The Stylistic Virtues of Clarity and Obscurity in Augustine of Hippo's De doctrina christiana

Abstract

In antiquity, rhetorical treatises generally identified clarity and obscurity as positive and negative qualities of style, respectively. But in the fifth century, Augustine developed a valuation such that both clarity and obscurity could potentially function as equally viable resources for persuasion. While previous rhetorical treatises acknowledged that standards of perspicuity varied with genre, Augustine's stipulations for variability are tied much more closely to the particulars of the rhetorical situation. In a bold vision of the potency of style, Augustine demonstrates how a principle like clarity can be adjusted according to the rhetorical situation.

Acknowledgments

I thank Dr. Jeanne Fahnestock and Dr. Vessela Valiavitcharska for their generous and invaluable help with multiple drafts of this article. I thank Dr. Barbara Johnstone and Dr. Meaghan O'Keefe for their advice on earlier versions of this article when it was a seminar paper and I was a master's student. And finally, I thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments, along with friends and colleagues from my rhetoric reading group at Maryland who also lent suggestions.

Notes

1. As is well known, Augustine began De doctrina christiana in 396 but did not complete it until 427 (Brown 2000, 261).

2. “Ipsa quoque obscuritas divinorum salubriumque dictorum tali eloquentiae miscenda fuerat, in qua proficere noster intellectus non solum inventione verum etiam exercitatione deberet” (Augustine 1995, 4.6.9).

3. “[N]equaquam putare debemus imitandos nobis eos esse in his … utili ac salubri obscuritate dixerunt… . [S]ed in omnibus sermonibus suis primitus ac maxime ut intellegantur elaborent, ea quantum possunt perspicuitate dicendi, ut aut in multum tardus sit qui non intellegit, aut rerum quas explicare atque ostendere volumus difficultate ac subtilitate, non in nostra locutione sit causa qua minus tardiusve quod dicimus posit intellegi” (Augustine 1995, 4.8.22; compare Quintilian 2001, 8.2.23, quoted and discussed later in the article).

4. I follow Green's use of the terms restrained, mixed, and grand for the low, middle, and high styles, respectively (Augustine 1995).

5. See Fortin (1974) for one critique of and partial answer to the general scholarly consensus that Augustine was “by and large faithful to the Ciceronian tradition” (86).

6. See Courcelle (1969, 168).

7. See Conley (1994, 17).

8. Cicero (1971) makes an explicit reference to Theophrastus in Orator when listing the virtues of style as they appear in the restrained (plain) style: “The language will be pure Latin, plain and clear (dilucide); propriety will always be the chief aim. Only one quality will be lacking, which Theophrastus mentions fourth among the qualities of style (orationis laudibus)—the charm and richness of figurative ornament” (23.79–24.79; emphasis added).

9. Aristotle's proscription against obscure language seems to apply only to rhetorical genres of discourse. Poetry, and presumably other nonrhetorical genres such as drama, would be exempt from this rule: “In poetry many things conduce to this [departure from ordinary speech] and there it is appropriate; for the subjects and persons spoken of are more out of common” (Aristotle 1959, 3.2.3.1404b). But even this allowance does not amount to a full-fledged warrant for obscurity.

10. “Nouns and verbs” (onomatōn kai rhēmatō) refers to all parts of speech (Aristotle 1959, 350nb).

11. “Proper” (kyrios) can mean “the prevailing meaning in good current usage” (Kennedy 2007, 198n15).

12. Quintilian (2001) recalls one teacher he read about in Livy who encouraged students to write obscurely: “[T]here was once a teacher who told his pupils to obscure (obscurare) what they were saying: he used the Greek word skotison, ‘Darken it!’ Hence the famous compliment, ‘Excellent! I couldn't understand it myself’” (8.2.18).

13. For example: “History also can nourish the orator with its rich, sweet sap. But we should read it too in the knowledge that many of its excellences are to be avoided by the orator. History is very close to the poets. In a sense it is a prose poem, and it is written to tell a story, not to prove a point. Moreover, it is wholly designed not for practical effect and present conflicts, but to preserve a memory for future generations and for the glory of its author's talents. It therefore avoids tedium in Narrative by employing more out of the way words and freer Figures” (Quintilian 2001, 10.1.31).

14. Tracy (1997) maintains that Augustine is “never … principally concerned with a rhetoric of style,” but rather his main objective in De doctrina is inventio, by which Tracy means Augustine's prescribed methods of interpretation as found in books 1 through 3 (272). While I would not make the opposite claim, that Augustine is not concerned with invention, I would argue that his concern with style permeates all four books and that his view of style cannot be separated from his prescribed methods of interpretation.

15. “Problems” in Green's translation (Augustine 1995, 3.30.42).

16. “Nec tamen omnia quae ita scripta sunt ut non facile intellegantur possunt his regulis inveniri, sed aliis modis pluribus, quos hoc numero septenario usque adeo non est iste complexus ut idem ipse multa exponat obscura in quibus harum regularum adhibet nullam, quoniam nec opus est” (Augustine 1995, 3.30.42).

17. Augustine is referring to a specific figure here, the similitude, already with a centuries-long history in the classical rhetorical tradition. While similitude may involve vivid description as part of its deployment, it was traditionally a form of argument expressing an explicit, complete analogy (Fahnestock 2011, 110). Green's translation of the Latin term as “imagery” obfuscates the figure's strategic purpose as well as the continuity of the rhetorical tradition in De doctrina (Augustine 1995, 2.6.8).

18. While Green translates modificavit as “organized,” I prefer Robertson's translation of the word as “modulated” (Augustine 1995; 1958, 2.6.8). I believe this translation better captures Augustine's argument that the Scripture style is regulated to meet the needs of its readers.

19. “Nunc tamen nemo ambigit et per similitudines libentius quaeque cognosci et cum aliqua difficultate quaesita multo gratius inveniri. Qui enim prorsus non inveniunt quod quaerunt, fame laborant; qui autem non quaerunt, quia in promptu habent, fastidio saepe marcescunt. In utroque autem languor cavendus est. Magnifice igitur et salubriter spiritus sanctus ita scripturas sanctas modificavit, ut locis apertioribus fami occurreret, obscurioribus autem fastidia detergeret. Nihil enim fere de illis obscuritatibus eruitur quod non planissime dictum alibi reperiatur” (Augustine 1995, 2.6.8). Compare Augustine's refutation, found in De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, of the Gnostic Manichaean belief that each testament of the Scriptures describes a different god, a belief grounded partly in the disparate styles of the two testaments: “The God of both Testaments is one. For as there is an agreement in the passages quoted from both, so is there in all the rest, if you are willing to consider them carefully and impartially. But because many expressions are undignified, and so far adapted to minds creeping on the earth, that they may rise by human things to divine, while many are figurative, that the inquiring mind may have the more profit from the exertion of finding their meaning, and the more delight when it is found” (Augustine 1887, 17.30).

20. See Augustine (1995, 3.27.38).

21. For example, Cicero (1976) writes, “A similitude is a passage setting forth a likeness of individuals or characters” (1.30.49).

22. I have replaced Green's “metaphorical” with Robertson's “figurative” for tropica, because metaphor is a specific trope, and here Augustine is using the term to refer to tropes, or figurative expressions, as a category (1995; 1958, 3.37.56). Throughout the rest of the article, I substitute “figurative” for “metaphorical” wherever Green uses the term in his translation when it appears that Augustine is referring to tropes as a class.

23. “Nam ubicumque velut aliud dicitur ut aliud intellegatur, etsi nomen ipsius tropi in loquendi arte non invenitur, tropica locutio est” (Augustine 1995, 3.37.56).

24. For a discussion of the role of grammar in De doctrina, see Chin (2008, 88–93).

25. Before he discusses the sources of obscurity, Augustine (1995) mentions that there is a variety of obscurity (and ambiguity) in the Scriptures: “But casual readers are misled by [obscurities] (obscuritatibus) and ambiguities of many kinds, mistaking one thing for another” (2.6.7; emphasis added).

26. See De dialectica, of disputed Augustinian authorship, for an earlier, but strikingly parallel view of obscure and ambiguous signs (Augustine 1975, 8.14–9.17).

27. Included in this class are individual ambiguous words (ambiguitas in propriis verbis), but Augustine (1995) argues that it is rare that such ambiguities “cannot be resolved either by the particular details of the context—which are a pointer to the writer's intention—or by a comparison of Latin translations or an inspection of the original language” (3.4.8).

28. For example, Augustine (1995) advises the exegete to consult the surrounding text of the passage in question as one means of resolving an ambiguous literal sign (3.2.2). This same legal method of resolving an ambiguity is prescribed by Cicero, who Augustine may be following (Cicero 1976, 2.40.117). Cicero, in fact, devotes an entire section of De inventione to legal methods of hermeneutics (1976, 2.40.116–2.51.154). These methods were organized under the rubric of the legal stases, which were a staple of the Western rhetorical tradition for much of its history. For a fuller discussion of stylistic and legal hermeneutic techniques in De doctrina, see Eden (1990).

29. For example, Cicero (1948, 3.13.49) and Quintilian (2001, 8.2.12–16), both quoted in this article.

30. Augustine (1995) specifies what theological or spiritual content is guaranteed to be found in the clearer passages of Scripture: “In clearly (aperte) expressed passages of scripture one can find all the things that concern faith and the moral life (namely hope and love, treated in my previous book [book 1])” (2.9.14).

31. See Brown for a discussion of Neoplatonic influences on Augustine (2000, 79–92).

32. II. Fragment, p. 6., fol. 64^r, lines 15–16.

33. Rejecting the idea that God is ineffable, Augustine (1995) writes, “But what I have spoken would not have been spoken if it were unspeakable. For this reason God should not even be called unspeakable, because even when this word is spoken, something is spoken… . Yet although nothing can be spoken in a way worthy of God, he has sanctioned the homage of the human voice, and chosen that we should derive pleasure from our words in praise of him. Hence the fact that he is called God (deus): he himself is not truly known by the sound of these two syllables, yet when the word strikes our ears it leads all users of the Latin language to think of a supremely excellent and immortal being” (1.6.6).

34. I disagree with Green's choice here. Green “[r]ead[s] volentibus with a minority of manuscripts rather than nolentibus,” arguing that, “the point is not that readers can put books down but that unlike listeners they do not withhold their attention when they fail to understand something” (1995, 224n33). In this passage, Augustine is determining which subject matter is appropriate for which audiences based on the constraints of the rhetorical situation. Augustine argues against discussing difficult subject matter in sermons precisely because there is little freedom on the part of the preacher or the listening audience to adjust the discourse depending on attention and understanding. This condition, at least to this degree, does not exist with books, where readers may leave the discourse (i.e., put down the book or skip the difficult passage) when their attentions wane or they do not understand the text. Hence, books are not annoying when they are not understood (cum … non intelleguntur molesti non sint). With sermons, however, respectful listeners, those who do not leave, have little choice but to continue listening, tune out the speaker, or fall asleep when their attentions wane or they do not understand part of the discourse.

35. “Sunt enim quaedam quae vi sua non intelleguntur aut vix intellguntur, quantolibet et quantumlibet quamvis planissime dicentis versentur eloquio. Quae in populi audientiam vel raro, si aliquid urget, vel numquam omnino mittenda sunt. In libris autem, qui ita scribuntur ut ipsi sibi quodam modo lectorem teneant cum intelleguntur, cum autem non intelleguntur molesti non sint [nolentibus] legere, et in aliquorum collocutionibus non est hoc officium deserendum, ut vera quamvis ad intellegendum difficillima, quae ipsi iam percepimus, cum quantocumque labore disputationis ad aliorum intellegentiam perducamus, si tenet auditorem vel collocutorem discendi cupiditas nec mentis capacitas deficit, quae quoquo modo intimata possit accipere” (Augustine 1995, 4.9.23). Note that I follow the alternative reading of nolentibus in place of volentibus (see, for example, Augustine 1962). See note 34 above for an explanation of this choice.

36. Upper-class members of the church may have also read the Scriptures, although among the laity at this time they were probably far and few in between (Harris 1989, 319).

37. “Non ergo expositores eorum ita loqui debent tamquam se ipsi exponendos simili auctoritate proponant” (Augustine 1995, 4.8.22).

38. Green translates evidentia as “clarity,” but we could also render it as “vividness” (Augustine 1995, 4.9.23). While it may seem that Augustine is encouraging preachers to preach without concern for style, it instead appears that Augustine is imploring preachers to vividly portray the message of the Scriptures. Cicero (1971) considers vividness to be something like a virtue of style, exhorting orators to “make the scene live before our eyes,” in Orator (40.139).

39. “[N]on curante illo qui docet quanta eloquentia doceat sed quanta evidentia” (Augustine 1995, 4.9.23). In issuing this warning, Augustine may have had in mind such speeches as the display orations, which were performed during the contemporaneous Second Sophistic (Conley 1994, 61–62; Schaeffer 1996, 1134).

40. “Sed apostolica ista sic clara sunt ut et profunda sint, atque ita conscripta memoriaeque mandata ut non solum lectore vel auditore verum etiam expositore opus habeant, si quis in eis non superficie contentus altitudinem quaerat” (Augustine 1995, 4.21.45).

41. Earlier in book 4, Augustine (1995) states, “So there are men of the church who have interpreted God's eloquent utterances (divinia eloquia) not only with wisdom but with eloquence (eloquenter) as well; and it is more likely even for students with leisure to read that their time will run out than that these authors will be exhausted” (4.5.8).

42. See Cicero (1971, 23.78).

43. “Cuius evidentiae diligens appetitus aliquando neglegit verba cultiora nec curat quid bene sonet, sed quid bene indicet atque intimet quod ostendere intendit. Unde ait quidam, cum de tali genere locutionis ageret, esse in ea quamdam diligentem neglegentiam. Haec tamen sic detrahit ornatum ut sordes non contrahat. Quamvis in bonis doctoribus tanta docendi cura sit, vel esse debeat, ut verbum quod nisi obscurum sit vel ambiguum latinum esse non potest, vulgi autem more sic dicitur ut ambiguitas obscuritasque vitetur, non sic dicatur ut a doctis sed potius ut ab indoctis dici solet” (Augustine 1995, 4.10.24).

44. The formal study of Latin grammar began to flourish in the fourth century (Chin 2008, 2).

45. When discussing the value of idiomatic translations of the Scriptures, Augustine (1995) argues that ungrammatical Latin constructions are not problematic unless “the less quick-witted reader would either fail to understand it or understand it wrongly” (2.13.20). Augustine cares little if at all about the preservation of grammatical customs (1995, 2.13.19). His goals are the reader's understanding and the salvation and betterment of the reader's soul.

46. “Quid autem agimus divinis testimoniis docendo quod dicimus nisi ut oboedienter audiamur, id est ut credatur eis, opitulante illo cui dictum est, testimonia tua credita facta sunt valde?” (Augustine 1995, 4.26.56; emphasis in original).

47. Augustine was evidently not directly influenced by ancient Greek rhetorical theory, and fully tracing the parallels between the discussions of clarity and obscurity found in the works of Augustine and ancient Greek rhetoricians represents another but important project (see Courcelle 1969, 165–196).

48. See also “Longinus” (1973, 7.3) and Hermogenes (1987, 4.241) for other examples of parallels.

49. “Problems” in Green's translation (Augustine 1995, 2.6.7).

50. “Sed multis et multiplicibus obscuritatibus et ambiguitatibus decipiuntur qui temere legunt, aliud pro alio sentientes. Quibusdam autem locis quid vel falso suspicentur non inveniunt: ita obscure dicta quaedam denissimam caliginem obducunt” (Augustine 1995, 2.6.7).