Coping with Conceptual Pluralism: Reflections on Concept Formation

Abstract

Concept formation is central to our scholarly enterprise, but different purposes, methods, and philosophies give rise to a welter of concepts without a “concept god” to arbitrate between them. We can manage this conceptual pluralism by better appreciating that concepts have messy histories that layer them with different meanings and anchor them to different images or discourses. By paying close attention to the entailments of concepts—their critical properties, dimensions and implications–we can do the boundary work necessary to distinguish concepts while acknowledging how they overlap. Entailments can also be used to think through the choice between whether variables should be continuous or dichotomous and highly elastic concepts can be dealt with by isolating a limited number of shared entailments and then developing a typology to distinguish divergent entailments. These ideas are grounded in an exploration of the meaning of important public administration concepts like collaboration and collaborative governance.

Keywords:

• collaboration
• collaborative governance
• concept
• concept formation
• public administration

Notes

1 This definition builds on a definition advanced earlier by Wood and Gray: “Collaboration occurs when a group of autonomous stakeholders of a problem domain engage in an interactive process, using shared rules, norms, and structures, to act or decide on issues related to that domain” (Wood & Gray, 1991, p. 146).

2 In an article that prefigures the paper by Keast et al. (2007), Mandell and Steelman (2003) distinguish between four types of interorganizational collaboration based on their temporal and structural features: intermittent coordination implies limited interaction and limited commitment; a temporary task force is an ad hoc arrangement set up to accomplish a specific time-delimited agenda; permanent or regular coordination occurs when organizations establish a formal and lasting arrangement to achieve some specific purpose; and a network structure is an institutional arrangement that develops a broader shared mission and requires greater commitment by the parties. They distinguish collaboration along six dimensions, including problem orientation, commitment to goals, intensity of linkages, breadth of effort, complexity of purpose and scope of effort. These dimensions can arguably be collapsed into three more general dimensions: Is the collaboration based on distributed or joint goals? Do members have more limited or more extensive interaction with one another as they collaborate? And how narrow or broad is the collaborative agenda itself? Collaborative arrangements vary from having distributed goals, limited interaction and narrow agendas to joint goals, extensive interaction and broad-based agendas. Arguably, the background concept for each of these dimensions ultimately refers to the degree of interdependence of autonomous actors.

3 Learning, however, is itself an elastic concept and there is a vast literature on the topic. It is therefore important to specify the meaning of this entailment. Ansell and Bartenberger draw on a definition advanced by Jack Mezirow, who developed the theory of transformative learning: “Learning may be defined as the process of making a new or revised interpretation of the meaning of an experience, which guides subsequent understanding, appreciation, and action” (Mezirow, 1990, p. 1). “Making a new or revised interpretation of the meaning of an experience” implies drawing an inference from action. Thus, learning is drawing an inference from action that guides subsequent understanding, appreciation, and action. As Mezirow notes, however, not all learning is intentional; it can also occur non-intentionally via processes like socialization or operant conditioning. Even when learning is intentional, it may only occur post hoc after an action is taken. Experimentation implies a level of self-conscious reflexivity about the goal of learning from an action that is prior to the action itself. It is prospective rather than retrospective. Even intentionality, however, is insufficient to define experimentation. For example, students doing a problem set to learn mathematical concepts may be learning intentionally but not experimentally. These students may be simply following a procedure described in a textbook. Therefore, experimentation also implies some degree of uncertainty about, or critical scrutiny of, the action in question. This uncertainty is conveyed by the question “what if?”

4 For arguments that architecture (design) is a mode of governance distinct from law, market and norm, see Lessig (1999).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Christopher Ansell

Christopher Ansell is a Professor of Political science at the University of California, Berkeley. His research focuses on collaborative governance, co-creation, crisis management and risk regulation.