Evaluating the Productivity of Collaborative Governance Regimes: A Performance Matrix

Abstract

Experiments in collaborative governance over the last several decades have transformed the way the public’s business is getting done. Despite growing interest, empirical research on the performance of cross-boundary collaboration continues to be limited by conceptual and methodological challenges. This article extends previous research to develop a performance matrix for assessing the productivity of collaborative governance regimes (CGRs). Three performance levels (actions, outcomes, and adaptation) are addressed at three units of analysis (participant organizations, the CGR itself, and target goals), creating a performance matrix of nine critical dimensions of CGR productivity. This performance matrix is illustrated with a case study of a CGR operating on the U.S.-Mexico border.

Keywords::

• evaluation
• collaborative governance
• collaborative governance regimes
• evaluation
• performance
• productivity

Notes

We use the terms “productivity” and “productivity performance” (as opposed to the more familiar “outcome performance” and “performance results”) for two reasons. First, the term “outcome performance” could be easily confused with the more specific term of “outcomes” in performance logic models. Second, the term “performance results” generally carries an implication that process benefits themselves are not valued “results.”

In Emerson et al., (2012), we refer to the results of collaborative action as “impacts,” whereas in this article, we refer to those results as “outcomes.” Likewise, we previously used the term “theory of action,” but now use “theory of change.” These changes reflect a stronger adherence to the accepted terminology in the performance measurement and management literature (e.g., Heinrich, 2002; Kellogg Foundation 2005; Koontz & Thomas, 2006). Specifically, the term “impacts” has an explicit meaning in the performance literature; use of the term requires experimental methods that verify the added value of the program above and beyond what would have happened otherwise in a comparable setting. Here, we are more interested in the outcomes of collaborative actions as they relate to CGR target goals and shared theory of change, although we believe that assessment of impacts is also important.

The real or perceived equity of actions from the perspective of participant organizations may also be an important performance dimension to consider at that level of analysis.

Data were collected in 2010 and 2013 through multiple days of field observation and semistructured telephone and in-person interviews with federal agency officials involved in border issues in the CNF. Over 50 interviews were conducted in 2010 to establish baseline conditions and identify specific case studies for future follow-up. Those interviewed included (1) federal public land managers and law enforcement officers from the Forest Service, the Interior Department, the Bureau of Land Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service across the four border states; (2) Border Patrol administrators and agents; (3) senior federal executives in agency and departmental offices in Washington; (4) borderland ranchers and resource users; (5) environmental and wilderness advocates; and (6) border researchers. Interviewees were selected based on their positions and their longevity in those positions or in their agencies.

The REAL ID Act of 2005 (Pub.L. 109–13, 119 Stat. 302) modified existing U.S. federal law pertaining to security, authentication, and issuance procedures standards for state drivers’ licenses and identification cards, as well as various immigration issues pertaining to terrorism. The act generated a lot of controversy, particularly around a provision that granted the secretary of homeland security sole discretion to waive any and all laws “necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and roads” in the vicinity of the U.S. border. This was followed in 2006, by the Secure Fence Act (Pub.L. 109-367), which mandated the construction of 700 miles of secure border fencing by the end of 2008. These congressional mandates placed additional pressure on Homeland Security, and as a result its then secretary, Michael Chertoff, saw fit to invoke the waiver authority five times over the next two years, each time increasing the number and geographic scope of laws waived. A total of 35 federal environmental, cultural, public health, safety, and religious freedom laws, as well as all related state and local laws, were waived during the Bush administration using the REAL ID authority. While the waivers expedited construction, they came at the expense of meaningful public participation and interagency consultation.

The Southwest Strategy is a regional interagency initiative funded by the Border Patrol and focused on resource management and communication issues. The strategy led to several regional agreements, ten local memoranda of understanding, and the establishment of interagency statewide borderland management task forces.

At the federal level, a border working group was established within the office of the Interior Department’s deputy secretary, with representatives from each of Interior’s agencies with land management responsibilities in the Southwest. A national borderlands coordinator at the Senior Executive Service level was appointed at the Interior Department to serve as a single point of contact for all Border Patrol sectors. Interior also set up regional points of contact for each Border Patrol sector. Borderland management task forces continued to provide interagency coordination and information exchange in every border state. The Border Patrol also created new positions for public lands liaisons in every sector to interface with land management agencies, while simultaneously increasing its border personnel from 2,000 to 20,000 agents. At the regional and local levels, the memorandum of understanding set forth shared principles, practices, and protocols for border law-enforcement operations, the installation of infrastructure, use of roads, protection of natural and cultural resources, and compliance with national environmental laws. It provided for more coordination, information-sharing, and strategic planning. It directed agency officials in the regional and local offices to address conflicts at the lowest operational level possible, and where a conflict was not resolvable, to set forth an elevation procedure within the departmental chains of command. It also included provisions for cooperative training of staff, joint operations, and improved communications.

Additional information

Kirk Emerson, is professor of practice in collaborative governance in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona, with joint appointments in the Schools of Planning and Public Health. She has had a long career in collaboration and conflict resolution as a practitioner, trainer, administrator, and researcher.

Tina Nabatchi, is an associate professor of public administration and international affairs at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Her research focuses on collaborative governance, public participation, and alternative dispute resolution.