Of brains and Borromean knots: A Lacanian meta-neuropsychology

ABSTRACT

Meta-psychological bridges between neuroscience and psychoanalysis have focused on Freud’s structural model [Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2002. Clinical studies in neuro-psychoanalysis: Introduction to a depth neuropsychology (2nd ed.). London: Karnac Books; Solms, 2013. The conscious id. Neuropsychoanalysis, 15(1), 5–19]. While other psychoanalytic schools have been in dialog on specific concepts, alternative full-scale meta-psychologies have received less attention. This paper maps the brain through the Lacanian triad of the real, imaginary, and symbolic. Dynamic localization of these concepts avoids neuro-structural reduction. Right and left cortical hemispheres appear necessary (but not sufficient) for imaginary and symbolic functions respectively, with the frontal lobes underlying social and self-reflective functions. The real is supported by subcortical affective and motivational structures, particularly the automatization of non-representational systems prior to hippocampal development. This project highlights the structural disjuncture (impossibility) which is constitutive of human subjectivity and brain function.

KEYWORDS:

• Lacan
• metapsychology
• affective consciousness
• real
• imaginary
• symbolic
• neuropsychoanalysis
• psychoanalysis

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was written for a seminar taught by Joan Copjec. I would like to thank Joan Copjec and Brian Hayden for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to thank the reviewers for their comments, which significantly improved this paper. Geolocation Information This paper was written while in New York City, New York and Providence, Rhode Island in the United States.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ORCID

John Dall’Aglio http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4620-743X

Notes

1. For more comprehensive discussions of Lacanian concepts, see Fink (1999) and Verhaeghe (2004).

2. “Other” refers to the symbolic Other. It is the dimension of language (difference) and the pool of signifiers where meaning is articulated. The Other extends to social institutions and the law. In contrast, “other” refers to the imaginary dimension of reflexivity and sameness. This is because the ego forms by identifications with others. Otherness proper, for Lacan, is accessible through language (the Other). It is important to note that the ego is distinct from the subject; see below (Johnston, 2013b; Verhaeghe, 2004).

3. This is not to equate the unconscious with the real. Rather, the real is the nucleus of the unconscious proper (without representation). Formations of the unconscious (e.g., dreams, parapraxes) involve participation of the other registers (Johnston, 2013b). This does not contradict Lacan’s statement that the unconscious is structured like a language, for the real is internal to language itself, an internal otherness (Lacan, 2007; Laurent, 2014).

4. Admittedly, this characterization of the real leaves out the essential dimension of sexuality and jouissance. These topics are beyond the scope of this paper and will be addressed in subsequent work. For work on the neurophysiology of jouissance, see Bazan and Detandt (2013).

5. In the sense of the auto-erotic drive discussed in the previous block quotation.

6. For an excellent discussion of primary processes and binding in relation to the brain, see Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010).

7. The use of capital letters follows Jaak Panksepp’s usage in distinguishing the circuits from the words while also qualifying their functions.

8. Solms (2017a) localizes the unconscious (as without representation) to the automatized action plans and memories of the basal ganglia. The present paper nuances this argument by extending the unconscious (through the Lacanian real) to the insistence of the real at the level of affective instincts. Affective instincts, in their activity prior to hippocampal development, also function without representation. In this way, the unconscious is felt emotionally (is affectively conscious) without being cognitively (representationally, declaratively) conscious. This reflects Solms’ (2013) argument that the id is conscious, in the sense that it is felt.

9. Indeed, for Lacan, the death drive is the foundation of the pleasure principle – a negative foundation (Zupančič, 2017).

10. This points to the distributed, dynamic localization of the imaginary, which is not wholly lateralized to the right hemisphere. Apraxia impairs symbolic action, thus reflecting the intersection of these registers. The same applies for Bálint's syndrome.

11. In the Kleinian sense (Klein, 1946), not the Lacanian sense of the split-subject.

12. Not all cases of right hemisphere damage result in these psychological effects (Morin, 2018). This reflects both the dynamic localization of the system as well as the broad localization made in the present model.

13. This supports dynamic localization, where imaginary components (self-reflective consciousness) are distorted alongside symbolic disturbances.

14. As Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2002) point out, this supports Freud’s argument that consciousness is not essential to the ego’s function. Likewise, Lacan emphasizes the structuring role of the symbolic for the subject, rather than the conscious dimension of the imaginary ego.