Rhetorical Crossings of 1989: Communist Space, Arguments by Definition, and Discourse of National Identity Twenty-Five Years Later

Abstract

The Romanian political scene at the end of 1989 calls for a critical rhetorical perspective to understand how totalitarian politics clash with revolutionary changes and how communist space, so ambitiously crafted to cover an entire country’s public sphere, influences, if at all, a free(d) discourse on national unity. Examining official discourse on the cusp of revolutionary changes in Romania, in December 1989, this study argues that the concept of rhetorical space along with the enthymematic argument by definition of “we the nation” capture rhetoric in action, showing complex discursive crossings that legitimize the relationship between rhetoric and history at such times. Thus, the relationship between rhetorical space and the “we the nation” political argument, when applied to Romanian political discourse of 1989, reveals challenges that continue to feature the unsettledness of postcommunist discourse twenty-five years later.

Notes

1. This entire collection strives to make this point, intending also to explain the distinct ways in which different national and international discourse carries such changes and their respective dramatic consequences.

2. Two caveats are in place: Caveat (a) is that each of the Central/Eastern European countries changes its vocabulary within specific historical and political conditions, as for instance Poland’s case is fundamentally distinct from Romania’s case. See Marin and Ornatowski (2011), in which such cases are studied from both a rhetorical and a historical perspective. Caveat (b) refers to the levels of communist/anticommunist discourse already part of each distinct public sphere for each of the mentioned countries, namely Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and even Yugoslavia and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). As explained in a multitude of scholarly studies in the past quarter-century, this particular issue has been amply discussed either in case-by-case studies or in regional and geopolitical research on the area. Since this falls out of the purpose of this article, the author focuses on selected works on Romanian communist rhetoric highlighted by such scholars as Vladimir Tismaneanu, Noemi Marin, and Lavinia Stan, to name a few, who in their research address mainly the Romanian case.

3. See Gorbachev (1987), Havel (1990), or Goetz-Stankiewicz (1992). There is such an extensive body of literature on both samizdat and perestroika that the mentioned concepts (samizdat, perestroika, glasnost) are assumed to be well known to readers.

4. It is an important point to make when comparing rhetorical contexts and even 1989 communist and anticommunist speeches from these countries. The long-standing history of Havel’s case (Czechoslovakia) or George Konrad’s well-established presence (Hungary) among international communities as well as the political writings produced for several years during the Solidarity antigovernmental and anticommunist struggles were not part of Romanian dissent scene; see Marin (2007). The lack of samizdat voices might explain some of the violent reaction to such dissent language, in particular in the year 1990, in the Mineriade street fights that created a civil conflict immediately after the fall of communism. For a description of the Mineriade and their activities immediately after 1990, see Deletant (2004).

5. See Tismaneanu, Dobrincu, and Vasile (2007).

6. Detailed descriptions of Ceausescu’s speeches in 1989 are included in the following studies: Marin (2006, 2010, 2011b, 2012).

7. Timisoara events are explained in detail in Marin (2010, 2012).

8. Ceausescu’s speech delivered on December 22 is available, translated by Marin (2011b); Ceausescu’s official speech delivered on December 22 is also included in the study and translated by Noemi Marin.

9. Programmatic is a communist term, used by Communist Parties throughout to ensure a scientific-socialist approach to social, political, cultural, and economic actions set each five years and approved by the respective Communist Party Congress.

10. In the past decade, multiple exhibits and public presentations on Ceausescu’s era, on communist history, and on communist propaganda have been hosted by the Museum of National History and the Museum of the Romanian Peasant, to name just two. Two major exhibits in 2007 were extremely well received, organized by the mentioned museums: one, titled “The Golden Era: Between Reality and Propaganda,” and the other, “Communism in Romania: 1945–1989,” both presented documents and artifacts attesting to Ceausescu’s dictatorial rule and the cult of personality. See http://www.mnir.ro/index.php.comunismul-in-romania-1945-1989/.

11. The author’s conceptual distinction between space and place is presented in some detail in the following section of the article.

12. Bogdan Stefanescu, in his recent research, proposes a rapprochement between colonizing practices and colonization of discourse in communist Romania. See Stefanescu (2013).

13. The author makes the distinction pointing to communist Romania in 1989, where the examination of Ceausescu’s rigid rhetoric reveals “the dissonance between political regime and its public, precipitating the moment of crisis and accelerating the pace of revolutionary change” (Marin 2011b, 235).

14. The discussion of public sphere from a Habermasian perspective is not part of this article. The definition of public sphere, however, is based on Habermas’ concept. See Habermas (1996a, 1996b). In addition, place is used in this article to signify location, and therefore it is not considered conceptually consequential for the arguments advanced in this study.

15. Gerald Hauser examines the public sphere at length in his work. See Hauser (1999).

16. The author’s numerous works on Ceausescu and Romanian totalitarian discursive practices listed in the study include also arguments about the continuation of a “gray” rhetoric, still unsettled in postcommunism. Agreeing with Adam Michnik’s famous position (regarding Poland) on the solution for postcommunist politics, Marin conceptualizes “gray” rhetoric as an unsettled yet forgiving public discourse that engages negotiation and tolerance for political past in the public sphere.

17. Detailed description of the historical context for the Romanian revolution of 1989 is presented in Marin (2011b).

18. See the original text in Ceausescu (1989a).

19. See the video posted on Ceausescu’s last discourse in December 1989: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QaN8VH_xbSU.

20. For Iliescu’s communiqué, addressing the Romanian people on December 22, 1989, see Marin (2004).

21. Important accounts of these days are to be found in an extensive number of publications recording the series of events. However, an interesting document is Iliescu’s own rendition of the events, as recorded in a dialogue with Vladimir Tismaneanu. See Tismaneanu (2004).

22. See Iliescu’s Communique, translated by Marin (2005a, 296); see also Marin (2004).

23. See Iliescu’s own memoirs presented in Tismaneanu (2004), as well as Paul Dobrescu’s (1997) book on Iliescu’s 1996 political campaign for presidency.

24. This is true for most Central/Eastern European countries, as the resurgence of nationalistic vocabulary is on the raise and some of the countries continue to experience communist political views as a majority.

25. While Georges Bachelard (1964) posits “space” as a poetic dimension, I treat space here as the public (official-governing) platform that allows access to participants in order to in order to perform a speech act and to engage an audience for a persuasive appeal. Hauser (1999) uses the notion of “public sphere” in a somewhat similar way. However, in a totalitarian regime like Ceausescu’s, the political occupation of rhetorical space is in my view an overlooked critical angle necessary to explain the unique totalitarian features of Romanian rhetoric of 1989.

26. Many scholars of Romanian 1989 and postcommunism bring up similar points about Ceausescu’s discourse.

27. As indicated previously, the author makes a distinction between space and place, as place appears to indicate only location, rather than an entire construction of where/when/how to occupy the public sphere, as space does in totalitarian discourse.

28. While this is not specific only for Romania, the level of political control provided under Ceausescu’s dictatorship in 1989 is the most dramatic and traumatic for its citizens. See Tismaneanu, Dobrincu, and Vasile (2007).

29. This refers mainly to Ceausescu’s speech delivered on December 21. However, all speeches delivered in the final three days of his regime indicate an almost identical attitude.

30. While the author’s listed studies since 2010 on Romanian dictatorship address some similar points, this article focuses most explicitly on the discussion of Romanian communist space as a rhetorical perspective.

31. See the description of the events that took place in Timisoara in 1989 (Tismaneanu, Dobrincu, and Vasile 2007).

32. The difference in capitalization between “Communist” versus “communist” is due to the fact that the former refers to the Romanian Communist Party, while the latter refers to the political regime per se.

33. See the translation of Ceausescu’s speech (Marin 2011a, 250).

34. See Ceausescu’s speech (Marin 2011a, 251).

35. Ibid., 252.

36. No one questions Ceausescu’s megalomania or his completely abnormal behavior as a tyrannical leader. Most historical and political studies illustrate in detail Ceausescu’s obsession with safety and with secure places for his speeches, public appearances, etc. The militarized approach to public communication becomes a major concern for him in the final years of his regime. This translates also into an occupied political space completely void of any opposition or alternative opinions. For more, see Marin (2010).

37. This is not to say that he was not aware of the dissident rhetoric, on the contrary. But the Romanian public sphere is closely watched and no dissident discourse enters it, as the Final Report on the Crimes of Communism attests through official documents. Romanian dissent comes mostly from the outside of the country, rather than from organized anticommunist discourse inside it.

38. Ceausescu is used to interruptions, but not like the one occurring on that day. His speech in November is interrupted sixty-seven times by long moments of applause and ovations from more than 3,000 Communist Party representatives, willing to demonstrate their pledge to the authoritarian leader. See Tismaneanu, Dobrincu, and Vasile (2007, 452).

39. The speech is televised by Ceausescu’s orders. When it gets interrupted, the cameras continue to record and the television stations continue to broadcast, creating as such a unique moments in revolutionary history—a live documentary of the changes taking place. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QaN8VH_xbSU.

40. An important account of these days is recorded in the memoirs offered during the dialogue Vladimir Tismaneanu has with Ion Iliescu. See Tismaneanu (2004, 183–200).

41. As events unfold on December 22, 1989, Ion Iliescu, former member of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, opponent to Ceausescu’s dictatorial practices, appears on national television, delivering the communiqué translated here. Iliescu is not the only person appearing on national television that day; however, he is one of the most recognized political figures, and from that day on he becomes one of the most well-known representatives of the Council of the National Salvation Front. By December 27, 1989, Iliescu is already the president of the above-mentioned council. These roles lead to his position as the ad interim president of Romania from 1990–1992.

42. The study utilizes argument by definition, but there is yet another important dimension to be visited for scholars examining arguments by and from definition when dealing with national appeals in communist and postcommunist discourse. See McGee (1999); Walton and Macagno (2009); Minielli (2010); Williams and Young (2005); and Zarefsky (2004).

43. Of note: Ceausescu was in hiding but still alive at the time the Communiqué was presented to the nation.

44. Throughout contemporary history, most postrevolutionary and postwar discourse carries such rhetorical redefinitions for national appeals when addressing political, economic, social, cultural, or national change.

45. See studies on argument by definition and the American presidency by Minielli (2010) and Zarefsky (2004).

46. Again, this is not specific to Romanian transition, but it is important for its context.

47. The enthymeme filling up the rhetorical context for the “we the — nation/people” argument can be translated as “we the (anticommunist/prosocialist/democratic) nation/people” for Ion Iliescu’s presidency; “we the (anticommunist and European) nation/people” for Emil Constantinescu during his presidency (1996–2000); and for Traian Basescu, Romanian president since 2004, the enthymeme remains “we the (European/democratic/capitalist/anticommunist) nation/people.”

48. I use totalitarian as a rhetorical stylistic term that fits mostly Ceausescu’s discursive style, specific to this study. Stalinist rhetoric carries also additional characteristics specific to both history and country that are not intended to be examined here.

49. One can easily identify a communist address by the lengthy list of epithets adding more and more descriptive insight intended to justify for its audience the benefits of living a communist life in a communist society.

50. For the past twenty-five years, most scholarship on Central/Eastern Europe and communist history invokes the construction of the enemy. It is hoped that more and more rhetorical studies will focus on this communist construction in order to create more theoretical perspectives on the specific versus general rhetorical arguments constructed in political spheres on the enemy.

51. Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the dyad “we-they” in political campaigns is used ad infinitum around the globe. In postcommunist times, in particular in Russian and Eurasian political discourse, this dyad reveal nationalist connotations that rhetorically can add novel nuances to postcommunist rhetorical discourse and political sphere.

52. “The condemnation of the communist regime as ‘illegitimate and criminal’ in a speech by the Romanian president in December 2006, one of the most dramatic and traumatic public actions, framed an important rhetorical attitude toward communist history, as it logistically and legally proclaimed the termination of a historical era. In doing so, all participants in this historical process have to address purging questions of legitimacy along with attitudes toward a Romanian history of the future. Following in the footsteps of Czech and East German lustration laws, the monumental Final Report of the Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania put forth the political response of Romania as a nation dedicated to rebuilding public trust, and with it, a new history” (Marin 2012, 457).

53. Romanian post-1989 witnessed the proliferation of an extraordinary number of political parties. The regulations on political party creation came only later, with constitutional changes in Romania.

54. Michael Ignatieff (2014), in his extensive review of most current scholarship on postcommunist and post-1989 changes in most countries from the area, highlights the recurrence of authoritarianism as a political choice for these governments and the peoples of these countries. The prime minister of Hungary in recent times has claimed the need for an “illiberal” state, which also involves a distinct function for rhetorical space, if one is to follow his lead (Orban, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/orbanviktor).

55. See Jerzy Axer’s (2003) volume on transitional rhetoric, published in Poland, pointing to some of the mentioned unsettled political and rhetorical concepts that continue to haunt postcommunist countries.

56. See Michnik (2003).