From rural transformation to global integration: comparative analyses of the environmental dimensions of China’s rise

Abstract

An American geographer and specialist on Asia’s environments reviews three theoretical frameworks (Classical, Ecological Modernization, and Critical Political Ecology) that offer different prognoses and solutions to the problem of environmental degradation in China. He argues that the former two approaches limit understanding of (and available solutions to) China’s environmental problems, often framed in environmental crisis narratives. He demonstrates how the third framework (Critical Political Ecology) offers an alternative analysis of the fundamental environmental issues accompanying China’s rise, yielding quite different insights informing policy and practice.

Keywords:

• China
• environment
• political ecology
• economics
• Ecological Modernization
• globalization
• economic transition

Acknowledgments

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on China and the Future of Human Geography, August 26–28, 2010, Guangzhou, China, jointly organized by the Department of Geography, University of Oregon, and the School of Geography and Planning, Sun Yat-sen University. The author thanks the participants (in particular, Alexander Murphy) for helpful comments and Amanda Morgan, Catherine Nelson, Lucy Jarosz, and Monica Varsanyi for critical readings of earlier drafts. Portions of the research utilized in the paper were funded by the National Science Foundation (Grants #0552420 and #0823177) and the Social Science Research Council. All omissions, errors, and other shortcomings of the final manuscript are solely the responsibility of the author.

Notes

1. See also, more recently, Economy (2007).

2. The recent controversy surrounding a Chinese corporation’s purchase of Smithfield, the largest producer of pork products in the United Sates, is a case in point, adding to the narrative in the United States that China’s expanding demand for food products will negatively impact US consumers through higher prices, lower quality, and decreased food safety (de la Merced and Barboza 2013).

3. According to China’s Development Research Center of the State Council, coal made up 66 percent of primary energy consumption in 2010 (World Bank 2010), and 70 percent in 2009 according to the US Energy Information Administration (USEIA 2012), with estimates of it falling to 59 percent by 2035 (USEIA 2012). China is by far the world’s leading coal producer and consumer (Thomson and Horii 2009). In 2009, China consumed 46.9 percent of global coal production (British Petroleum 2010), the vast majority of which is produced in country. The US Energy Information Administration estimates China’s consumption for 2010 at 50 percent of global production (USEIA 2011).

4. According to one account, 16 of the 20 world’s most polluted cities (in terms of air pollution) are found in China (Economy 2007, 40).

5. Holdaway raises an interesting counter-argument that foreign direct investement (FDI) is correlated with positive impact on China’s environment, though the study is hampered by its inadequate attention to TNC subcontracting relations that stretch throughout China, and in particular negatively impact rural areas (Holdaway 2013).

6. For the most recent iteration of this argument, see the discussion of the Chinese state’s new program to move 250 million rural peasants into cities (I. Johnson 2013).

7. For example, neoliberal economists believe state efforts at the national level should be focused on supporting the ability of individuals and businesses to operate freely within markets, providing all the incentives needed for environmentally sound allocation of resources. On the other hand, Marxist economists would stress the need to intervene generally at both the national and international scales in order to challenge the structures of accumulation and dispossession that they argue lie at the heart of environmental destruction.

8. Varied framings lead to dissimilar results; for example, socioeconomic and geographic inequalities are interpreted as either historical in creation or just a product of individual merit or national endowment.

9. The Chinese state full realizes the potential of the environmental technology industry both in China and abroad, and is currently committing substantial resources to its expansion (CCICED 2013).

10. Another version of this anti-democratic approach is the current shift in the international conservation movement from community-based natural resource management back to fortress conservation. This argument asserts that there is inadequate time for the messy process of participation of impacted communities if we are going to save the planet’s biodiversity and properly utilize our natural resources. See Blaikie and Muldavin (2004) for a detailed discussion of this in the Himalayan Hindu Kush region including China.

11. See for example the website of the Institute of Public and Environmental affairs in Beijing, which operates as an NGO coalition watchdog on corporate environmental performance (http://www.ipe.org.cn/en/about/about.aspx).

12. For a history of SEPA, see Jahiel (1998). See also Muldavin (2000a).

13. Redclift (1997, 338–339) argued that Ecological Modernization’s emphasis on “internalizing externalities” diverts attention from the political implications – i.e. the agents who cause environmental problems and the groups who will suffer the greatest consequences from them. He posits that the state and TNCs dominate the determination of who bears the costs of environmental degradation and that industrialization confirms existing power relationships (Muldavin 2008a).

14. Of particular interest are periods of significant change in political economy, for example, from pre-colonial to colonial, or state-centric to neoliberal market-orientation.

15. Reflecting Blaikie’s insistence that “policy makers, government officials, and scientists be scrutinized as closely as Third World peasants,” it “reverses the gaze” and opens to analysis “questions of power, knowledge, and ideology as they relate to claims about environmental degradation” (Neumann 2008, 730).

16. China is the largest importer of illegally logged timber; perhaps as much as half of its timber imports may be illegally harvested (see Economy 2007, 45).

17. Zhongguo huanjing bao. 2011. “Zhou Shengxian zai zhongjinshu wuran zonghe fangzhi ‘shierwu’ guihua shiping gongzuo huiyishang qiangdiao jianjue dahao zhongjinshu fangzhi gongjianzhan qieshi weihu renmin qunzhong liyi he shehui wending. (Zhou Shengxian emphasizes in video conference on the 12th Five-Year Plan for the Comprehensive Control of Heavy Metal Pollution that [MEP] will resolutely fight the battle to control heavy metal pollution and effectively protect the rights of the masses and social stability).” 21 February. http://www.zhb.gov.cn/zhxx/hjyw/201102/t20110221_200992.htm/ Accessed on 7 December 2012.