Determinants of Whistleblowing Intention: Evidence from the South Korean Government

ABSTRACT

In 2001, the South Korean government passed the Anti-Corruption Act, which provides whistleblower protection in the public sector. The system of protections and rewards was strengthened in 2011 by the Act on the Protection of Public Interest Whistleblowers. Although these laws ensure immunity—and even financial incentives—for whistleblowers, whistleblowing is still not a straightforward task. Based on a survey of 5,706 public officials in central government, this article examines how a range of factors influence whistleblowing intention: attitude, knowledge, colleague support, organizational support, and protection against retaliation. A number of demographic variables relating to gender expression, marital status, length of tenure, duty, and position type are used as controls. The results of the ordered probit regression analysis show that all of the independent variables have a significant positive effect on whistleblowing intention. However, colleague support and organizational support have the biggest effects, while perceived protection against retaliation has the smallest. This suggests that there is a need for future government efforts to build upon the available legal protections by focusing on creating a supportive culture among colleagues and in the organization more generally.

KEYWORDS:

• ordered probit regression
• South Korean government
• whistleblowing determinants
• whistleblowing intention

Notes

The questions asked were: “Even though you tried to fix the problem of corruption in your organization and the corrupt practice still continues, do you blow the whistle outside of the organization?” (Responses: Strongly yes: 3.7%; Yes: 53.1%; No: 43.2%; Not at all: 0%). The questions relating to attitude were, first: “What do you think about public officials blowing the whistle outside of the organization?” (Responses: Desirable: 52.6%; Not desirable: 47.4%); second: “If you think about whistleblowing, what kind of image first comes to mind?” (Responses: Efficient tool to get rid of corruption: 13.4%; Improve ethics and democracy in organization: 14.4%; Increase right to know of citizens: 2.1%; Spoil line of command: 4.9%; Boost distrust among organizational members: 51.8%; Decrease public trust of government (public organizations) by exposing low quality of information: 13.4%).

Based upon the Anti-Corruption Act, public officials should only report corruption that violates the law to the ACRC, investigative agencies, or the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea. Thus, responses were not concerned with other forms of wrongdoing (e.g., that violate social norms but not the law), nor with reporting to supervisors, press, or the public.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Yongjin Chang

Yongjin Chang is an Assistant Professor in the Public Management and Policy Analysis Program in the Graduate School of International Relations, International University of Japan. He holds a PhD in Public Administration from the School of Public Affairs, American University and his primary research interests are whistleblower protection, public integrity and corruption, public human resource management, and comparative public administration.

Mark Wilding

Mark Wilding is Lecturer in Social Policy in the Directorate of Social Sciences, University of Salford, Manchester, UK. He has a PhD in Labour Studies from the University of Manchester, and his research interests include policy comparisons of the UK and Korea.

Min Chul Shin

Min Chul Shin is Research Fellow at the Department of Urban Management in the Seoul Institute in Korea. He holds a PhD in Public Administration from the Sungkyunkwan University in Korea and his primary research areas are evaluation, anti-corruption, and internal control.