ABSTRACT
Within-firm wage inequality, which individuals face daily, has largely been neglected by the literature on wage inequality. However, it may affect an individual’s incentive to work, resulting in an overall impact on a firm’s operation. This study discusses the effects of within-firm wage inequality on corporate innovation. Using data from Chinese firms listed over the period 2000–2015, we found that (1) within-firm wage inequality promotes innovation, (2) the use of two instrumental variables for our analysis confirms that the chain of causality goes from inequality to innovation, and (3) possible mechanisms are incentivizing managers to increase R&D inputs and using bank loans to finance innovation.
Notes
1. In 2002, state-owned enterprises in China first implemented the “annual salary system” for managers. On May 7, 2002, the “Outline of National Talent Team Construction Plan from 2002–2005” was passed by the Organizational Department of the Central Committee and the “annual salary system” was put into effect in July. The plan’s aim was to “try to implement the annual salary system of the senior management of enterprises”.
2. The policy is “Opinions on further regulating the remuneration of central enterprises’ managers”, which was launched by the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Supervision, Organizational Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, National Audit Office, and State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC).
3. We choose not to report the placebo tests’ results here in order to save space. Readers who are interested in this part can obtain the results by emailing the authors.
4. We are grateful for the referee’s suggestion that long-term loans are channels through which wage gaps could affect corporate innovation. The coefficients of sales growth are insignificant here but do not contradict our previous results. We thank the referee for helping us to clarify this mechanism.