From War to Peace, From Soldiers to Peacebuilders: Interim Stabilisation Measures in Afghanistan and South Sudan

Introduction

In post-conflict settings, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes are increasingly utilised as a programmatic tool to facilitate an ‘enabling environment’ so that peace dividends can accrue. Often targeting members of armed forces or groups and their associated members, DDR takes place where there is a signed peace agreement or in contexts where there is no agreed peace agreement, or where armed conflict remains ongoing. As outlined in the United Nations policy guidelines known as the Integrated DDR Standards, disarmament is the collection, management and/or destruction of arms, while demobilisation is the ‘controlled’ discharge of forces from armed groups in the transition from military to civilian status. In DDR initiatives, reintegration is the long-term process of integrating ex-combatants economically and socially back into communities.

During demobilisation, the release and return of large numbers of ex-combatants into communities with limited economic absorption capacity can result in a deterioration of the security situation. An ‘interim stabilisation measure’ (ISM) establishes a ‘holding pattern’ for armed groups slated for DDR, facilitating a controlled release of ex-combatants back to communities at a rate congruent with a community's economic capacity to reintegrate them. Doing so preserves a command and control structure for ex-combatants that fosters their psycho-social reintegration, allowing DDR candidates to adjust psychologically to the idea of transitioning to civilian life. As such, the goal of an ISM is to facilitate the stabilisation the economic environment as peace dividends accrue by retaining a command and control structure for DDR candidates.

The link between security and development in peacebuilding and recovery efforts is becoming widely recognised. Persons working on peacebuilding efforts continue to seek innovative ways of developing and implementing programmes dovetailing recovery with development initiatives. Failure to do so is often at the expense of peace and may even lead to the resumption of armed conflict if not handled in a context- and conflict-sensitive manner.

This briefing provides an overview of two illustrative examples of how ISMs were used in DDR programmes. The ISM implemented from 2004 to 2006 during the DDR programme in Afghanistan underpins a structural approach that fostered psycho-social reintegration through engaging ex-combatants as de-miners in a civilian capacity. In the structural approach, armed forces or groups remain intact under a command and control structure, as either a military or a civilian force. In Afghanistan, the armed groups deployed against the Taliban were cobbled together into a single military force slated for DDR.

The case for Southern Sudan1 utilised a strategic approach for an ISM. Intended to be operational from 2005 until the 9 July 2011 referendum, the strategic approach known as the Interim DDR Programme targeted special needs groups ahead of regular forces of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Special needs groups consisted of women and children associated with the SPLA, as well as ex-combatants with disabilities and the elderly. By vetting such groups initially, the subsequent phase for DDR would be able to tackle the hard-core fighters, perceived as an acute security threat to the fragile peace. The importance of this approach was in recognising that different phases and approaches to the programme's development and implementation would increase positive impact by targeting specific needs of the various groups involved in the DDR process.

This briefing covers the Southern Sudan and Afghanistan DDR efforts through the lens of the ISMs put in place to effect a smooth transition for ex-combatants into civil society. Discussion of how an ISM is integrated into DDR aims at pointing out the economic and psycho-social benefits that accrue to individuals and communities to which ex-combatants are set to return. Examining the military and civilian aspects of ISMs, the briefing outlines how an ISM can be used for facilitating a smooth transition from a post-conflict situation to recovery and development programming in a peacebuilding environment.

Background to ISMs

The articulation of the need for ISMs occurs in the work of several authors and institutes examining DDR and transitional efforts in post-conflict settings.2 One such study effectively consolidates emerging thinking on ISMs, offering as a broad definition:

measures that may be used to keep former combatants' cohesiveness intact within a military or civilian structure, creating space for a political dialogue and the formation of an environment conducive to social and economic reintegration (Colleta et al 2008: 11).

As such, ISMs provide innovative and quick-impact stability results during the demobilisation phase for DDR and in the time lag that often occurs between demobilisation and reintegration. In the reintegration phase, the command and control structure of armed groups is deliberately disbanded in the interests of securing civilian livelihoods. Complementary to a comprehensive DDR effort, an ISM may be created for the purposes of holding DDR beneficiaries in a military structure until preconditions for related recovery, development and peacebuilding efforts take root.

An ISM can be put in place for a statutory or non-statutory armed force or group, as was the case with the SPLA, or a conglomeration of several armed groups into a single command and control structure of a military character, as was the case with the Afghanistan Military Forces (AMF). As ISM can also take a civilian form, such as a corps of engineers or a working brigade charged with public works projects. In the case of Afghanistan and South Sudan, structural ISMs facilitate DDR planning and operationalisation by increasing the credibility for eligibility and verification of DDR candidates, as well as ensuring that salaries are maintained during the demobilisation and reinsertion phases, when ex-combatants are beginning the process of re-entry into communities.

Interim Stabilisation Measures in Afghanistan: Mine Action and Reintegration

After more than two decades of conflict, Afghanistan is one of the most heavily mined countries in the world. This situation limits capacities for agricultural and related economic recovery, constraining access for humanitarian aid. In collaboration with the government of Afghanistan, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided ex-combatants with the opportunity to contribute to efforts to increase security by becoming involved in demining activities. The risks inherent in demining activities require a regimented approach to team management comparable to a military command and control structure, similar attributes as for an ISM.

The UNDP project was modelled on a community-based approach designed to serve the people of Afghanistan on a long-term basis by providing community-based mine clearance and related activities. Following their demobilisation and release from the armed forces, ex-combatants were trained as deminers and sent back to work in communities. During this period, vocational and livelihoods trainings were provided to assist in their integration back into communities. The net effect was concrete economic, social and psycho-social reintegration benefits that accrued to ex-combatants and community members.

Pilot projects for the Afghanistan DDR started in April 2004. In all instances, communities were consulted about what areas represented high risk due to landmines, including risks of explosions, the impact on security within and between communities and the effect on their livelihoods. The communities identified priority areas for demining. By July 2006, almost 75% of ex-combatants who engaged in mine action were able to obtain the skills required to engage in demining as an interim livelihood option (UNDP 2006). While the benefits of social reintegration were not quantified during the project cycle, monitoring and evaluation missions to communities indicated that they complemented increased economic opportunities. Community consultations in assigning demining priorities facilitated ex-combatants' social acceptance into communities.

Within the Afghan context, demining was an attractive option from a psycho-social perspective as well. It was not uncommon for Afghans to perceive working as a deminer as a legitimate means of contributing to reconstruction and peacebuilding. This had a reinforcing psychological element in that DDR deminers believed they were fighting for the peace and security of their country against a ubiquitous enemy (landmines).3 In this regard, a foreign enemy was supplanted with an internal enemy that was a residual effect of the withdrawal of a foreign power. The preservation of a civilian command and control structure lent itself to psycho-social support mechanisms for Afghan deminers.

A Case for a ‘Holding Pattern’ for Sudan People's Liberation Army

An independent assessment for Britian's Department for International Development in August 2006 of the Interim DDR Programme indicated that Sudan and Southern Sudan were seeking stronger, more efficient and effective armed forces. In the development of a strategic ISM targeting special needs groups, the international community supported a DDR programme that removed women and children from the SPLA. In doing so, the SPLA could allocate more resources towards strengthening its core group of fighters. A post-referendum DDR aims to professionalise the SPLA and targets able-bodied fighting forces. A potential downside of the strategic ISM for the Interim DDR Programme is that the recruitment policy might favour the allocation of financial resources to a bloated military instead of recovery and development efforts.

The post CPA DDR programme in South Sudan will target 180,000 persons over an eight-year period. They will be standing SPLA members and members of other armed groups such as the wildlife and fire brigades. Special needs groups will be targeted in ancillary programmes. Prior to their release and return into communities, all candidates will spend three months in transitional facilities undergoing training for economic reintegration and life skills in order to be eligible for entry into the DDR programme. During their time in transitional centres, a command and control structure will be maintained with salaries paid to ex-combatants following their release.

Although not official policy, DDR planning might include a corps of engineers composed of ex-combatants engaging in public works projects. In this regard, the government has adopted a structural approach for an ISM with both military and civilian characteristics. There were indications as early as 2007 for an ISM, which points towards an understanding of the security risks and the deterrent character that the SPLA represented within South Sudan and vis-à-vis its northern neighbour, as well as the constraints to a comprehensive reintegration effort in South Sudan from economic and social perspectives.

Summary Analysis

Among the difficulties in the post-CPA DDR programme that South Sudan is addressing are the individual and state security concerns associated with a rapid and significant downsizing of the army in an economy with severely limited economic and social reintegration absorption capacity. Civilian institutional capacities, while improving, remain weak, especially at state levels. Fighting in the transitional areas and the limiting of its oil revenue by Sudan might force South Sudan to put austerity measures in place. A delay in the DDR programme might also mean that spending on the military cannot be redirected towards civilian expenditures fostering development and peacebuilding.

The Stockholm Policy Group assessment of December 2010 was critical of the CPA caseload, noting that many individuals passing through the DDR process were not bona fide ex-combatants. The benefits accruing to non-SPLA personnel did not serve the purpose of redirecting funds budgeted for the military for civilian purposes or lead to any appreciable downsizing of the SPLA. In Afghanistan such ‘ghost soldiers’ were taken off the payroll of the military force. In Southern Sudan, their salaries were maintained due to a weak vetting process.

The use of transitional facilities in South Sudan can be viewed as both a structural and a strategic ISM. Structurally, a military command and control mechanism is retained with ongoing training, while DDR candidates are kept in a ‘holding pattern’ waiting for discharge into communities following demobilisation. This is to provide ex-combatants with the economic and social skills needed to reintegrate effectively into civilian livelihoods. Their retention in transition facilities means that they can go through this process with the social network support acquired while in the SPLA. This also provides the time needed to increase economic and social absorption capacity at the community level. This will also lend itself to robust vetting procedures being put in place, ensuring that the individuals entering the programme are in fact bona fide SPLA members.

A civilian corps has great potential to provide ex-combatants with marketable skills through large public work projects. It also provides economic livelihood opportunities that may be lacking for larger numbers of persons integrating back into communities. Integrating ex-combatants with community members in these projects will blend economic and social reintegration, as all parties are benefiting from DDR initiatives. While this is the case, it is unclear whether a civilian corps of engineers will retain its civilian character. The SPLA is not yet squarely under civilian control and currently provides security functions for the state and within the state. In addition, there have yet to be foundational processes whereby a transition of government is achieved through democratic elections. It is yet not known if this will occur. In any case, a security risk to the state exists. Utilising an ISM that maintains the structural links for ex-combatants in the long term in a civilian capacity does not preclude a reversion to a military force outside the control of the state.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

The DDR programmes in Afghanistan and the South Sudan represent a distinct set of dynamics, and an examination of their strategic and structural approaches to ISMs provides a useful basis for comparison They are both governed by a CPA and receive broad international support in peacebuilding efforts, and either ongoing or supplementary efforts are being considered. The ISM that was used in Afghanistan positively impacted DDR, particularly the reintegration process. Complementary benefits were seen in the stabilisation of the security environment, allowing recovery and peacebuilding dividends to be achieved. It is widely recognised that the downsizing of the SPLA will free up considerable financial resources for the state to reallocate towards development objectives.

As a transitional programme in conflict and post-conflict contexts, DDR serves as an ideal entry and integration point for mainstreaming humanitarian, recovery-to-development and related security and peacebuilding efforts. In Afghanistan, institutional capacity development and mainstreaming demining into broader recovery and peacebuilding issues never became fixed in DDR programming at the operational level through an ISM. South Sudan provides an opportunity to better link reintegration for ex-combatants and peacebuilding. In particular, efforts should be made to ensure that current and future efforts integrating DDR and mine action with peacebuilding and recovery – the vanguards of the programme – drive structures and processes for more integrated and responsive national institutions. A transitional vehicle for this in South Sudan could be an ISM corps of engineers.

Afghanistan and South Sudan share security circumstances such that civil and military coordination planning requirements are necessary to achieve programme objectives. In South Sudan, the downsizing and subsequent professionalisation of the SPLA remain within the ambit of military actors, while reintegration of former SPLA personnel resides squarely in the civilian sphere. A structural ISM for the SPLA could include engaging in reinsertion and reintegration training prior to disarmament and demobilisation. Doing so would imply that DDR candidates of the SPLA would be trained in the transitional centres with SPLA colleagues and, if applicable, with their family members.

Deminers in the field have clear reporting lines and methods of working that are not optional; the life of a deminer is dependent upon the actions of another. These are akin to military command and control structures. The case of Afghanistan clearly illustrates how the retention of an interim command and control structure similar to the military through demining activities facilitated economic and psycho-social reintegration for ex-combatants. Mine action enhances reconciliation and community security, and repairs social cohesion. It involves community outreach and consultation, and deminers take considerable risks to their personal safety to ensure land is freed for use in farming and infrastructure development, including schools, clinics and roads. Increasingly, the international community recognises the link between security and development, and views mine action as a development undertaking. DDR and mine action served as a nexus for development in Afghanistan in this regard.

It is also widely recognised by the international community that there is a need to ‘do DDR differently’. As recent models with planned follow-up DDR programmes, both South Sudan and Afghanistan are relevant cases to draw lessons from, but also to apply these lessons to current programme design and implementation. The UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, composed of 22 UN and non-UN entities, is considering policy guidance on ISMs, signifying that the envisaged DDR in South Sudan, as well as the Afghanistan model, are well placed to inform practitioners and policy makers on how to integrate ISMs in DDR programmes. The validation and launching of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations' ‘Second Generation DDR in Peace Operations’4 combined with the groundbreaking work spearheaded by the Folke Bernadotte Academy indicate growing attention to integration of ISM models and approaches into DDR efforts.

The gap in delivery of services between demobilisation and reintegration often exacerbates security problems. ISMs provide an opportunity to revisit DDR through a more nuanced lens recognising constituent components as being complex and non-linear. While ISMs are recognised in literature on DDR, including the Integrated DDR Standards, policy does not often translate into practice. ISMs as a tool allow DDR to take on a true programmatic and transitional approach rather than a panacea to peacebuilding in post-conflict settings. ISMs present an opportunity to ‘do DDR differently’ and practically. The Afghanistan and South Sudan models represent cases for immediate application.

Notes

¹‘Southern Sudan’ is used to denote the pre referendum DDR as governed by the CPA. The independent Republic of South Sudan came into being following the July 9 2011 referendum whereby Sudanese voted for secession from Sudan.

²Other institutions that have added to the volume of research, policy guidance and lessons learned for ISMs include the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Geneva Centre for Security and Policy, the UN's Integrated DDR Standards and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

³The author, serving UNDP/ANBP in the capacity of Deputy Senior Programme Advisor, conducted an interview in Kandahar with a DDR beneficiary who had chosen the demining option. In an effort to determine his economic status, the author asked if the deminer had been accepted back into his community. The deminer replied that he was not concerned with this dynamic as he was continuing the ‘jihad’ for peace against landmines. This is when it was determined qualitatively that Mine Action had a positive psycho-social impact on beneficiaries from DDR.

⁴Commissioned in 2010 by the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Professor Erin McCandless developed a comprehensive set of policy and programme options that can be developed in tandem to DDR efforts to address critical gaps in DDR efforts. The study effectively addresses the facilitation of preconditions necessary for DDR to take place.