Mind the gap: role expectations and perceived performance of the EU in the South Caucasus

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on how the European neighborhood policy is viewed in the three South Caucasus countries (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan). We explore perceptions of the EU’s role in the region and compare these perceptions with the EU’s own role conceptions in the neighborhood. We use role theory as a theoretical framework, within which these perceptions can be analyzed and compared. We scrutinize the partner countries’ perception of the EU as a driver of democratization and modernization, as well as their assessment of the degree to which the EU fulfills the role. Our findings indicate that the EU’s role conception is indeed recognized and accepted by a majority of key actors in the South Caucasian countries. However, in the perceptions of South Caucasus actors the EU’s role as a promoter of democratization and modernization is not mirrored by its role performance, as EU policies do not adequately address the domestic and regional contexts.

KEYWORDS:

• European Neighborhood Policy
• Eastern Partnership
• South Caucasus
• perceptions
• democratization
• modernization

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

List of interviews and focus groups

Armenia

1. NGO representative, Vanadzor, 2015.

2. Member of the Armenian Parliament, Yerevan, 2015

3. Member of the Armenian Government, Yerevan, 2015.

4. NGO representative, Yerevan, 2015.

Azerbaijan

1. Official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baku, 2015.

2. Official, Ministry of Economy, Baku, 2015.

Georgia

1. Chair of a political party (opposition) Tbilisi, 2015.

2. Official, Ministry of Economic Development, Tbilisi, 2015.

3. Member of the Georgian Parliament, Tbilisi, 2015.

Focus groups

1. With representatives of Georgian civil society, Tbilisi, January 2016.

2. With representatives of Armenian business sector, Yerevan, November 2015.

3. With representatives of Azerbaijani civil society, Baku, October 2015.

Notes

1. The main interviews used throughout the text are listed at the end of the article.

2. The Velvet Revolution of 2018 is undoubtedly the most substantial political change in Armenia’s post-Soviet existence. As such, it bears important implications on relations with the EU, not least because of the new congruence between the EU’s and the current Armenian authorities’ reform agenda. However, we do not delve into these implications as we focus on perceptions of the EU rather than relations with the EU per se.

3. Instead, as we argue elsewhere, Armenians expected the EU to increase its involvement in security issues (Delcour and Wolczuk 2018).

4. The current expectations cannot be covered in-depth as part of this article, as additional interviews and focus groups would need to be conducted to ascertain the degree to which Armenian perceptions of the EU have changed.

5. Our findings are corroborated by the surveys conducted among Azerbaijani general public over the past decade, which highlight a growing dissatisfaction with the EU’s involvement in the country. According to the Caucasus Barometer, in 2008 41% of the respondents trusted the EU. Five years later, trust toward the EU decreased to 24% and distrust rose to 27% (Caucasus Barometer 2008, 2013). The percentage of Azerbaijani citizens having a positive image of the EU is not only much weaker than in the two other South Caucasus countries (39% in 2018); it is also decreasing (by 8% as compared to 2017, EUNeighboursEast 2018a). While structural factors (such as the EU’s low visibility in the country, especially outside the capital city) explain the lack of a positive image, the deteriorating trends points to the regime’s ability to shape perceptions of the EU and the diffusion of a negative image of the EU via the state-controlled media.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the European Union under the 7th Framework Programme (grant 613354).