Abstract
Involuntary psychiatric commitment for suicide prevention and physician aid-in-dying (PAD) in terminal illness combine to create a moral dilemma. If PAD in terminal illness is permissible, it should also be permissible for some who suffer from nonterminal psychiatric illness: suffering provides much of the justification for PAD, and the suffering in mental illness can be as severe as in physical illness. But involuntary psychiatric commitment to prevent suicide suggests that the suffering of persons with mental illness does not justify ending their own lives, ruling out PAD. Since both practices have compelling underlying justifications, the most reasonable accommodation might seem to be to allow PAD for persons with mental illness whose suffering is severe enough to justify self-killing, but prohibit PAD for persons whose suffering is less severe. This compromise, however, would require the articulation of standards by which persons’ mental as well as physical suffering could be evaluated. Doing so would present a serious philosophical challenge.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful critiques, which improved our article greatly. We are also grateful for the comments and questions we received from attendees at a meeting of the University of Utah Program in Bioethics and Humanities in which we presented an earlier version of this work. The article has particularly benefitted from conversations with Gretchen Case, Linda Carr-Lee Faix, Leslie Francis, Jennifer Kious, Benjamin Lewis, Ryan Nelson, Anthony Smith, and James Tabery.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. ▪
Notes
1. We mention but do not argue for the controversial idea that some mental illnesses could also be considered terminal; were that the case, it would be a further reason for thinking terminality cannot exclude all mental illnesses from PAD.