Can China lead in multilateral environmental negotiations? Internal politics, self-depiction, and China’s contribution in climate change regime and Mekong governance

ABSTRACT

The impacts of China’s intensified efforts to engage in regional and global environmental governance is widely noted and debated. With rapidly increasing economic and political influence, China has been gradually changing its attitude and strategy in negotiations over some of the most challenging cross-border environmental crises. In this paper, we examine two cases of multinational environmental negotiations, where China exhibited leadership potential and efforts, namely the climate change regime and Mekong river governance system. Our analysis focuses both on the leadership activities around institutional, moral, and financial contributions to the governance regime, and on the efforts for China to take up exemplary actions at domestic level. We argue that in both cases, China exhibited both determination and commitment to shape the course and outcome of the negotiations, whilst applying two clearly different strategies. In the case of climate change, China is using its entrepreneur power to facilitate the deals and portray itself as the moral leader of the climate change course, while in the Mekong river case, financial and institutional inputs are the major instruments for Chinese to assume the leadership role. Yet in both cases, China exhibited a notable shift from an un-cooperative and coercive veto power to a more constructive player in the multinational environmental negotiations.

KEYWORDS:

• Climate change
• water management
• leadership
• environmental governance
• transboundary river basin

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. Xinhua News, XI’s Speech on the closing ceremony of 19^th CPC congress party, 2017, available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/27/c_1121867529.htm (in Chinese) (last accessed 1 May 2018).

2. Several Chinese officers expressed such reluctance of being the leader of climate change negotiations, including Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and China’s top climate negotiator Xie Zhenhua. See https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-41510110.

3. Focus discussion group 1, conducted in Beijing in November, 2016.

4. Many interviewees believe China only has the potential to co-lead climate change negotiations with other parties like the UK or the EU.

5. In one of the recent CPC statements, Xi reframed China’s core social conflict, as it is no longer between the low productivity and people’s material needs. Rather, the new core conflict is between the unbalanced and insufficient development, and people’s quest for high-quality life. Such a narrative shift represents CPC’s intention to change the policy paradigm to focus on social and environmental issues apart from economic growth.

6. Interview No. 3, conducted in Beijing in November, 2016.

7. Xinhua News, The Constructive Role that China Played in Paris Climate Summit, 2015, available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-12/04/c_1117363195.htm (in Chinese) (last accessed 1 May 2018).

8. Focus group No. 2, conducted in Beijing in November, 2016.

9. Focus Group 2, conducted in December 2016 in Beijing.

10. BBC, Interview with Xie Zhenhua: China truly incapable of leading global effort in addressing climate change? 2017, Available at: http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-41510110 (in Chinese).

11. Xinhua News, Now it is the time to end the climate scepticism, 2018a, Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-01/21/c_129795558.htm (in Chinese) (last accessed 1 May 2018).

12. State Council, “Climate Change Policy and Action Plan in China,” 2016, available at: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2011-11/22/content_2618563.htm (last accessed 1 May 2018).

13. Interviews No 1, 4, 5, and 9 in November and December, in 2016.

14. Interview No 1, from a former Chinese government officer, in November 2016.

15. Interview no. 13, with officials from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the establishment of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, in May 2017.

16. First Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Lancang-Mekong River Cooperation Held Lancang-Mekong River Cooperation Mechanism Officially 12 November 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1315515.shtml (date accessed).

17. Interview no. 13, in May 2017.

18. Interview no. 14, with scientists who advise Ministry of Water Resources on the management of transboundary water resources, 1 June 2017.

19. China has since 2002 provided the MRC Secretariat with daily water level and rainfall data from two Lancang River hydrological stations at Yunjinghong and Man’wan during the flood season from 15 June-15 October each year. The agreement is renewed in 2008.

20. Mekong River Commission and China boost water data exchange.

21. Interview no. 14, in May 2017.

22. Ibid.

23. Interview No.15, with official from the Ministry of Water Resources, May 2017.