Inside the post-Soviet de facto states: a comparison of attitudes in Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria

Abstract

In the wake of the Ukrainian crisis in 2013–2014, renewed attention has been given to the earlier so-called “frozen conflicts” of the successor states of the Soviet Union. In Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan, national conflicts of the early 1990s resulted in establishment of four breakaway regions, the de facto states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Nagorny Karabakh. While the first three are supported by Russia, the latter is supported by Armenia. Such support as well as growing internal legitimacy has enabled these republics to retain separate status for almost 25 years. Though appearing quite similar from an external perspective, the populations of the de facto states are quite diverse in composition, geopolitical preferences, and support for political institutions and persons. Large representative public opinion surveys conducted by the authors in 2010–2011 in the four de facto states allow a deeper comprehension of internal political and social dynamics. Three main dimensions of their current status and orientation (relations with Russia, support for local institutions, and possibilities of post-war reconciliation) are examined using nine key comparative questions. Nationality is the main predictor of divergent opinions within the republics, and results are reported along this dimension. Close relations with the external patron, support for the legitimacy and identity of the respective de facto republics, and little interest in returning to the parent state testify to the longevity and successful promotion of state and nation in the de facto republics in the Caucasus-Black Sea Region.

Keywords:

• public opinion
• Georgia
• Moldova
• Azerbaijan
• geopolitics

Notes

1. The term “quasi-state” has a different meaning in Africa. Jackson (2007) defines quasi-states as sovereign states, primarily former colonial possessions in Africa whose independence was granted and did not result from “natural” processes of state building. He stressed that such states have a “negative” sovereignty; i.e. are formally recognized by other states, but do not achieve “positive” sovereignty – the ability to fully control their own territory and to keep a monopoly on coercion. The term “de facto state” can be applied to the most successful quasi-states, which have all attributes of a legitimate and viable state but lack international recognition. Pegg (1998) defines a de facto state as a break-away political unit that assumes effective control over its territory for a protracted time, is capable of offering its population the whole spectrum of public services, and is seeking international recognition as a sovereign state. Other authors consider the aspiration to get international recognition as the main feature of de facto states (Lynch 2004; McGarry 2004).

2. In another accounting, Florea (2014) tallies 34 de facto states on the world map since 1945.

3. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is another de facto state in Europe but not considered here as it did not form part of the Soviet Union and Russia’s involvement with it is small.

4. At the time of the surveys, Dmitry Medvedev was President and Vladimir Putin was Prime Minister in Russia.

5. For a long time, Georgia blocked Russian participation in this organization. As a result of long negotiations and under US pressure, Georgia agreed to establish international monitoring of goods that cross the Russian-Abkhazian and Russian-South Ossetian boundaries (the de jure Russian-Georgian boundaries) instead of creating its own national customs posts. It is not clear yet who will control the flows crossing the land boundaries of Russia and by what means.

6. Unlike the Crimean separatists, the preference expressed in the wake of the EuroMaidan protests in Kyiv in 2013–2014 by the Transnistrian Government to also join Russia have not yet been accepted by the Putin administration.