannery et al., 2015), organizing institutional facilitation,⁹ and making use of accurate and comprehensive data regarding characteristics and interests of the marine area to be planned (Soininen & Hassan, 2015). All these suggestions are useful, but a legitimate and effective development and implementation of TMSP requires the ability of actors to redefine the (institutional) rules of the game, as well as a form of mobilization which challenges the dominant discourses and the discursive space of MSP. In other words, the crucial question is: under what conditions can TMSP be developed as a reflexive marine governance arrangement, in which the actors involved are able to change the rules of the game and to challenge the existing (nationalistic) discursive space of MSP? Therefore, in Section 5, a framework of reflexive governance will be developed to assess the reflexive potential of TMSP.

5. Reflexivity and reflexive governance

Reflexivity means self-confronting (Beck, 2006) and the ability of actors to turn or bend back on themselves (Hendriks & Grin, 2007, p. 334). The transition to reflexive modernity introduces the challenge of developing a new logic of action and decision, which no longer finds its orientation in the principle ‘either this or that’ but rather in the principle ‘this and that both’ (Beck, 2006, p. 33). For Beck, reflexive modernization, or second modernity, ‘means self-confrontation with the effects of risk society that cannot be dealt with and assimilated in the system of industrial society – as measured by the latter’s institutionalised standards’ (1994, p. 6). The consequence of continuously reflecting and re-inventing modernity leads to new political practices outside of the formal institutions of the nation-state. This is what Beck calls ‘sub-politics’.

Reflexive governance as the political theory of a second modernity, ‘calls into question the foundations of governance itself, that is, the concepts, practices and institutions by which societal development is governed, and that one envisions alternatives and reinvents and shapes those foundations’ (Voß& Kemp, 2006, p. 4). It is a form of governance, in which coalitions of actors have the ability and the capacity to change the constellation of rules of the game and resources (rule-altering politics) in governance arrangements, to question and amend rule-directed politics.

A governance arrangement

is a temporary stabilization of the content and organization of a policy domain, in which different, more or less stable, coalitions of governmental and non-governmental actors try to influence activities and developments within that (policy) domain, and to design legitimate initiatives, based on shared discourses, for managing resources and defining the rules of the game (on different levels). (Van Tatenhove, 2013, p. 298)

Rule-directed politics can be creative and non-conformist, but operates within the rule system of the nation-state (simple). Rule-altering politics aims at a ‘politics of politics’ in the sense of altering the rules of the game themselves (reflexive).

Governance arrangements are reflexive if coalitions of actors are capable of confronting, questioning, amending and changing rule-directed politics, resulting in forms of sub-politics, by their ability to change the rules of the game (rule-altering politics) and to mobilize resources (given their dispositional power position) based on alternative discourses.

To understand the degree of reflexivity of governance arrangements, I need two additional concepts: congruence and mobilization.

Congruence means sufficient coherence or similarity between two objects, for example, coherence between the discourses actors use, or coherence between the dimensions of a governance arrangement. Inspired by Boonstra (2004), I make a distinction between strategic-internal congruence and structural congruence.¹⁰

Strategic-internal congruence refers to the sharing of policy discourses and common interests to give sensible meaning to project themes (in this case MSP) that are being addressed when actors deploy their strategic actions within a governance arrangement. This results in strategic positioning of these actors within a governance arrangement in which the dimensions are coherent, that is, the backing of certain policy objectives (based on shared policy discourses) by adequate resources and appropriate rules. Structural congruence refers to the extent to which the governance arrangement as a whole is embedded in or matches the wider institutional context, or differently phrased, when there is no conflict between the governance arrangement and the institutional context.

When actors understand their problems as being shared by others and they organize to influence policy, it is called mobilization (Stone, 2012, p. 232). Based on the work of Pestman (2001), two forms of mobilization can be distinguished: action-oriented mobilization and performative mobilization. Action-oriented mobilization is a form of mobilization where actors try to increase their political opportunities by mobilizing resources, applying rules, or forming coalitions within a certain institutional setting. Performative mobilization is a form of mobilization in which the discursive space of a policy domain is challenged. As a result, new coalitions are made possible and new rules and resources may become relevant. A discursive space consists of accepted conceptualizations, categorizations and problem definitions of a socially and politically debated policy theme. The discursive space determines the actor’s political opportunity for manoeuvring, since it legitimizes the relevance of relationships between actors, rules and resources.

By combining congruence and mobilization, a continuum of reflexivity can be developed consisting of unreflectiveness, structural reflectiveness, performative reflectiveness and reflexivity (Table 1).¹¹

Table 1. Forms of reflexivity.

	Action-oriented mobilization	Performative mobilization
Internal congruence	Unreflectiveness	Performative reflectiveness
Structural congruence	Structural reflectiveness	Reflexivity

In general, unreflectiveness is a governance situation ‘in which representations, understandings and interventions are effectively restricted to whatever are held to be the most obvious, operational or instrumentally pertinent attributes of the object under intention’ (Stirling, 2006, p. 226; Hertin, 2016, p. 104). In this context, I define unreflectiveness as a governance situation, based on action-oriented mobilization and strategic-internal congruence. Actors are mobilized within the context of one dominant discursive space (discourse), which structures the legitimate rules and available resources of the governance arrangement. Although alternative discourses could emerge, challenging the dominant discourse, problems and solutions (and connected resources and rules) are defined and selected based on the available knowledge in a rational–instrumental way. Neither discursive space nor the institutional rules are challenged. This is what Beck called rule-directed politics.

Reflectiveness is ‘a mode of representation, understanding and intervention by governance systems in which attention extends to a “full range” of whatever are held to be broadly salient attributes to the object in question’ (Stirling, 2006, p. 227; Hertin, 2016, p. 104). Combining the variables of congruence and mobilization, two forms of reflectiveness can be distinguished: structural and performative. When actors have the ability to strategically use rules from different institutional settings/layers within the given discursive space of a policy domain, I call this structural reflectiveness. The governance arrangement is embedded in its institutional context and actors are able to mobilize rules and resources from different layers, but they are not able to change the rules of the game (rule-directed politics). Action-oriented mobilization takes place in the existing nested governance setting. In the case of performative reflectiveness, actors challenge the discursive space (dominant discourse) of a governance arrangement. This could lead to an alternative discourse challenging the dominant discourse, resulting in new coalitions, rules and resources, and thus the institutionalization of an alternative governance arrangement side by side with the existing governance arrangement. Although actors do challenge the discursive space of a policy domain, the formulation of planning/policy objectives, the definition of problems, and the solutions take place within the given institutional rules and power relations (polity) which are not challenged.

Reflexivity involves the recognition that governance subject and object – the governance system and the area of intervention – are co-constituted through a ‘recursive mutual contingency of subjective representations and interventions’ (Stirling, 2006, p. 229; Hertin, 2016, p. 104). I speak of reflexivity when actors both challenge the existing discursive space of a policy domain, and are able to change the institutional rules, resulting in reflexive governance arrangements (rule-altering politics). Performative mobilization and structural congruence results in rule-altering politics (sub-politics), which concerns both a switching of the rule system and the question of what system of rules one should switch to (Beck, 1994, p. 35).

6. TMSP: a reflexive governance arrangement?

The leading question of this article is ‘under what conditions could TMSP be a reflexive governance arrangement to overcome the shortcomings related to conceptual and institutional fragmentation?’ When looking at the ongoing MSP initiatives and the pilot projects, it is clear that the current practice of TMSP can be characterized by unreflectiveness and (performative and structural) reflectiveness. Both TPEA and MASPNOSE are examples of a combination of unreflectiveness and structural reflectiveness: the national planning discourses are leading and respected, while the institutional rules are not challenged. Plan Bothnia is an example of performative reflectiveness because it presents successful attempts to implement forms of transboundary cooperation within the rule systems of both countries. BaltSeaPlan has resulted in new planning principles, two transboundary draft spatial plans and a new role of an existing institution. Especially, the pilot maritime spatial plan for the Pomeranian Bight and Arkona Basin project shows some elements of reflexivity (Käppeler et al., 2012) because experts from Denmark, Germany, Poland and Sweden challenged the discursive space by stressing the need for permanent cross-border cooperation and suggested new institutional rules and forms of cross-border cooperation. However, the fragmented institutional setting was not challenged; the planning exercise took place outside the formal planning processes of the four countries (Käppeler et al., 2012). In general, MSP is nationally organized. Making plans, initiatives to cooperate, coordinate or to formulate a common position is the responsibility of national governments. In their planning activities, they incorporate international regulations, and they cooperate and negotiate within the institutional setting of the networked polity.

To truly institutionalize transboundary MSP, it should be organized as a reflexive marine governance arrangement. I will conclude this paper with presenting (pre)conditions that are crucial to implement TMSP as a reflexive marine governance arrangement.

Firstly, to gain insight into the enabling and constraining conditions of rule-altering politics, one could learn from the pilot projects discussed in this paper, or regional planning initiatives, such as the EU macro-regional strategy and the sea-basin strategy.¹² The PlanBaltSea project is an example of a pilot project at the level of the regional sea, which has resulted in the development of planning principles. These new planning principles, such as Pan-Baltic thinking and connectivity thinking, make it possible not only to change the discursive space of national planning discourses, but also to identify those institutional rules and unequal division of resources which hamper rule-altering politics. Besides these TMSP pilot projects, the last decennia different forms of marine regionalization (Van Tatenhove & Van Leeuwen, 2015) have been developed, such as the development of networks of MPAs (Van Haastrecht & Toonen, 2011), and offshore power grids (Jay & Toonen, 2015). These planning initiatives should be evaluated to assess the potentials to develop to reflexive governance arrangements, that is, whether and under what conditions they could challenge existing MSP discourses, their potential to change existing institutional (national) planning rules and procedures and what the enabling and constraining conditions are to develop TMSP at the level of regional seas.

Secondly, knowledge production and sharing of information are the backbone of TMSP as a reflexive governance arrangement. The exchange of data and information and the production of knowledge at the regional sea level presuppose not only collaboration between national governments, NGOs, EU institutions, European Marine Observation and Data Network (EMODNET), international organizations (IMO, United Nations Environment Programme) and representatives of maritime activities, but also the harmonization of data and information systems of these actors and institutions, in order to realize a legitimate and robust knowledge base for joint planning processes at the regional sea level. A starting point is to identify best practices, such as the transboundary data protocol in TPEA; high-tech mapping (HELCOM – OSPAR – ICES workshop), and the interactive geo-spatial tools (MASPNOSE), to have insights into the enabling and constraining factors of data exchange on the level of the regional seas. Another issue concerns how to organize the exchange, sharing and harmonization of data and information in TMSP projects. This could be done by an ‘information authority’ (Toonen, 2013, p. 147): a state or non-state actor, who is acknowledged by the actors involved as legitimate and who directs informational processes by determining the rules of the game and decides what information is needed and should be used in transboundary planning processes.

Thirdly, to transfer responsibilities to the regional sea level, it is necessary to change the discursive space of MSP in order to formulate a common regional position, while actors need to be able to change the rules of the game (rule-altering politics). However, to change the institutional rules and to challenge the discursive space of national marine planning discourses, so-called bordering capabilities (Sassen, 2009) should be developed. By strengthening transversal bordering capabilities, it is possible to bring different national rule systems and the different multi-level dynamics of regime complexes together. The burning question is: who should do that? My initial answer to this question is that nation states (in their role of programmers) still have a crucial role to play and their role will not disappear. However, states are not the most suitable proponents to stimulate transboundary processes, and sometimes even hamper the transfer of responsibilities to the joint regional sea level. Therefore, other potential programmers (such as the Regional Sea Commissions and the European Commission) and potential switchers (state actors, NGOs, representatives of maritime activities) should be identified to perform this role. Additional research is needed to get insight into how programmers and switchers could develop bordering capabilities to develop TMSP as a reflexive governance arrangement.

Acknowledgements

This paper is based on my inaugural lecture upon taking up the post of Honorary Professor at the School of Planning, Architecture and Civil Engineering at Queen’s University Belfast on 27th April 2016. I like to thank Dr Hilde Toonen and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and Eveline Vaane for helping to improve the English content of the text.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Jan P. M. van Tatenhove is Personal Professor of Marine Governance at the Environmental Policy Group at Wageningen University (the Netherlands), and Honorary Professor at the School of Planning, Architecture and Civil Engineering of Queen’s University Belfast (Northern Ireland, UK). He is co-director of the International Centre for Maritime Research (MARE).

Notes

1. For example, Australia; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; France; Germany; Greece; Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Spain; etc.

2. VASB is the regional cooperation body among spatial planning ministries of the Baltic Sea countries, founded in 1992. In 2010 HELCOM and VASB merged their activities by creating a joint intergovernmental group (HELCOM-VASAB MSP WG) with participation from all nine Baltic countries and the EU Commission, focusing on MSP as well as adopting a joint set of regional MSP principles: (1) sustainable management; (2) ecosystem approach; (3) long-term perspective and objectives; (4) precautionary principle; (5) participation and transparency; (6) high-quality data and information basis; (7) transnational coordination and consultation; (8) coherent terrestrial and maritime spatial planning; (9) planning adapted to characteristics and special conditions at different areas; (10) continuous planning (Backer, 2011, pp. 284–286).

3. The vision should be implemented by six objectives: (1) creating a framework for a healthy ecosystem; (2) safeguarding maritime traffic; (3) designating areas for sea-based energy; (4) maintaining spawning, nursery and fishing areas; (5) ensuring a network of offshore nature-protected areas; (6) the sea and coastal communities.

4. The MSP planning cycle was the basis for all pilot projects. The MSP planning cycles consists of the steps: assess the content; stocktaking; planning; implementation; monitoring.

5. Pan-Baltic thinking translates into six spatial planning principles: taking a holistic Baltic Sea view; putting long-term objectives first; using objectives and targets as guides; using spatial differences to their best advantage; fairness as an important consideration; integration of land and sea uses.

6. To implement spatial efficiency, planners adhere to general rules when allocating sea space, such as the sea is no repository for problematic land uses, immovable sea uses and functions have priority; co-use is actively encouraged, and sea uses do not preclude the existence of other sea uses or functions.

7. Linear elements (such as cables, pipelines, shipping lanes, blue corridors for living species) are at the heart of TMSP. Spatial advantage is gained by bundling linear structures.

8. Patches are areas with a particular type of use or functions.

9. The regional sea convention organizations can function as facilitators for discussions in coordinating national MSP governance frameworks planned (Soininen et al., 2015).

10. Boonstra (2004) introduced congruence to theorize about the prerequisites for the institutionalization of policy arrangements. She distinguished between strategic, structural-internal and strategic-external congruence. Strategic congruence refers to the extent to which policy actors share policy discourses and common interests when deploying their strategic action. Structural-internal congruence refers to the extent to which the dimensions of a policy arrangement are coherent (i.e. when the coalitions, rules and resources can be understood from one dominant discourse). Structural-external congruence refers to the extent to which a policy arrangement is embedded in or matches the institutional context.

11. This continuum of reflexivity is based on the typology of Stirling (2006) and Hertin (2016): unreflectiveness, reflectiveness and reflexivity. This typology highlights the distinction between broadening decision criteria and participation (reflectiveness) and the more fundamental rethinking of the ontological and epistemological basis of governance (reflexivity).

12. ‘Macro-regional strategy means an integrated framework endorsed by the European Council, which may be supported by the European Structural and Investment Funds among others, to address common challenges faced by a defined geographical area relating to Member States and third countries located in the same geographical area which thereby benefit from strengthened cooperation contributing to achievement of economic, social and territorial cohesion. Sea basin strategy means a structured framework of cooperation in relation to a given geographical area, developed by Union institutions, Member States, their regions and where appropriate third countries sharing a sea basin; a sea basin strategy takes into account the geographic, climatic, economic and political specificities of the sea basin’. Regulation (EU) Nr. 1303/2013.