Magical realism: assumptions, evidence and prescriptions in the Ukraine conflict

ABSTRACT

The term “realism” has been invoked often in discussions of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, both to explain what happened and to evaluate potential policy options for the West. This article examines the application of realist international relations theory to the conflict, focusing on two crucial issues. First, before one can apply realist theory to any topic, one must specify what version of the theory one is applying. Whether one adopts “offensive” or “defensive” realism is potentially decisive in determining what policy prescriptions result. If one adopts offensive realism, trying to strike a bargain with Russia makes no sense. If one adopts defensive realism, a deal with Russia is at least theoretically possible. Second, if one adopts defensive realism the key question is whether Russia is a “status quo” or revisionist power. Only if one adopts defensive realism, and if one finds Russia to be a status quo power, does accommodating Russia’s demands follow from realist theory.

KEYWORDS:

• Ukraine
• Russia
• realism
• realpolitik

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. The argument made here is at odds with Alexander Motyl’s (2015) assertion of “realism’s striking irrelevance to the current Ukrainian context.” Realism is highly relevant, but not sufficient by itself to produce useful policy prescriptions.

2. Focusing on the intentions of the states pushes the analysis from the system to the state level. Some see this as ad hoc theorizing that undermines the essential claims of structural realism, while others see this as consistent with structural realism.