Abstract
Russia faced a lost decade in its East Asia policy due to Yeltsin's “divide and rule” policy-making strategy, an ill-coordinated and ideologized policy agenda. This hampered Russian influence in Northeast Asia (NEA) and allowed the United States to consolidate its primacy in the region for two decades. After Putin's recentralization of NEA foreign policy unfolded, Russia re-emerged as an active player in many regional affairs, guided by its regional strategies. These strategies are often influenced by multiple factors. Russo-Korean relations and the North Korean nuclear crisis offered a critical policy window for Russia to reassert its great power aspiration in NEA and redevelop the Russian Far East (RFE). This article argues the evolution of Russia's foreign policy ideologies shaped by its leaders remains the cause of fluctuation of Russian power in NEA. These ideologies both encourage and frustrate the realization of the regional strategies and interests related to Russia's great power aspiration. The nuclear crisis, in fact, gives Russia's leaders a means to access regional diplomatic mechanisms to substantiate and adjust these ideologies to serve their great power aspiration – the ultimate and primary policy goal. Although Russia could not sustain the regional superpower status of the USSR, this article re-emphasizes the Kremlin's determination to consolidate its ties with other NEA neighbours, aiming not only for a regional security balance but also for economic development in the RFE and a responsible mediator in the reconciliation of regional disputes.