Demolition of Chengzhongcun and social mobility of Migrant youth: a case study in Beijing

ABSTRACT

Since the late 1980s, millions of poor and low-income rural migrant workers migrating to Chinese metropolises with their children have congregated in chengzhongcun (villages in the city) for low-cost housing. Drawing on data from a 14-month participant observation in one chengzhongcun in Beijing, we critically explore the potential impact of urban expansion on social mobility of migrant youth. We argue that the uncertainty and chaos connected with looming demolition result in substandard schooling and business closures for migrant parents, leading to the stagnant mobility of migrant youth. Expanding the social hierarchy pyramids, we argue that eliminating chengzhongcun, a space that creates the possibility of climbing the social ladder, hampers the social mobility of migrant youth in the context of the rigid class structure in the late-socialist China. This research re-examines the goals of the demolition of chengzhongcun and advances our understanding by analyzing the prospects of disadvantaged migrant youth during and after the demolition process.

KEYWORDS:

• Social mobility
• Migrant youth
• demolition of chengzhongcun
• social hierarchy triangle
• rural migrant workers

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. To achieve rapid urbanization, city governments in China must requisition land from rural neighborhoods; therefore, cities expand to incorporate nearby villages in the urban fringe. These villages are called “chengzhongcun” (villages in the city). According to the Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China (National People’s Congress 2004), “[l]and in rural areas and suburban areas of cities excluding those belonging to the state prescribed by law belongs to peasants’ collective ownership.” However, in reality, urban development under the ambiguous property rights of chengzhongcun land causes social tensions between city governments and village residents. For more details about policies regarding chengzhongcun, see Buckingham and Chan’s (2018) article, “One City, Two Systems: Chengzhongcun in China’s Urban System.”

2. Housing plots (zhaijidi) are the land “inherited from parents or later allocated to an expanded household for housing” (Buckingham and Chan 2018, 9).

3. These social strata include (from higher to lower), state and government administrators, managers, private business owners, specialized technicians/professionals, clerks, self-employed entrepreneurs and businessmen, business and service industry workers, industrial workers, agricultural laborers, and the rural and urban unemployed and semi-unemployed (Lu 2012).

4. Short-range mobility describes a situation in which individuals achieve small but important increases of socio-economic benefits. In contrast, long-range mobility focuses on sharp rises in one’s status advancement and accumulative drastic changes for social structure.

5. This study assesses the possibility of migrant youth scaling up the socioeconomic ladder through education and/or occupation. Concerning other pathways, Li Forthcoming argues that some rural-hukou individuals, particularly those living in the countryside, obtain higher social status through enlisting in the military or marrying urbanites.

6. “Nail householders” refer to people who refuse to make room for the ongoing demolition.