Marange Diamonds and Zimbabwe's Political Transition

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Correction to Briefing, 'Marange Diamonds and Zimbabwe's Political Transition', by Farai Maguwu, Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 8:1: 74–78

Introduction

The signing of the Global Political Agreement on 15 September 2008 was meant to begin a political transition leading to the holding of a credible democratic election in Zimbabwe. President Robert Mugabe of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), who has ruled Zimbabwe since independence from Britain in 1980, had emerged out of both the first-round election and the re-run battered and bruised. He lost the first-round election to Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of his wing of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDCT), whilst the re-run was a one-man race after Morgan Tsvangirai pulled out a week before the election, citing state-sponsored violence against his supporters (Perry 2008). The one-man re-run was declared illegitimate by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union observers (Freedom House 2012)

Militarisation of Marange Diamond Fields

Bankrupt and isolated even from his peers in the SADC and the African Union, Mugabe turned to the Marange diamond fields for political survival. Whilst negotiations for power-sharing were taking place, Mugabe was busy securing control of the Marange diamond fields, estimated to hold between 25% and 30% of the world's diamond deposits (Bickis 2012). In October 2008, Mugabe deployed the Zimbabwe National Army into Marange under an operation codenamed Operation Hakudzokwi (in the Shona language, ‘You will not return’) to drive out artisanal miners and dealers to whom Marange had become the only source of livelihood during a time of hyperinflation, high unemployment, collapse of social services and shortage of basic commodities. From about 100 artisanal miners in June 2006 the number had swelled to over 35,000 in November 2008, including children, women and the elderly.

According to Human Rights Watch, the military takeover appears to have aimed at allowing ‘key army units access to riches at a time when inflation in Zimbabwe was astronomically high and the country teetered on the verge of bankruptcy’; their report added that ‘the plan was for all army units to rotate and take turns to “guard” Marange's diamond fields and take the associated benefits’ (Human Rights Watch 2009).

Although the first diamond-mining concessions were granted in July 2009, several months after the formation of the coalition government, also known as the Inclusive Government, there is no documented role played by the two formations of the Movement for Democratic Change in selecting the investors and negotiating the contracts. The Global Political Agreement was signed on 15 September 2008 but the Inclusive Government was formed in February 2009. President Mugabe and Minister of Mines Obert Mpofu (ZANU-PF) secretly granted special grants to Mbada Diamonds and Canadile Miners in July 2009 (Maguwu 2011).

Whilst it was clear that Marange diamonds had been patronised by ZANU-PF, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai's MDCT formation continued to ask the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) to lift the ban on Marange diamonds, arguing that doing so would improve transparency and accountability. However, two years after the lifting of the embargo, diamond revenues continue to circumvent Treasury (Global Witness 2012). In March 2013 Finance Minister Tendai Biti (MDCT) claimed that the total diamond sales for 2012 amounted to US$800 million but the Treasury received a paltry US$45 million (Mushava 2013). The failure of Minister Biti to access diamond revenues is symptomatic of a dysfunctional government or the powerlessness of the MDCT to effect change in the Inclusive Government.

National Efforts to Address the Situation

The MDCT

The MDCT response to the Marange diamond controversy has lacked coordination, consistency and focus. In October 2010 Bulawayo South Member of Parliament Eddie Cross moved a motion in parliament calling for the diamond mines to be nationalised. He estimated that in 2010 Zimbabwe had been prejudiced of over US$2.7 billion through corruption (Cross 2012). The bill was taken to cabinet, where it didn't pass due to resistance from ZANU-PF ministers (The Zimbabwean 2012).

In 2011 Finance Minister Biti tried to draft a Diamond Control Revenue Bill, a move that would have given him greater control of diamond revenues (Hartmann 2011). More significantly, the move would have nullified all the special grants awarded by President Mugabe to the mining companies in Marange. When ZANU-PF resisted the move, the MDCT backed off.

Also of particular concern is the lackadaisical approach of the MDCT in addressing the diamond issue at the international level. Whilst ZANU-PF has sent big delegations to attend KPCS events for advocacy purposes, no MDCT official has attended KPCS events since Murisi Zvizvai, the then Deputy Mines Minister, attended the June 2009 Intercessional in Namibia. Pro-ZANU-PF institutions such as the President's Office, Attorney General's Office, Affirmative Action Group, Amakhosi Theatre, Resources Exploitation Watch and some less visible entities attend KPCS events to push the ZANU-PF agenda. Thus, at both local and international levels, the MDCT has been less vocal in addressing problems associated with the Marange diamonds. Whilst ZANU-PF has been consistent and vocal in blaming everything on sanctions, MDCT has failed to articulate its position on diamonds.

Parliamentary efforts

The Zimbabwe parliament has a 13-member Portfolio Committee on Mines and Energy which exercises oversight on all mining activities. The committee has powers and privileges to summon government ministers and mining executives to give oral evidence about their activities. In February 2010 the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Mines and Chief Executive Officers of Mbada Diamonds and Canadile Miners refused to appear before the committee, arguing that doing so would compromise their defence, since Canadile Miners had a pending legal case. The officials only attended after receiving summons of parliament and threats of contempt of parliament (Zvoma 2012).

The committee, comprising legislators from the three political parties that constitute the Inclusive Government, was also denied access to Marange on two occasions between 2010 and 2011. Prime Minister Tsvangirai, who also chairs the Council of Ministers, was also barred from visiting families affected by diamond-mining activities in Marange in June 2011 (Newsday, 3 July 2011). Clearance to enter Marange was to be obtained from the Home Affairs Ministry, which is shared by MDCT and ZANU-PF, though executive power lies with the ZANU-PF minister.

While the legislature and the Prime Minister were denied access to Marange, President Mugabe, senior ZANU-PF and military officials and foreign delegations such as the African Diamond Producers Association and various Chinese delegations had unfettered access to Marange. Parliament was only allowed to tour Marange in 2012 but denied access to mine-level data such as weekly and monthly production statistics. Thus parliament has been prevented from playing its oversight role on behalf of the electorate. Diamonds from Marange have become closely associated with political power in Zimbabwe. President Mugabe has shown disregard for other parties in the government or parliament of Zimbabwe on matters pertaining to decision-making, control and ownership re the Marange diamonds. His dominance of the political space in Zimbabwe has translated into total control of Zimbabwe's diamond wealth.

Despite Zimbabwe celebrating the separation of powers on paper, in practice parliament has no independence or power to hold the executive accountable. Parliament also lacks the technical capacity to monitor diamond-mining activities, since Zimbabwe has no history of large-scale diamond-mining. Polarisation in Zimbabwe's body politic also makes it difficult for parliamentarians to consistently speak with one voice demanding transparency and accountability in the diamond sector. Thus Zimbabwe needs external support to complement the role of local actors in promoting transparency and accountability in the diamond sector.

International Efforts to Address the Situation

The role of South Africa

Through the mediation team of President Jacob Zuma, the South African government has played a significant role in negotiating the implementation of the 2008 Global Political Agreement that led to the formation of Zimbabwe's Inclusive Government. However, the position of South Africa in the KPCS with regard to diamonds from Marange appears to contradict its mediation efforts aimed at creating a level playing field for all political actors in Zimbabwe.

South Africa was the leading voice demanding the lifting of the KPCS ban on Marange diamonds. In June 2011, South African Mines Minister Susan Shabangu demanded during a KPCS Intercessional in Kinshasa that the ban be lifted unconditionally, adding, ‘while we acknowledge irregularities, we also believe Zimbabwe is compliant with the minimum requirements’ (Rawoot 2011). Further, while the status of the Marange diamonds was still under discussion in the KPCS, the South African State Diamond Regulator, Linda Makatini, who is a close ally of President Zuma, reportedly purchased diamonds worth US$1 million from Zimbabwe (Rawoot 2011). Being closer to the political situation in Zimbabwe and being a recipient of over three million refugees fleeing poverty in Zimbabwe, South Africa could have done more to promote transparency in Zimbabwe's diamond sector than any other international actor. It is clear that South Africa could have used its power and influence in the KPCS to demand transparency and accountability as a precondition for the lifting of the KPCS ban on Zimbabwe.

The efforts of the KPCS

The KPCS responded to human rights abuses in Marange by sending a fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe in June 2009. The team recommended an immediate ban of Marange exports after noting ‘credible indications of non-compliance’ (Kimberly Process Certification Scheme 2009). During its plenary in November 2009, the KPCS developed a one-year JWP for the implementation of the KPCS minimum standards in Zimbabwe. Although no significant implementation took place, Zimbabwe demanded an end to KPCS monitoring in December 2010, arguing that the JWP was to expire after one year. With full backing from South Africa and the African Diamond Producers Association and employing a combination of divisive tactics and threats of causing a market glut, Zimbabwe pressurised the KPCS to lift the ban in November 2011 and withdraw the KPCS monitoring team in November 2012. Nevertheless, despite the KPCS declaring Marange diamonds ‘conflict free’, the 27-member European Union and the United States have maintained an embargo on diamonds from Marange, arguing that more political reforms are required before they normalise relations with Zimbabwe.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Neither domestic nor international efforts to normalise diamond-mining activities in Zimbabwe have yielded positive results. It is highly unlikely that revenue transparency will improve without nullifying all the existing contracts in Marange. However, the existing contracts cannot be cancelled without the political will to ensure that diamonds are properly accounted for. Nullifying the contracts will mean Mugabe disappointing key allies such as the Zimbabwe National Army and the Republic of China which have stood by him in difficult times. Thus the Marange diamonds controversy is part of the bigger political crisis afflicting Zimbabwe. Rather than trying to attend to the Marange issue as an isolated problem, a broader political transformation leading to the establishment of an accountable, progressive and transparent government is arguably the most feasible way of improving transparency in Zimbabwe's diamond sector.

In that light, three key recommendations are offered. First, there is need for a well-coordinated international support mechanism to enable Zimbabwe to hold a credible general election. The United Nations, African Union and SADC (South Africa in particular) should play a leading role in preparing Zimbabwe for the 2013 general election. Second, in spite of their involvement in Zimbabwe's diamond sector and strong ties with ZANU-PF, India and China must be called upon to support a peaceful, free and fair election in Zimbabwe. Finally, SADC should develop a post-election reconstruction plan for Zimbabwe which include technical support in the governance of the diamond sector.