The geopolitics of Russia's annexation of Crimea: narratives, identity, silences, and energy

Abstract

This article analyzes official Russian government narratives for the annexation of Crimea and connects these narratives of identity and territory to the energy implications and narratives of Black Sea resources and the recent 30-year gas agreement with China. We argue that the events of Crimea’s annexation in the “west” signal a Russian shift “eastward.” With the occurrence of the Euromaidan protest movement and Ukraine’s president, fleeing from power, a pro-European Union government came to power in Kyiv. The Russian government reacted by deploying unmarked troops to support the holding of a secessionist referendum for the peninsula’s population. The Russian government incorporated Crimea by engaging in a sophisticated effort, through nonmilitary and military means, to promulgate narratives justifying Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The Russian government appealed to Russia’s geopolitical and historical imaginations of Crimea. There were two other, no less important, factors for annexing Crimea: control of the Russian Black Sea Fleet based in Crimea and new maritime territorial claims that encompassed much of Ukraine’s Black Sea energy potential and existing facilities. These two impetuses form the silent connection between Crimea, energy, and the Black Sea Fleet, that are then linked to the subsequent gas deal with China. The important gas agreement follows the discursive arc begun in Crimea, which appealed to the historical past, whereas economic developments in Asia and Russia’s energy power status discursively represent Russia’s future. Viewing Russia’s geopolitical narratives in the context of historical and geographical dilemmas shows the layered relationships informing identity, territory, and resources.

Keywords:

• Russia
• Ukraine
• China
• annexation of Crimea
• energy
• Black Sea

Acknowledgment

The authors wish to thank Meghan Kelly for creating Figure 1.

Notes

1. There is a plethora of evidence highlighting the little green men’s Russian military connections, from Putin’s admittance to soldiers’ admittance of who they were on (see Putin’s admission on the Direct Line program on 17 April), to tracking the vehicles used to units operating in the North Caucasus via their license plates. See (Mackey 2014) for these examples.

2. The text of the two choices of the 16 March referendum read: 1. Vy za vossoedinenie Kryma s Rossei na pravakh sub’’ekta Rossiiskoi Federatsii? [Are you for the reunification of Crimea with Russia, with the rights of a subject of the Russian Federation?] 2. Vy za vosstanovlenie deistviia Konstitutsii Respubliki Krym 1992 goda i za status Kryma kak chasti Ukrainy? [Are you for the restoration of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea of 1992 and for the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine?] (Gossudarstvennyi Sovet 2014b).

3. Even though Yanukovych fled, the Rada’s impeaching actions did not follow the correct procedure, and hence, some of the actions of Ukraine’s government were technically illegal.

4. As noted in comments made by Ralph Clem in the “Ukraine Roundtable” session at the Association of American Geographers Annual Meeting on 17 April 2014.