Notes
1. Legitimacy is a matter of an institution having the power to impose duties of compliance with policies (Smith Citationforthcoming). In contrast, justice may sometimes make claims independent of—and even in contrast to—the demands of a institution.
2. Resnik and colleagues refer to the Revision and Appeals and Regulative Conditions by names other than those that Daniels and Sabin use for reasons that escape me.
3. Compare Daniels's note on perfect and imperfect procedural justice (Citation2008, 108, note 5).
4. Unfortunately, aside from Daniels's note, mentioned in note 3 above, proponents are generally not careful to consider the possibility that AFR might offer unjust results. For example, while Resnik and colleagues (2018) acknowledge that AFR may not offer maximal environmental protection in challenging cases, they do not make clear whether or not they believe it could offer unjust results.
5. CitationSmith (forthcoming) considers several options—arguing that each fails in solving similar problems regarding theories like AFR as theories of legitimacy. Here I consider the one that is suggested by Resnik and colleagues.
6. Cf. Daniels (Citation2008, 105–110) and Resnik and colleagues (2018). See also Fleck, while defending, not AFR, but a similar theory (2009, 113 et passim). See CitationSmith (forthcoming) for illustrations of just how difficult this tension is to navigate regarding AFR as a theory of legitimacy. Similar points apply mutatis mutandis to AFR as a theory of justice.