Amidst the wide consensus that building peace must be a nationally led endeavour, the notion of infrastructures for peace, or I4P, has arisen to capture the attention of policy and practice communities engaged in peacebuilding, statebuilding and development. That peace requires a robust architecture to sustain is self-evident, and yet the international community has not been quick to support I4P. Traditional approaches to peacebuilding have tended to concentrate on one-off activities and interventions rather than longer-term structures to undergird and sustain peace efforts.
The growing interest in I4P reflects the awareness that contemporary conflicts are increasingly intra-state and spring from deep-rooted causes that often re-emerge if not tackled at their source. Peacebuilding thus requires multi-level and long-term investments targeted at building capacities and structures that can help prevent violent conflicts, manage those that erupt, ensure the implementation of peace agreements, and over time address the structural roots of violent conflict. The I4P concept also comes with the awareness that top-down, externally driven approaches to peacemaking are rarely sustainable, and that there is a need for structural and long-term measures founded on capacities and ownership within the country and its communities.
Many fragile and conflict-affected countries lack adequate capacities and structures to deal with the range of conflicts and security threats that most immediately affect their communities. There is clearly a need to move beyond the formalistic security and rule-of-law approaches long supported by governments and international actors. Viable local and national mechanisms are more likely to advance the prospects for self-sustaining peace by managing conflicts in transformative ways and by helping to build states that are better able address the needs and aspirations of their societies.
This special issue of the Journal is the product of an innovative collaboration between institutions and individuals who have for decades been working in different ways on these issues. Together with JPD and the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, UNDP's Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, PATRIR's Department of Peace Operations, and the International Civil Society Network on Infrastructures for Peace have pooled our resources and networks to broaden and deepen the conceptual and practical debate.
Conceptual Development of I4P
The vibrancy of a new field is reflected in its conceptual development. This is true of peacebuilding, as demonstrated by its embrace of new concepts and the steady expansion of its scope in the last few decades. As successive phases of peacebuilding efforts laid bare the complexity and limitations of achieving sustainable peace in conflict-affected societies, policy makers, practitioners and scholars responded by rethinking earlier assumptions, questioning conventional approaches, learning from experience and offering new ways of conceptualising and supporting peacebuilding.
There is no single definition of I4P or a ready-made architectural model. The concept was originally formulated in the 1980s by a contributor to this issue, John Paul Lederach , and was based on his experiences with local and national peace processes and the use of commissions in peace negotiations. A consummate reflective practitioner, Lederach in 1997 elaborated the idea of I4P as a core ingredient of a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding in his seminal study Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. He saw I4P as one of several core principles entailed in a comprehensive approach to address protracted internal conflicts that embraced an understanding of the dynamic interplay and interdependence between the various levels of society, the need for a greater strategic engagement that links response to immediate and emerging crises, and the commitment to sustainability through locally rooted peacebuilding. He wrote:
I have a rather modest thesis. I believe that the nature and characteristics of contemporary conflict suggest the need for a set of concepts and approaches that go beyond traditional statist diplomacy. Building peace in today's conflicts calls for long-term commitment to establishing an infrastructure across the levels of society, an infrastructure that empowers the resources of reconciliation from within that society and maximises the contribution from outside (1997, xvi).
The ‘modest thesis’ took root and was developed in important ways over the next decade, including by Lederach himself as reflected in his contribution in this issue. Today there are several definitions of I4P that encompass a variable mix of basic principles, institutional modalities and desired outcomes. A widespread view among scholars and practitioners is of I4P as a means to establish institutions appropriate to the national context and needs, although there are some who also see a need for complementary strengthening of institutions and capacities for peacebuilding at regional and global levels. The national and community-based approach often takes into account societal and cultural particularities, while popular mechanisms include peace or mediation committees and forums, with a multi-stakeholder problem-solving approach aimed at dialogue and reconciliation at the local, district and national levels.
Others define I4P more broadly to refer to the building of institutional capacities for peacebuilding, prevention of violent conflict and recovery from post-war violence. For example, in February 2010, representatives of governments, political parties, civil society and United Nations country teams from 14 African countries came together in Naivasha, Kenya, and agreed on a common definition of I4P as a ‘dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in a society’.
This definition seems to have gained traction, although there are continuing debates, informed by evolving practices, about the scope, practical implications and applicability of I4P. At its heart though, I4P focuses on building and on having in place the necessary institutions and capacities to do peacebuilding effectively at all levels.
I4Ps in Practice: Evolution, Modalities and Emerging Evidence
Immediately after the Cold War, several countries emerging from conflict set up a variety of institutions to undergird their peace agreements, which were early manifestations of I4P. The South African model is remembered as an important development of the I4P concept. Concerned by escalating violence, 27 South African parties and institutions signed the National Peace Accord (NPA) in 1991. The peace architecture envisioned in the NPA consisted of a national peace committee with representatives of all the signatories, 11 regional peace committees, 260 local peace committees and a national peace secretariat. Several studies have confirmed the positive impact of South Africa's peace infrastructure in containing violence and preparing the ground for peaceful elections. Kenya and Ghana have also set up multi-structured I4Ps that are producing promising results in tackling various forms of conflict. As Aeneas Chuma and Ozonnia Ojielo state in their article about Kenya in this issue, ‘in districts in North Eastern Province where the NSC [National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management] had established district peace and development committees, there was either no violence or the violence was quickly arrested’.
The contributions in this issue show how different countries have employed various I4P modalities based on their culture, institutional traditions and particular needs. They include:
| • | Peace committees: Often linking national and local institutions, peace committees focus on violence reduction, promoting dialogue, problem solving, community building and reconciliation. They are often designed to capitalise on the skills of respected individuals who can bridge the political divide. Andries Odendaal in this issue describes the important roles of the National Peace Council (NPC) in Ghana as a mediator and facilitator of social cohesion, although he points to the need for role clarity. Odendaal and Sead Alihodžić describe how the NPC mediated a peaceful political transition in the 2008 elections in Ghana after chieftaincy-related conflicts that spawned severe tensions. Chuma and Ojielo illustrate the development of the national peace infrastructure in Kenya, but also highlight how role confusion and the lack of clearly defined mandates brought the National Steering Committee into unnecessary competition with another key peace structure, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission. | ||||
| • | Peace secretariats: The objectives of peace secretariats are to assist the parties in peace negotiations and advance the peace process or the implementation of process results. In her briefing, Ulrike Hopp-Nishanka describes the conditions under which peace secretariats that fulfil useful roles during peace negotiations can help to build a more permanent I4P by coordinating their role with other structures, creating linkages between tracks and contributing to more coherent peacebuilding approaches. | ||||
| • | National peacebuilding platforms or forums: These differ from NPCs in serving as multi-stakeholder mechanisms for consultation and cooperation. In his personal reflection, Lederach explains his reasons for switching from the concept of ‘institutions’ to ‘platforms’, the latter being founded on inclusive and interactive relationships and networks that create spaces for collective action and foster concern for systemic engagement. | ||||
| • | Conflict analysis and early warning and response systems: In the last 20 years, various types of conflict analysis and early warning and response systems have proliferated, often as part of wider I4P. Chuma and Ojielo describe the establishment of the Uwiano Platform for Peace in Kenya, which developed strategies for preventing violence around the referendum in 2010. Uwiano, which can also be considered a ‘platform’, received more than 20,000 text messages during the referendum and conducted 364 interventions in communities, all of which, they argue, ‘contributed significantly in ensuring that not a single case of violence occurred in the country’. | ||||
| • | Insider mediators: A relatively novel concept (albeit a time-honoured traditional practice) is that of ‘insider mediators’, who are increasingly considered essential to establishing trust and strengthening communities' capacities for negotiation and mediation. In their briefing on Nepal, Jeannine Suurmond and Prakash Mani Sharma describe how community mediation is one of the informal mechanisms through which disputes are settled, complementing the formal justice system and traditional justice mechanisms. | ||||
These modalities are often supplemented by government units, new legislation, capacity-building programmes, and peace education and social cohesion policies. Most of these modalities can be found in two important documents on I4P: the National Peace Council Act of 2011 in Ghana and the final version of Kenya's National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management of December 2011.
Location of I4P and Roles of Different Actors
Many would argue that I4P is strongest if situated in and led by the national government. Some would go further in suggesting that specific I4P institutions would be more effective – or have the needed ‘teeth’ – if they are situated in ministries that encompass the police. On the other hand, if the police are not trusted by civil society, this can limit their legitimacy. A key argument of many leading practitioners therefore is that there need to be multiple capacities at different levels of state and/or society. These may develop differently in different countries. Addressing the challenge of coherence, coordination and cumulative impact – how different structures and capabilities work together and can make a genuine impact on peacebuilding and transforming conflict dynamics – is key.
Government infrastructures for peace have at times shown limited political will for extensive consultation and buy-in by stakeholders, particularly when government elites may be benefiting from some aspect of a conflict. Strengthening civil society I4P is also therefore essential. Respected leaders can play pivotal roles in peacebuilding, while I4P can institutionalise and maximise the gains and impacts of their work.
Elections can be divisive in countries with deep social cleavages and fragile institutions. Governments may become partisan and their I4P may be less capable of bridging the divide, becoming instead part of the problem or even paralysed. Experiences in the last 10 years show that I4P can make important contributions towards peaceful elections. Alihodžić points out that the conflictual processes around elections, which naturally bring opposing political views into contention, can tip latent tensions into violence. I4P contributed to more or less peaceful elections or a reduction of violence in South Africa in 1994 and in Kenya and Ghana in 2007 and 2008. Key to its success have been the involvement of the main stakeholders in the peace structure, especially key individuals and ministries/bodies of government with the capacity and leverage to convene high-level meetings and reconcile the main protagonists, and the development of early warning mechanisms that have identified possible early risks of violence and been linked to quick and effective early response mechanisms at different levels, and involving a wide range of critical stakeholders.
A peace infrastructure is unlikely to be effective if it has little or no legitimacy. As Odendaal argues, peace committees at the national level are particularly vulnerable to ‘political headwinds’. Because they must facilitate peacemaking and peacebuilding at the national level, this often denies them sufficient independence from political control. With I4P located within and steered by the government, there is greater likelihood of political or bureaucratic interference than with individuals selected from outside on peacebuilding merit. An independent peace structure may be more flexible and less expensive to run. Odendaal cites as examples the NPC in Ghana, which has its own secretariat, and its Ministry of the Interior, in charge of peacebuilding and security, which has a small peacebuilding support unit. In her briefing on Peru, Giselle Ober describes the dilemmas of developing a state infrastructure for peace, which includes the challenge of coordinating different institutions and engaging civil society actors.
There is wide agreement that while peacebuilding needs to be a nationally driven endeavour, there are also important roles for international actors. The UN is making strong contributions to the concept and practice of I4P as well as developing its own institutional capacity for supporting peacebuilding and peace consolidation. Moreover, peacekeeping and political missions, through overarching strategies and targeted activities, illustrate their awareness that achieving sustained peace and fostering transition – and ultimately exit of international actors – can be done only through nationally owned and driven processes. The UN Development Programme and especially its Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) are the primary UN bodies providing support to the development of I4P. Since 2002, the BCPR, in collaboration with other UN agencies and national partners, has helped more than 30 countries to build resilience by strengthening I4P. In his contribution, Jordan Ryan describes several elements of I4P that the UNDP has helped to sponsor: regular analysis and monitoring of incidents of conflict and violence; early warning and response; institutional capacities for mediation, dialogue and consensus building; institutionalising forums for promoting peace; creating peace committees; and building capacity for collaborative leadership among political leaders and actors.
It is also worth pointing out that the UN has made concerted efforts within its own peace and security architecture to develop I4P at the global level. In 2006, it established the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The architecture operates in accordance with the consensus definition of peacebuilding that was adopted by the Secretary-General's Policy Committee in 2007:
Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development.
This ensures that both the political and technical assistance provided by the PBC and PBF support the building of structures and capacities that lie at the heart of I4P. Regional groupings – the Organisation of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union and especially the African Union, with its Peace and Security Council, Group of Elders, AU mediation roster and continent-wide early warning system – are similarly taking concrete steps to develop their infrastructure.
I4P Moving Forward
These conceptual and practical developments confirm the growing importance of I4P. Yet there are vexing questions that require further examination. Myriad programmes, mechanisms and processes exist to promote inclusive dialogue and non-violent conflict management. Duplication, role confusion and rivalry are rife. What combination of these initiatives and institutions constitutes an I4P? What are the necessary and appropriate modalities for I4P in any given context? Is there a critical mass of initiatives or modalities that is necessary (though not necessarily sufficient) for effective peacebuilding? Might formal institutions like national peace observatories be less effective as part of I4P than rapid-response insider mediators who are trained to defuse conflicts in times of rising tensions?
As Ryan makes clear in his reflective piece, I4P will take different forms ‘consistent with the local context and its dynamics’. Articulating an approach strongly supported by the UNDP, he suggests that supporting the transformation from fragility to resilience requires institutionalising mechanisms and systematically building capabilities to deal with challenges ‘in an inclusive and peaceful manner’. As various authors in this issue argue, such inclusive dialogue is critical to the success of I4P. Other elements likely to contribute to successful I4P are adequate funding and human resources, sustained political commitment by governments and key stakeholders, and extensive public support.
Learning processes are also essential. Developing capacity to extract lessons from experiences within and between countries will be essential to improve the quality, impact and effectiveness of I4P. It is clear from the contributions to this issue that I4P is yielding important results. However, systematic documentation and evaluation of existing modalities and the cumulative experiences in different contexts are needed to assemble a body of sound evidence of what works under different conditions so that these might offer guidance for countries seeking to develop their own I4Ps.
An important question for further research is the potential role of informal LPCs and especially local communities themselves to counter or mitigate fragility or insecurity. Such structures, already operating in many countries, can play a vital role where government is fragile and lacking in legitimacy, and where security institutions are failing or non-existent. They fulfil vital functions in fostering dialogue in divided communities, managing conflict and protecting communities from violence. They often have a working relationship with local government. A key challenge for their effectiveness, however, is their ability to devise and implement agreements that are not vulnerable to polarising tendencies.
The contributions in this issue demonstrate that further critical and collaborative discussions are needed to arrive at a shared concept of I4P. The concept remains broad and fragmented. It encompasses a wide range of efforts and initiatives, but little has been done to create a coherent perception of how the various forms of I4P fit together and how they can be improved. On the other hand, this may be an advantage in that it allows for a more expansive appreciation of the requirements for peace that emerge organically in different contexts. At the very least, the concept of I4P provides a useful framework for understanding the varied structures within a particular society that work together towards what should be shared aims – be they conflict prevention, conflict management or transformation, or reconciliation – and for distilling comparative insights. Most importantly, though, it brings to the integrated field of peacebuilding and development the recognition that we need to identify the institutions and structures that are working on peacebuilding, their capacities, where they operate, with what support and legitimacy, and how effective I4Ps can be developed and strengthened. We hope that this issue is a useful step in that direction.
Visiting Editors:
Paul van Tongeren, Founder of the International Civil Society Network on Infrastructures for Peace
M. Ozonnia Ojielo, Coordinator, Conflict Prevention and Recovery, BCPR, UNDP
Kai Brand-Jacobsen, Director, Department of Peace Operations, PATRIR
And JPD Editors: Erin McCandless and Necla Tschirgi
Related Research Data
