Three Ways to Politicize Bioethics

Abstract

Many commentators today lament the politicization of bioethics, but some suggest distinguishing among different kinds of politicization. This essay pursues that idea with reference to three traditions of political thought: liberalism, communitarianism, and republicanism. After briefly discussing the concept of politicization itself, the essay examines how each of these political traditions manifests itself in recent bioethics scholarship, focusing on the implications of each tradition for the design of government bioethics councils. The liberal emphasis on the irreducible plurality of values and interests in modern societies, and the communitarian concern with the social dimensions of biotechnology, offer important insights for bioethics councils. The essay finds the most promise in the republican tradition, however, which emphasizes institutional mechanisms that allow bioethics councils to enrich but not dominate public deliberation, while ensuring that government decisions on bioethical issues are publicly accountable and contestable

Keywords:

• public bioethics
• bioethics councils
• liberalism
• communitarianism
• republicanism

Acknowledgment

I am grateful for helpful comments from Alexander Bogner, Jennifer Brian, Marvin Brown, John Evans, Jeff Lustig, two anonymous reviewers, and participants at the 2007 meeting of the Science and Democracy Network. This research was supported by the National Science Foundation under award number 0451289. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

Notes

1. This distinction explains why Sandel (1996), Habermas (1998), and others use the term “republican” to characterize a perspective similar to what I refer to here as “communitarian.”

2. For Moreno (1995, 12), in contrast, “consensus is not a regulative ideal of human affairs.”

3. While recognizing that bioethical arguments are shaped by culture, E. Cohen (2006) argues that it is sometimes necessary “to judge cultures from the outside, and to make arguments against deeply ingrained cultural practices (like the forced circumcision of women) that violate the dignity of all human beings” (46). Cohen points toward an important dilemma, but he neglects that even “traditional” cultures are internally diverse; they are not monolithic wholes defined by their respective elites, and they often contain internal sources of dissent. Criticism by outsiders must avoid misunderstanding the local context, producing counterproductive effects, and hypocritically accepting similar practices in their own culture. In particular, critique needs to involve participation by those whose cultural practices are at issue (Gutmann 2003, 47–73).

4. Note that libertarians are also skeptical about efforts to establish deliberative moral consensus, but unlike republicans, their primary goal is not to make government publicly accountable but to reduce the size and power of government as such (Trotter 2006, 240–244).

5. Green (2006) neglects the President's Council's multifaceted charter, asserting simply, “Such bodies exist to provide expert advice” (121).

6. See the account on the Center for Disability Rights webpage, available at http://www.rochestercdr.org/20060714ndy.html (accessed December 20, 2008).